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Abstract 
 
 
This study analyses the reform of justice in Afghanistan which started 
in the wake of the US-led military intervention of 2001. In particular, it 
focuses on the role of international actors and their interaction with 
local stakeholders. The research addresses a number of issues, relating 
to the way justice system reform is practically carried out in 
Afghanistan. It also highlights some provisional results, together with 
problems and dilemmas encountered in the reform activities. The main 
objective of this study is to evaluate whether the success of justice 
system reform in Afghanistan may be linked to any specific reason, 
feature or approach. 
The research has been conducted under a twofold approach, 
comprising both theoretical and practical phases. The former phase has 
included the analysis of the relevant literature on the topic, drawing 
particular attention on several specific issues of interest (e.g. the 
development cooperation policies currently applied at international 
level, the ‘local ownership’ principle, the justice system in place in 
Afghanistan, etc.). This theoretical phase has been enriched by a period 
of study at the Department of Peace Studies of the University of 
Bradford (UK), and by the organization of the Conference on the Rule 
of Law in Afghanistan in July 2007. On the other hand, the practical 
phase has been characterized by a ‘learning by doing’ methodology, the 
author having served as a consultant to the Italian Development 
Cooperation Office in Kabul (Dec. 2007 – May 2008), working within 
the ‘Italian Justice Programme’. 
This research confirms that justice system reform in Afghanistan may 
succeed only if development programmes are implemented through a 
real multilateral approach, involving domestic authorities and other 
relevant local stakeholders. Success is therefore linked to: limiting the 
political interests of donors (which should abandon the idea of gaining 
‘political dividends’ from their assistance); establishing pooled 
financing mechanisms for the sector reform; restricting the use of 
bilateral projects; improving the efficacy of technical and financial aid; 
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and concentrating the attention on the ‘demand for justice’ at local level 
rather than on the traditional supply of financial and technical 
assistance. 
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Alcibiades: Tell me, Pericles, […] can you explain to me 
what law is? 
Pericles:  Most Certainly. […] When the people, meeting 
together, approve and enact a proposal stating 
what should or should not be done, that is a 
law. […] 
Even the enactments of a despot in power are 
called laws. 
Alcibiades:  And what is violence and lawlessness, 
Pericles? Isn’t it when the stronger party 
compels the weaker to do what he wants by 
using force instead of persuasion? […] Then 
anything that a despot enacts and compels the 
citizens to do instead of persuading them is an 
example of lawlessness? 
Pericles:  I suppose so […]. I retract the statement that 
what a despot enacts otherwise than by 
persuasion is law […]. 
If one party, instead of persuading another, 
compels him to do something, whether by 
enactment or not, this is always violence rather 
than law*. 
 
                                                           
 
 
*  Xenophon, ‘Memoirs of Socrates’, in R. Waterfield and H. Tredennick (eds. 
& trans.), Conversations of Socrates (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 68-216, at 
80-81. 
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1  Introduction: Justice System Reform in Afghanistan 
 
 
 
I suppose it is tempting, if the only 
tool you have is a hammer, to treat 
everything as if it were a nail 
Abraham Maslow1 
 
What is law? This question lies at the very basis of the legal science. 
Since ancient Greece, philosophers and legal theorists have always 
tried to give a  plausible answer, elaborating complex theories on the 
origin and the essence of law. In particular, scholars have attempted to 
answer three further questions: What does it mean to follow a ‘rule’? 
What is the difference between a legal and a moral obligation? More 
importantly: what is the difference between being obliged by force and 
obliged by law?2 There are two Latin sayings that may summarize a 
possible answer to such questions. They are: ubi maior, minor cessat, i.e., 
the weak (minor) capitulates before the strong (maior); and ubi societas, 
ibi ius, i.e., where there is society, there is law. The former phrase refers 
to the autocratic conception of law: law is the rule imposed by the 
mighty, the tangible manifestation of a political order. The latter 
instead mirrors a sociologic conception of law: law is considered to be a 
social phenomenon, a product of the society, a set of norms which 
regulate the life of society, according to its beliefs and cultural 
orientation. The first saying entails a top-down approach in the 
                                                           
 
 
1  American psychologist, founder of humanistic psychology. A.H. Maslow, 
The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 
15-16. 
2  See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 
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formation of law: law descends from the mighty to the society. In the 
second case, law simply emerges from the society as a consequence of 
people’s life. 
And what is ‘state-building’? This concept mainly refers to the 
process that aims at rebuilding the institutions of a weak, post-conflict 
or failing state, undertaken by international actors. In this respect, state-
building always implies some form of external intervention. For 
intervening countries and organizations, this means, in the end, to 
exercise their own influence in the host country’s internal affairs. Any 
kind of intervention entails a form of coercion, even though this may be 
exercised hypothetically without the use of force, for example only 
through the so-called ‘peace-conditionalities’3. 
Therefore, justice system reform in a state-building operation 
implies an external intervention in the host country’s domestic legal 
order, aimed at reshaping justice institutions and the internal system of 
laws. Generally, international actors (the maiores) are able to influence 
the host country’s (the minor) institution-building process on the basis 
of their financial/technical power and appeal. Indeed, in order to 
intervene in the host country’s legal order, international players need a 
mutually-shared reference model. This may be found in human rights 
standards and treaties, but also in the internal administrative 
organization of intervening states. Under this perspective, the 
(re)establishment of the rule of law in countries recovering from 
conflict is largely conceived as a one-way, top-down transfer of 
                                                           
 
 
3  Peace conditionality may be defined as «the use of aid as a lever to persuade 
conflicting parties to make peace, to implement peace accords, and to 
consolidate peace» (G. Frerks, The Use of Peace Conditionalities in Conflict and 
Post-conflict Settings: A Conceptual Framework and a Checklist (The Hague: 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingandel’, October 2006), 
1, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20061000_cru_frerks.pdf. 
See on Afghanistan, J. Goodhand and M. Sedra, ‘Bribes or Bargains? Peace 
Conditionalities and “Post-Conflict” Reconstruction in Afghanistan’, 14(1) 
International Peacekeeping 2007, 41-61. 
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knowledge from ‘civilized’ to ‘fragile’ states4 – a technical problem, 
based on the replication of institutional models deemed universally 
applicable. 
However, institutional changes do not take place in a political, 
legal and social vacuum. There is always an existing set of (maybe non-
statutory) rules and institutions governing the life of local societies (the 
societas), which are the product of the historical, economic, political, 
social and even religious conditions in which people have been living. 
Social organizations always aim at a balance in human relations – 
which is not necessarily conflict-free – as a precondition for an ordered 
course of social life. In this regard, law is the way by which social 
balance is maintained. This bottom-up, social dimension of law and 
justice institutions clashes with the classic ‘dirigiste’ approach to justice 
reform in the above-mentioned state-building operations. As a 
consequence, justice system reform in state-building operations rests on 
a perennial struggle between these two conflicting pressures. Besides, 
the concept of state-building itself is formulated in a contradictory way, 
as, on the one hand, it aims at strengthening state sovereignty, while, 
on the other hand, it inevitably ends up in undermining the autonomy 
of the recipient state from external economic and technical 
dependency5.  
Such a contradictory tendency, which affects justice system 
reform in state-building operations, may be described by combining the 
two Latin sayings, mentioned earlier, into a novel expression: ‘Ubi 
Maior, Ibi Ius’. In English this phrase would sound almost like: ‘only 
                                                           
 
 
4  The term ‘fragile states’ has now gained the momentum in the development 
cooperation literature (see, e.g., the OECD, Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States & Situations (Paris: OECD, April 2007), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf). Besides, the 
expression ‘fragile states’ is prima facie more ‘politically correct’ than ‘failed 
states’, LICUS, ‘countries recovering from conflict’, or ‘developing 
countries’. In addition, it is also more neutral than the others: in fact, it does 
not entail any ‘development’, or ‘recovering’, or temporary failure. 
5  See D. Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building (London: Pluto 
Press, 2006), 26. 
  
 
 
4 
 
the mighty make the law’6. Under this perspective, law is a 
‘superstructure’, which reflects the existing political and social order – 
set up by whoever is able to do it. Besides, «[t]o say that ‘law is a tool of 
the powerful’ is not to embrace or promote cynicism. […] Law is not 
contaminated simply because it is an instrument of power. The degree 
of justice or injustice depends on who wields power and for what 
ends»7. In the context of state-building operations, the linkage between 
justice reform and the achievement of a lasting peace becomes 
fundamental. However, this relationship raises further questions, such 
as: «do these efforts actually provide […] justice and help build a just 
and lasting peace in [these] societies»8? Or are such efforts simply 
aimed at achieving what scholars call ‘liberal peace’9? Are international 
actors mighty enough to impose their own rule of law formula? Do 
local actors have the power and authority to make their own 
orientations and strategies prevail over external organization models? 
Will a compromise between the two instances be successful?  
                                                           
 
 
6  A similar expression has been used in the book of J.E. Stromseth, D. 
Wippman, and R. Brooks, Can Might Make Rights?: Building the Rule of Law 
After Military Interventions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
7  S. Holmes, ‘Lineages of the Rule of Law’, in A. Przeworski, J.M. Maravall 
(eds.), Democracy and the Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 19-61, at 51. 
8  R. Mani, ‘The Rule of Law or the Rule of Might? Restoring Legal Justice in 
the Aftermath of Conflict’, in M. Pugh (ed.), Regeneration of War-Torn Societies 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000), 90-111, at 93. 
9  Liberal peace may be described as a «paradigm that gives priority to the rule 
of law rather than social justice, to quick-fix election rather than political 
accountability, to neoliberal economics rather than state direction (dirigisme) 
to increase purchasing power, and to widening external influences rather 
than strengthening autonomy in the undeveloped world» (M.C. Pugh, N. 
Cooper and J. Goodhand, War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of 
Transformation (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 6). See also M.R. Duffield, 
Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security 
(London: Zed Books, 2001), 9. 
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All these questions assume a new and fundamental significance 
with the intervention in Afghanistan, born on the ashes of 
multilateralism and moulded since the beginning by strong ideological 
features. Indeed, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, with the 
beginning of the War on Terror, the liberal peace theories reached their 
apex. The international community was believed to speak with only 
one voice: that of the US. The development cooperation policies 
themselves changed, rerouting humanitarian assistance towards the 
achievement of political goals. More importantly, in the initial 
expectations of the US government, both military interventions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan should have lasted a few months and should have 
been followed by a quick reconstruction, which would have helped in 
exporting liberal democracy and values in ‘freed’ countries. 
Accordingly, the reform of domestic legal and judicial systems would 
have been accepted by the local population, as a sign that the ‘victor’s 
justice’ was globally applicable.  
However, things have gone differently. The progressive failure 
of both military expeditions in establishing order after conflict (and in 
the case of Afghanistan, basically in winning the war) has led to a 
‘reawakening of consciousness’ within the international community. 
This impasse has also affected the US political credibility on the global 
stage, resulting in an increasing rivalry among the other intervening 
powers. In Afghanistan, such a competition has in turn impeded the 
formation of a common strategic vision for the end of the conflict and 
undermined the foundations of this interventionist approach. ‘Exit 
strategy’ is a phrase which is now being rather recurrent in the US and 
international political debate. In addition, the economic crisis that the 
world is facing in fall 2008 is wiping out the last financial and economic 
certainties of liberal democracies. The scientific and political 
community is now searching for alternative models of development. 
That in Afghanistan is therefore something more than a mere 
justice system reform carried out in the framework of a state-building 
intervention. In particular, it occurs in the twilight of the idea that 
values, principles and institutions sustaining the Western concept of 
‘liberal justice’ may be successfully exported to war-torn societies. 
Indeed, the limited results accomplished so far in the reform itself and 
the worsening of the security conditions have progressively led to a 
change of approach, which has shifted from an orientation focused on 
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pre-established organizational models towards a mixed operational 
concept based on pragmatic political compromises and the formal 
involvement of national authorities in the reconstruction process. Such 
a change of course has been rather visible in the reform of governance 
mechanisms. In 2002 the security sector reform in Afghanistan was 
divided between ‘lead nations’, each one being in charge of managing 
the reconstruction activities within a single sector of responsibility (the 
‘lead nation approach’). Italy was entrusted with the reform of justice. 
However, this mostly unilateral approach waned in 2006, when the 
whole policy-making framework in charge of reforms was reshaped 
comprehensively and aligned with the templates set by major 
International Financial Institutions for countries emerging from 
conflict. Since then, justice system reform has been carried out under a 
more inclusive approach, generating a mixed international-national 
governance regime. Eventually, this local ownership consolidating 
process has recently led to the adoption of a development strategy for 
justice sector (National Justice Sector Strategy) by the Afghan 
government, to be implemented through a National Justice 
Programme. The latter’s key feature is the use of an integrated funding 
structure to finance justice system reform, through the creation of a 
dedicated project, which is run jointly by the Afghan justice 
institutions. Such a project is funded by several donors through a trust 
fund, administered by the World Bank. In short, donors would grant 
the required financial assistance and monitor the status of activities, the 
World Bank would provide the technical expertise, and the local 
authorities would manage the project autonomously. However doubts 
remain on the success of this initiative. Will justice system reform be 
really successful, or will this change of approach be only a desperate 
attempt to make Western-oriented development policies bite? 
In this context, the thesis analyses the post-2001 justice system 
reform in Afghanistan, focusing, in particular, on the role of 
international actors. I will first discuss some methodological aspects of 
this thesis, attempting to highlight the scientific significance of this 
research and explaining the reasons that led me to choose the topic of 
this study (Chapter Two). I will then illustrate the major changes that 
occurred after the September 11 attacks in development cooperation 
policies. To this aim, I will also analyse strategies and frameworks used 
at international level to foster the development of ‘fragile states’. I will 
  
 
 
7 
 
also describe the rising of the ‘local ownership’ principle in 
development cooperation policies and how this theory is practically 
implemented through the establishment of joint ‘consultative’ and 
working groups (Chapter Three). In Chapter Four, I will explore state-
building theories and methods, as applied to justice system reform in 
post-conflict scenarios. I will first consider imposed and consensual 
solutions, namely the ‘dirigiste’ and the consent-based approach. In 
addition, I will also look at the need to settle the domestic political 
order before providing to legal or judicial reforms. In the third section I 
will illustrate the reasons for choosing a model of reform based on 
internal consensus and how to successfully rely on it, by considering 
the local ‘demand for justice’. I will then briefly examine the issue of 
transitional justice in post-conflict situations, extending the analysis to 
Afghanistan. In the last paragraph, I will list some common 
characteristics of state-building operations dealing with justice system 
reform, and make a comparison with the current state of affairs in 
Afghanistan. 
The following chapter (Chapter Five) will open with a 
description of the Afghan justice system’s development in the recent 
history. I will first examine the most relevant principles of Islamic law, 
which are of interest for this study. In the subsequent section I will 
focus on the influence of Islamic law over the Afghan justice system in 
the years prior to the US-led military intervention, starting from the 
reforms undertaken in the twenties. A paragraph will be dedicated to 
the justice system in place during the Taliban domination. In the 
subsequent two sections I will study the evolution of the Afghan legal 
and judicial systems from the sixties to 2001. Chapter Six, will contain a 
detailed analysis of the Afghan justice system currently in force and the 
first phase of reform activities, going from the beginning of the 
international intervention to the opening of the London Conference on 
Afghanistan in 2006. Initially, I will concentrate on the study of 
institutional changes undertaken in the aftermath of the Bonn 
Agreement, also examining the Italian leadership in justice sector 
reform. I will then focus on the adoption of the 2004 Constitution and 
the reorganization of the domestic legal and court system. Specifically, I 
will divide this issue into four sub-paragraphs, concerning the 
organization of courts, the applicable law, the legal training/capacity-
building activities, and the reconstruction of judicial infrastructure. The 
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last paragraph will be dedicated to a preliminary assessment of justice 
reform during the first phase of reconstruction. 
In the last chapter before the conclusion (Chapter Seven), I will 
discuss the second phase of justice system reform, going from the 
London Conference to date. This phase is characterized by a rather 
more inclusive approach to reconstruction activities, with a wider 
participation of the Afghan authorities to the decisional process. The 
first paragraph will illustrate the evolution of the institutional scenario 
in Afghanistan starting from the London Conference to the Rome 
Conference of 2007. A further section will be dedicated to present some 
data and figures reflecting the status of justice before the opening of the 
Rome Conference. I will then delineate the developments which 
occurred since mid-2007 to date, also focusing on the analysis of both 
the National Justice Sector Strategy and the National Justice 
Programme. The subsequent paragraph will concern the study of the 
initiatives undertaken during this second phase of reconstruction. It 
will include sub-sections on the new counter-narcotics law, the training 
and capacity building activities, and the restoration of the judicial 
infrastructure, with special reference to the establishment of the 
National Legal Training Center. Furthermore, I will address the role of 
the US in justice sector reform, also providing data and figures. In the 
conclusive paragraph, I will make a second assessment of justice 
reform, centred on the real implementation of the ‘local ownership’ 
principle. In doing so, I will also attempt to give a practitioner's view of 
the ongoing activities, based on my service for the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Rome and Kabul. 
In the conclusive chapter (Chapter Eight) I will outline some 
general conclusions as regards the effectiveness and efficacy of the 
state-building intervention in Afghanistan, concentrating the 
assessment on the reform of justice. Ultimately, I will list a number of 
recommendations, descending from this study, which could be of help 
for a successful reform of the Afghan justice system. 
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2  Objectives and Methodology 
 
 
 
Law is the pendulum of human society, regulating its 
action and mechanism. Just as a pendulum sometimes 
runs behind or ahead of time, so law occasionally leads 
or lags behind prevailing climates of opinion. When its 
pendulum breaks down completely a clock becomes 
functionally useless. […] [S]imilarly, […] [w]hen [the 
system of laws] is no longer in harmony with the 
communities that it governs, […] it may render justice 
ineptly and inefficiently. In the worst scenario law may 
give refuge and expression to the darkest, and most 
malign, forces in the human character10. 
 
The topic of this thesis has been chosen for a number of reasons. First, 
in my opinion, there are some background issues which make this 
research rather interesting and innovative. I have always been 
fascinated by the contradictions and dilemmas that peace-builders (or 
state-builders11) have to face when reforming state institutions in war-
torn countries. In particular, I have often focused my attention on the 
dichotomous approach between either the transplant of external 
institutional and administrative models in countries recovering from 
conflict (i.e., the ‘neo-colonial’ or ‘dirigiste’ approach), or the simple 
restoration and/or reform of existing state institutions according to a 
                                                           
 
 
10  H. Ross, Law as a Social Institution (Oxford/Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 
2001), 1. 
11  In my opinion, the distinction between the concepts of peacekeeping, peace-
building, state-building, etc. is extremely vague. In fact, currently, 
distinguishing among these operations is of limited operational value, given 
the evolution of peace operations doctrine towards a holistic and integrated 
approach. As a consequence, I deem all these terms as interchangeable. 
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new ‘social contract’, signed at the end of hostilities (i.e., the consent-
based approach). Although these two theoretical approaches exhaust 
the issue at the strategic level (and this is why I refer to a dichotomy), 
they are not separated by a clear demarcation line, nor are they 
mutually-exclusive at the operational level. Indeed, operationally, state-
building interventions usually see a joint application of both these 
orientations, so that it is basically impossible to label a mission either as 
‘neo-colonialist’ or consent-based, in operational terms. As a 
consequence, in order to assess a state-building mission, it becomes 
fundamental to study in-depth the decisional mechanisms standing at 
the very basis of reform activities. In fact, in the face of each and every 
choice in the course of reform activities, international and local actors 
are forced to take a decision according to one of these two approaches. 
In other words, to be scientifically valuable, a research should examine 
who exactly, and even de facto, runs the state-building process, through 
what decisional apparatus, where problems possibly lie and how such 
problems may be addressed, when the state-building process will be 
over, and last but not least, why the latter initiated and under which 
approach. 
It is obvious that the magnitude of such a task makes the topic 
unfit for any doctoral research. Therefore, it has been necessary to limit 
the objective of research to the reform of a single institutional sector. In 
this respect, I have opted for the justice system12 for several reasons. 
First because of my educational background, as I am a law graduate. 
Secondly, I am convinced that law itself may be successfully used as a 
subject of analysis and assessment. Clearly, the mere study of new laws 
                                                           
 
 
12  In English, this term is basically quite unspecific and vague. It describes one 
or all of the various components of the law-related state institutions, 
including the judiciary, the prosecution service, the bar, the police service, 
and the prisons. However, this study pays less attention to the status of the 
legal profession, the police, and the corrections in Afghanistan and mainly 
focuses on the court system and the prosecution service. Conversely, to the 
aims of this study, the term ‘justice system’ also encompasses the legal 
system, intended as the system of laws and other norms officially in force in 
the country.  
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and regulations, together with the introduction of a new court system, 
would be only descriptive. On the other hand, investigating the reasons 
at the basis of legal reforms, explaining how the latter have been 
decided, according to which interests, under which logic, what 
consequences they generate and what the expected short and medium-
term impact of reforms is, would entail a true analysis.  
In other words, I believe that the study of laws, norms, 
prescriptions and decision-making frameworks may be studied from 
an analytic perspective. This may be true for the reform of any 
institutional sector, as any novel organization system is settled through 
the enactment of new laws and regulations. For example, even the 
restoration and development of the agricultural sector passes through 
the adoption of new norms. However, with the reform of justice we go 
to the heart of the normative dilemma. Analysing the reform of the 
legal (including the constitutional) and judicial system entails 
investigating the instruments and mechanisms through which a new 
political entity manifests its power and authority over the society it is 
supposed to govern. Choosing between the ‘dirigiste’ or the ‘consent-
based’ approach in founding a new legal order implies a decision 
between the autocratic or sociologic origin of law, which is the 
fundamental and irresolvable issue at the basis of the general theory of 
law. This happens every time an international consultant or a local civil 
servant drafts a policy document or a new statute. For a legal scholar, 
as I am, this sounds like a miracle – the most exiting discovery ever. 
Although only for a moment and within certain limits, that consultant 
or civil servant cuts the Gordian knot and reveals the true nature of 
law: in that moment he/she is a Leviathan or a simple citizen-
consociated. Having been involved in the legal reform in Kabul, this 
dilemma has been rather recurrent in my mind. 
However, there are also other reasons why the reform of justice 
in state-building interventions may be deemed so significant. Being a 
social phenomenon, law is typically a product of society. Law 
characterizes the society which it applies to, and vice-versa. Law 
focuses on the society’s common interest, which is established 
according to the society’s values and purposes. Moreover, law unifies 
the social and the individual consciousness, namely the public and 
private mind, under a single explicative theory. Above all, «law 
presupposes a society whose structures and systems make possible the 
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mutual conditioning of the public mind and the private mind, and the 
mutual conditioning of the legal and the non legal»13. In this regard, 
modifying the legal and court system in a country recovering from 
conflict, and making the new justice system acceptable for the local 
population means, to some extent, inducing profound changes in the 
local society. On the other hand, the acceptance of a large-scale justice 
system reform entails that the local society is probably already 
changed. This makes the adoption of the right approach particularly 
important for the success of reforms. 
Several other reasons have induced me to take Afghanistan as a 
case study. Among these are: the major change in the concept of 
humanitarian action which occurred in the wake of the September 11 
attacks and its immediate application to the state-building intervention 
in Afghanistan; the profound ideological basis of such intervention, 
matured in the context of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT); the 
magnitude of the commitment undertaken by the international 
community; and the challenge of reforming public institutions by 
introducing Western-oriented legal and administrative models into an 
Islamic, war-torn, atomized society, traditionally refractory to any 
political and institutional change. 
Specifically, as I will show in the third chapter, at international 
level, development cooperation policies and procedures have radically 
changed since the beginning of the civil and military intervention in 
Afghanistan. Changes were initially based on the idea that 
humanitarian action should be openly aimed at achieving political 
goals. It is easy to imagine that this has happened, at first, as a result of 
the unanimous international political response to the 9/11 attacks. The 
‘politicization’ of development assistance presupposes a final political 
goal which is mutually-shared by the community of national and 
international stakeholders participating in the country’s reconstruction. 
The substantial failure of the reconstruction process in Afghanistan 
could prove that such a political end-state was absent, probably from 
                                                           
 
 
13  P. Allot, ‘The Concept of International Law’, 10(1) European Journal of 
International Law 1999, 31-50, at 32. 
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the beginning. Possibly, such a ‘common’ approach was nothing but 
the product of an ideological representation of reality – just like the 
GWOT itself14 – which has led the US and its allies to foresee the 
establishment of ‘democratic’ and Western-oriented state institutions as 
a panacea to tackle situations of political instability. 
Moreover, while the state-building doctrine has been extensively 
used during peace support operations in the nineties, none of those 
operations have concerned a war-torn country bigger than France15, 
whose central government has never really extended its authority over 
a third (at least) of the territory. The complexity of the mission also 
reverberates in the number of tasks to be accomplished – political, 
military, civilian, and humanitarian – and in the large number of 
national and international stakeholders concerned in the reconstruction 
process. Ultimately, there is the ‘clash of civilizations’16 issue. Of course, 
it is extremely interesting to study the dilemmas, contradictions, results 
and failures encountered in reforming a justice system dominated by 
Islamic law and traditional justice resolution mechanisms, trying to 
transplant Western-oriented, technocratic legal and administrative 
models into the country and adapt such models to local conditions. 
In this context, I believe that the scientific significance of 
assessing justice system reform in Afghanistan is indisputable. 
However, my expectations in 2005, at the beginning of this research, 
were not optimistic. Too many factors were conditioning the success of 
legal and judicial reforms. In particular, apart from independent 
variables such as the security and the difficult socio-economic 
environment, my concerns were focused, in particular, on the 
ideological portrait of the situation on field, with the intervening 
                                                           
 
 
14  I have considered the issue in M. Tondini, ‘Beyond the Law of the Enemy: 
Recovering from the Failures of the Global War on Terrorism Through 
(Criminal) Law’, 5 Processi Storici e Politiche di Pace/Historical Processes and 
Peace Politics 2008 (forthcoming). 
15  France extends for 551,500 km²; Afghanistan for 652,090 km². 
16  From the famous Samuel P. Huntington’s book, The Clash of Civilizations 
and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
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powers convinced that the Afghan population would have followed the 
institutional reforms, driven by a kind of ‘democratic instinct’ towards 
the adoption of Western legal and administrative models. In my 
opinion, this simplistic assumption would have made the entire 
intervention rest on false premises. Another issue was the limits of the 
‘lead nation approach’17 in addressing an immense commitment such as 
the reform of justice in a big country like Afghanistan. Given the ‘size’ 
of this undertaking, such top-down approach would have probably 
failed. However, during the period spent in Kabul, I did not pay so 
much attention in verifying these initial hypotheses, since I realized 
that by 2007 their truthfulness was already evident to any scholar or 
practitioner. In addition, at that time, just after the Rome Conference, 
aid architecture had already evolved under a more inclusive 
orientation, leaving the ‘lead nation approach’ behind. Conversely, I 
focused on other conditioning factors, such as the short-term political 
and economic objectives of donors, the effective participation of local 
stakeholders to the decisional process, and the way financial resources 
are made available and funds disbursed. Comments are included in the 
conclusion. 
Research has been conducted under a two-stage approach: 
theoretical and practical. The theoretical phase lasted up until 
November 2007 and has seen, inter alia, the study of: the justice system 
previously and currently in place in Afghanistan, the development 
cooperation policies and guidelines followed by international and 
national authorities, and the bodies that compose the policy-making 
structure which governs legal and judicial reforms. As a preliminary 
research, I have also analysed state-building theories and methods as 
applied to justice system reform in previous post-conflict operations. 
This was necessary to be able to make comparisons with the same kind 
of reforms undertaken in Afghanistan. In addition, I have had to study 
some key issues of Islamic law, since the latter has deeply influenced 
the Afghan legal culture. Indispensable has been also to examine 
policies and guidelines set up by the World Bank, the IMF and the 
OECD for countries recovering from conflict, since the aid architecture 
                                                           
 
 
17  See Chapter 6. 
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in Afghanistan was shaped according to such policy documents. 
Ultimately, I have become familiar with the ‘local ownership’ concept 
and with the other modern development cooperation principles, as 
these terms are rather recurring in the dedicated literature. In practice, 
it has been essential to merge typical legal studies (e.g., the analysis of 
the legal and court system) with the study of development cooperation 
policies, and the analysis of some relevant figures and data. 
During this phase of activities I spent three months as a visiting 
student at the Department of Peace Studies – University of Bradford 
(UK), under the supervision of Prof. Michael Pugh (September-
December 2006). I further served as a consultant to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs for the organization of the Conference on the Rule of 
Law in Afghanistan, held in Rome on 2-3 July 2007. In addition, I gave 
presentations and lectures, both in Italy and abroad, and published 
three articles focusing on the topic (a fourth article has been recently 
submitted to an international journal). 
The practical phase of my research has been characterized by a 
‘learning by doing’ methodology. From December 2007 to May 2008 I 
served as a consultant for the Italian Development Cooperation Office 
in Kabul (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), working as a policy analyst 
within the ‘Italian Justice Programme’. My service in Kabul has been 
extremely valuable in gaining crucial insights into how the reform of 
justice in Afghanistan is currently being conducted and how the 
theoretical issues previously studied are actually dealt with in practice. 
While some aspects of my job in Kabul are not in the public domain 
and cannot be mentioned or discussed in this thesis, due to my duties 
of confidentiality as a civil servant, there are many issues that are not 
confidential but that only a practitioner may perceive. In this respect, 
my experience in Kabul has been indispensable for the success of this 
research. 
The main research questions of this study are: 
i)  How has justice system reform been practically carried out in 
Afghanistan? 
ii)  Does it present the same characteristics of reforms undertaken in 
previous state-building missions or does it own specific features? 
iii)  What are its provisional results? 
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iv)  What are the problems and dilemmas encountered during 
reform activities, and what is the origin of such issues? 
v)  Is the success of justice system reform in Afghanistan linked to 
any specific reason, feature, or approach? 
Answers to these questions will be given throughout the thesis, 
especially in the last paragraphs of Chapters Six and Seven and in the 
conclusion. As for now, it may be said that justice system reform in 
Afghanistan has been implemented, at the strategic level, under both 
the ‘dirigiste’ and the consent-based approach, thus confirming the 
trend that emerged in previous state-building missions. A first part of 
reform activities was carried out according to a pure ‘dirigiste’, top-
down approach. Conversely, a second phase, which started 
approximately in 2006, has seen a change of course towards a more 
inclusive strategy, involving a growing number of local stakeholders. 
Generally, the application at the operational level of general policies 
and guidelines set up by International Financial Institutions proves that 
justice system reform in Afghanistan has followed pre-established 
models and conformed to other contemporary state-building 
operations. Besides, the adoption of a rather strict top-down approach 
in the first phase of activities could be considered as an evolution of the 
‘benevolent despotism’18 of international actors, experimented during 
the previous territorial administrations of the nineties, when 
international authorities were running quasi-state administrative 
apparatus in Bosnia, East Slavonija, East Timor and Kosovo. This 
would also confirm that the reform of justice in Afghanistan followed 
the existing development patterns at the time of its establishment in 
2001. In this context, the ‘light footprint approach’19, officially adopted 
by the international community in Afghanistan in 2002 could be 
considered as a mere necessity imposed by the magnitude of the 
undertaking, rather than a genuine evolution in the overall approach to 
                                                           
 
 
18  See J.C. Beauvais, ‘Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.N. State-Building 
in East Timor’, 33(4) New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 2001, 1101-1178. 
19  See para. 3.1. 
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state-building. Such a major change has only occurred with the 
evolution of development cooperation policies at international level, 
marked by the 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonization and the 2005 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness20, and the integration of such 
principles (and above all the ‘local ownership’ principle21) in the current 
state-building agenda. 
On the other hand, justice system reform in Afghanistan presents 
unique characteristics due to the socio-economic environment in which 
it takes place: a traditional Islamic society, mainly administered by 
council of elders rather than the state, and reluctant to any social or 
political change. Another element of discontinuity with previous and 
contemporary state-building missions is the situation of armed conflict, 
which is still ongoing. The latter affects the solidity of the internal 
political order, the establishment of a transitional justice phase, and 
thus the effectiveness of any successful legal and judicial reform. That 
in Afghanistan is not a post-conflict but an in-conflict justice reform. 
However, leaving the establishment of a solid political order behind the 
reform of justice practically reverses the theory of rule of law as the 
product of a social contract22, thus undermining the foundation of the 
same liberal-democratic values that current justice reform aims at 
diffusing in the country. This basic contradiction has further 
conditioned the establishment of a common reform strategy, which is 
frequently invoked in literature and official documents. However, is it 
really possible to set up a common strategy for justice sector reform in 
the absence of steady and credible local and international political 
authorities? In this respect, that in Afghanistan is a sui generis justice 
system reform, including elements of colonialism – such as the 
extensive use of the military apparatus in the reforms, the strong 
political pressure exercised by external actors on the local government, 
the latter’s lack of sovereignty, its dependency from foreign technical 
and financial resources – and local ownership – such as the adoption of 
                                                           
 
 
20  See para. 3.2. 
21  See para. 3.3. 
22  See para. 4.1. 
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inclusive development policies, the involvement of local authorities at 
all levels in the decisional process, and the formal adoption of each and 
every decision concerning justice sector reform solely by the Afghan 
government. In the end, I believe that this situation only reflects a 
provisional status quo and that such a hybrid model will soon evolve. 
Unfortunately, at this stage of activities, it is difficult to predict the final 
outcome of this process. 
  
 
 
19 
 
3  Reforming Public Institutions in Countries 
 Recovering from Conflict: A Brief Overview 
 
 
 
3.1 A New Approach to Institutional Reforms in the 
Aftermath of 9/11 
In future studies, that in Afghanistan will probably be regarded as one 
of the most significant state-building interventions undertaken by the 
international community under a novel approach. This new trend 
reflects a large-scale change in the concept of humanitarian action, 
which becomes increasingly professionalized and rationalized, as well 
as openly aimed at achieving political goals23. 
The first signs of such evolution in the development aid agenda 
started in early ‘nineties, as a consequence of the resurgence of 
cosmopolitan idealism in the US foreign policy. The post cold-war era 
had left behind any form of dialectic confrontation between distinct 
ideas on global development. Mankind’s ideological evolution was 
believed to be at its end point, with the victory of the of western liberal 
democracy over any other possible political philosophy24. The 
resumption of ‘state-building’25 (or ‘nation-building’ in American 
                                                           
 
 
23  For an analysis see M. Barnett, ‘Humanitarianism Transformed’, 3(4) 
Perspectives on Politics 2005, 723-740. 
24  F. Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’, The National Interest (Summer 1989), 3-
35, at 4. This thesis was lately developed by Fukuyama in the famous The 
End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992). 
25  ‘Nation-building’ was a concept widely used in the fifties and sixties, in the 
context of the East-West confrontation. In particular it constituted a western 
strategy for containing socialism and the expansion of Soviet Union in the 
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literature26) doctrine followed the universalization of this theory, which 
was mostly implemented as a one-way, top-down transfer of 
knowledge from ‘civilized’ countries to weak states or countries 
recovering from conflict. Generally, the whole process was conceived 
as a path towards the formation of a legal and political civitas maxima – 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
third world. Indeed, the term ‘nation-building’ almost disappeared from the 
political debate during the seventies, along with the US defeat in Vietnam. 
However, the rationale of past state-building operations clearly resembles 
that of current interventions. According to Hippler, during the sixties,  
«(e)conomic development was perceived to imply a market economy, and 
political development a nation-state. Political development as a component 
of or prerequisite for economic development was thus regarded above all as 
a nation-building process. The two together, that is accomplishment of the 
market mechanism and the nation-state, were regarded as being closely 
linked and as ‘modernisation’» 
(J. Hippler, ‘Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and Nation-building – 
Terminology and Political Concepts’, in J. Hippler (ed.), Nation-Building – A 
Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation? (London: Pluto Press 2005), 
3-14, at 5). 
26  Scholars are inclined to distinguish between the two concepts. In this 
respect, they define State-building as the «actions undertaken by 
international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the 
institutions of the state which may or may not contribute to peacebuilding». 
On the contrary, Nation-building mostly focuses at forging a sense of 
identity and nationhood. It may be described as the «actions undertaken, 
usually by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood, usually 
in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian, or communal differences; usually to 
counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty; and usually to mobilize a 
population behind a parallel state-building project» (C.T. Call and E.M. 
Cousens, Ending Wars and Building Peace: Coping With Crisis (New York: IPA, 
Working Paper, March 2007), 3, 
http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/151/CWC_Working_Paper_ENDIN
G_WARS_CCEC.pdf). According to Fukuyama, nation-building may be 
divided into three different aspects or phases: 1) post-conflict reconstruction; 
2) creation of self-sustaining state institutions; and 3) strengthening of state 
institutions (F. Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 
21st Century (New York: Cornell University Press), 100-101). 
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a concept which entails a single universal state, law and morality 27. This 
process entailed «an ideology of world order that reflect[ed] and 
legitimize[ed] neoliberal values, state-centrism and the economic 
structure of the international system [, as a] part and parcel of a 
globalized ‘liberal peace’»28. 
On the other hand, this scenario was naturally nothing but an 
ideological representation of reality. This resulted pretty evident with 
the poor outcomes of most interventions undertaken either by a 
number of different international actors under the UN political 
umbrella or by the UN itself by means of international territorial 
administrations29. In Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, 
the powers assumed by external actors were so extensive that the status 
of the administered territories resembled that of a protectorate or a 
trusteeship administration30. The authority vested by international 
administrators encompassed, inter alia, «the creation and enforcement 
of new legal systems; the management and rebuilding of the local 
                                                           
 
 
27  See D. Zolo, I signori della pace: Una critica del globalismo giuridico (Carocci: 
Rome, 1998), 137. 
28  M. Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and IR Theory: Phantom of the Opera?’, 10(4) 
International Peacekeeping 2003, 104-112, at 110-111. 
29  Among the latest contributions on the issue of international administration 
of territories, see gen. C. Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial 
Administration: From Versailles to Iraq and Beyond (New York/Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). According to Stahn, the success of 
international administrations as a tool for state-building is difficult to assess. 
Though to some extent they have made «a lasting contribution to the 
development of pluralist and democratic structures of society», their major 
achievements have been hampered by «repeated drawbacks, such returns to 
violence […] or the strengthening of radical political forces in elections» 
(ibid., at 404-405). See also gen. R. Caplan, International Governence of War-
Torn Territories (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
30  See gen. R. Wilde, International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and 
the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008). See also R. Paris, ‘Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global 
Culture’, 9(3) European Journal of International Relations 2003, 441-473, at 456. 
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economies; the appointment and dismissal of officials; the 
reconstruction and operation of public utilities; the establishment of 
effective customs and police services; and, not least, the provision of 
public security»31. The UN ‘peace-building’32 soon became «an 
enormous experiment in social engineering – an experiment that 
involves transplanting Western models of social, political and economic 
organization into war shattered states in order to control civil conflict: 
in other words, pacification through political and economic 
liberalization»33. However, at the same time, state-building operations 
in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor have been 
described as marked by various levels of success. While missions in 
Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia (pre-Dayton) are commonly considered 
as debacles, the other interventions, which are still in place, are seen by 
scholars as requiring continuous economic and political assistance in 
the years to come34.  
To some extent, the September 11 attacks in New York and 
Washington accelerated the process. Once again such a change may be 
traced back to a vigorous shift in the American foreign policy, under 
which the US are now forced to «either tak[e] on responsibility for the 
governance of weak states or else [to] throw the problem in the lap of 
the international community»35. The latter was suddenly influenced by 
                                                           
 
 
31  M. Berdal and R. Caplan, ‘Politics of International Administration’, 10(1) 
Global Governance 2004, 1-5, at 2. 
32  The concept of ‘post-conflict peace-building’ was initially conceived by the 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace as an 
«action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and 
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict» (An Agenda for Peace 
Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-
General, UN Doc. A/47/277 – S/24111, 17 June 1992, para. 21) 
33  R. Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, 22(2) 
International Security 1997, 54-89, at 56. 
34  N.D. White, The United Nations System: Toward International Justice (Boulder, 
Co: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 155-156. 
35  Fukuyama, State-Building, p. 94.   
  
 
 
23 
 
this renewed unilateral policy. As a result, a vast consensus emerged 
among key actors participating in state-building interventions on the 
leading policy to be implemented in the reconstruction activities. In 
particular, the donor community agreed that, while the international 
assistance efforts must combine into an integrated approach to support 
the political process, the short-term relief activities must turn rapidly 
into long-term investment strategies, aimed at reducing poverty and 
consolidating the authority of national government all over the state 
territory36. With regard to Afghanistan, the external assistance was thus 
largely intended to stabilize the Afghan state structure and provide 
legitimacy for the central government, under a strategy that has been 
further labelled as ‘aid-induced pacification’37. On the whole, since the 
stabilization is now conceived as passing through an effective policy of 
aid assistance, the real objective of the reform process becomes that of 
structuring state political economy in order to convince potential 
opponents or spoilers to join the new political process38. 
As a consequence of this new scenario, the UN role in state-
building missions was rapidly reconsidered. The UN abandoned 
comprehensive governance models, as experimented in Kosovo and 
East Timor, and returned to a more modest modus operandi, by assisting 
the local government in the state-building process, rather than directly 
providing to the administration of territory39. The theory and practice of 
                                                           
 
 
36  A. Costy, ‘The Dilemma of Humanitarianism in the Post-Taliban Transition’, 
in A. Donini, N. Niland and K. Wermester (eds.), Nation-Building Unraveled? 
Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004), 
143-165, at 145. 
37  N. Stockton, Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan (Kabul: AREU, August 
2002), 25, 
www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=&task=doc_do
wnload&gid=260. 
38  B.D. Jones, ‘Aid, Peace and Justice in a Reordered World’, A. Donini, N. 
Niland and K. Wermester (eds.), Nation-Building Unraveled? Aid, Peace and 
Justice in Afghanistan (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004), 207-226, at 214. 
39  Stahn, The Law and Practice, p. 348. 
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United Nations post-conflict operations had thus initially passed from 
the application of a consent-based model, as in the case of the UN 
missions in Namibia, Cambodia and El Salvador, to a ‘dirigiste’ (also 
labelled ‘neo-colonialist’40) approach, as in the cases of Somalia, Kosovo 
and East Timor. Eventually, it became minimalist again with the UN 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)41. The right formulation 
for this renewed UN engagement was found by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in Afghanistan, 
Lakhdar Brahimi, who called this novel UN strategy the ‘light footprint 
approach’42. This new model of engagement would reflect those past 
failures and excesses registered in the establishment of quasi-state 
administrative apparatus run by international authorities, which have 
                                                           
 
 
40  See e.g. J. Chopra, ‘The UN's Kingdom of East Timor’, 42(3) Survival 2000, 
27-39, at 33. The term ‘neo-colonialism’ was initially coined by Kwame 
Nkrumah in 1965. It refers to the economic and political control which 
former colonial powers and other powerful states continue to exercise over 
former colonies and other third-world countries after their formal 
independence (see K. Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism 
(London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1965). 
41  J.S. Kreilkamp, ‘UN Postconflict Reconstruction’, 35(3) New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 2003, 619-670, at 622, 634 and 657. 
UNAMA was established with UNSC Res. 1401 (2002). For a brief analysis of 
its initial mandate see A. de Guttry, ‘Il ruolo delle Nazioni Unite in 
Afghanistan dal ritiro sovietico alla pax americana’, in A. de Guttry, Oltre la 
reazione: Complessità e limiti nella guerra al terrorismo internazionale dopo l’11 
settembre (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2003), 139-200, at 186. 
42  Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-
General, 6 February 2002, 
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2002/db020602.doc.htm. See 
also The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and 
security, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/56/875 – S/2002/278, 
18 March 2002, at 16: «(d) UNAMA should aim to bolster Afghan capacity 
(both official and non-governmental), relying on as limited an international 
presence and on as many Afghan staff as possible, and using common 
support services where possible, thereby leaving a light expatriate 
‘footprint’» 
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deeply conditioned the reform of local state institutions according to 
externally-imposed models. Indeed, whereas that in Afghanistan may 
be considered as the first mission undertaken under this ‘light 
footprint’ strategy, the same approach is consistent with that of 
subsequent UN missions in Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Ivory Coast43. 
Conversely, more recently, with the stalemate in the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq and the growing concerns over 
the failure of both interventions, the focus has progressively shifted on 
the responsibilities of beneficiaries, shadowing those of participating 
states and organizations. Accordingly, state-building is now regarded 
as being «a primarily endogenous development»44, a «responsive 
process»45, with scholars debating on the failure of ‘external’ nation-
building46. The loss of political credibility by the US on the global stage 
and the resulting increasing rivalry with the other major powers 
impedes the formation of a single strategic vision for peace-building 
interventions. This in turn has led to a creeping crisis in the UN’s 
                                                           
 
 
43  Stahn, The Law and Practice, p. 350. 
44  OECD-DAC, Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: 
From Fragility to Resilience (Paris: OECD-DAC, Discussion Paper, 2008), 3, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/41100930.pdf. 
45  A. Whaites, States in Development: Understanding State-building (London: 
DFID, 2008), 6, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/State-in-Development-
Wkg-Paper.pdf.  
46  M. Ottaway, ‘Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States’, 33(5) 
Development and Change 2002, 1001-1023; U. Hopp and A. Kloke-Lesche, 
‘External Nation-building vs. Endogenous Nation-forming: A Development 
Policy Perspective’, in J. Hippler (ed.), Nation-Building – A Key Concept for 
Peaceful Conflict Transformation? (London: Pluto Press 2005), 137-150; T. 
Dodge, ‘Iraq: the Contradictions of Exogenous State-Building in Historical 
Perspective’, 27(1) Third World Quarterly 2006, 187-200. 
  
 
 
26 
 
capacity to organize effective state-building missions47. Such 
circumstances could be considered as indicators of a further evolution 
in the theory of state-building, whose final outcome is, however, still 
doubtful. 
 
3.2 The Role of International Institutions in the Formation of 
Development Aid Policies 
The peace-building strategy experimented in Afghanistan also comes at 
the end of a process of transformation in the approach taken by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) towards countries recovering 
from conflict48. Some months before the beginning of the international 
intervention, the World Bank (WB) had adopted its Operational Policy 
(OP) No. 2.3049 that sets the scope and terms of the Bank’s intervention 
in conflict prevention activities. However, already in 1999 both the 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had adopted a 
broader common approach to development planning, called 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), which lays down the 
framework for ‘concessionary’ lending, mostly through the mandatory 
adoption of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) by requesting 
countries50. 
                                                           
 
 
47  R. Gowan, ‘The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006–08’, 15(4) 
International Peacekeeping 2008, 453–469 (for a brief analysis of the situation in 
Afghanistan see p. 462). 
48  P. Cammack, ‘Global Governance, State Agency and Competitiveness: The 
Political Economy of the Commission for Africa’, 8(3) British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations 2006, 331-350, at 336. 
49  World Bank, Development Cooperation and Conflict: Operational Policy No. 2.30  
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, January 2001). This policy should now 
be read in conjunction with the World Bank Operational Policy No. 8.00, 
entitled ‘Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies’. 
50  See the joint note by J.D. Wolfensohn and S. Fischer, The Comprehensive 
Development Framework (CDF) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) 
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A PRSP outlines the country’s macroeconomic, structural and 
social policies and programmes over a three year or longer period. It 
aims at promoting growth and reducing poverty, as well as identifying 
associated external financing needs and major sources of financing51. 
The PRSP formula was initially developed in order to respond to 
evident weaknesses in relations between poor countries and IFIs – in 
particular the lack of country ownership during reforms52. The PRPS 
rationale is in fact that of conditioning international support to clear 
prospects and policies by the recipient country.  In this respect, a PRSP 
should be country-driven, result oriented, comprehensive in scope, 
partnership-oriented, and participatory53. While national governments 
are in principle responsible for setting up their PRSPs, they normally 
receive relevant inputs and assistance from domestic and external 
partners, including the WB and the IMF themselves. PRSPs also 
provide the basis for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative. The latter, first launched in 1996, is a 
comprehensive policy to debt reduction for heavily-indebted countries 
pursuing IMF/WB adjustment and reform programmes. Before 
receiving full assistance, a country must await the final approval of its 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 5 April 2000), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/pdf/cdfprsp.pdf. 
51  For a definition of PRSP see IMF, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) 
(Washington, D.C.: IMF, 20 May 2008), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp. See also G. Nicotera, 
‘United Nations Development Cooperation from its Origins to the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Is the UN on the Rights Track?’, 63(3) La 
Comunità Internazionale 2008, 469-487, at 476. 
52  Bretton Woods Project, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs): A Rough 
Guide (London: Action Aid, 9 April 2003),  
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/adjustment/prsp_roughguide
/prsp_roughguide.pdf. 
53  For an in depth analysis see L. Yiu and R. Saner, ‘Development Diplomacy 
and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers for Least Developed Countries: Non-
State Actor Advocacy and Multistakeholder Diplomacy’, in J. Kurbalija and 
V. Katrandjiev (eds.), Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities 
(Malta: DiploFoundation, 2005), 105-121, at 106. 
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PRSP by both the Bank and Fund Boards. A PRSP normally covers a 
period of three years. However, changes can be made to the content of 
a PRSP using an Annual Progress Report. Usually, the majority of 
requesting countries are not ready to engage in a difficult task such as 
drafting a PRSP, due to the lack of human and economic resources. In 
this case, they submit an Interim PRSP (I-PRSP). An I-PRSP outlines a 
provisional poverty reduction strategy and a roadmap towards the 
adoption of a PRSP. Normally, the Interim Paper precedes the full 
Paper by 12 months. In case more time is required, a ‘PRSP Preparation 
Status Reports’ is to be submitted in order to receive continued 
assistance. 
On the other hand, a major change was similarly affecting the 
UN approach to peace-building. At the time of intervention in 
Afghanistan, and even before that, since 1999, the UN had been 
implementing the concept of ‘integrated mission’ in Kosovo, after it 
had matured experience in the former Yugoslavia where a similar 
model based on single lead agencies had been adopted. Indeed, 
integrated missions are conceived to address situations of transition 
from war to peace through a wide UN response, which subsumes 
relevant actors and policies within an overall political-strategic crisis 
management framework54. Under this holistic approach, state-building 
missions should immediately focus on capacity building without 
jeopardizing the local ownership of the reform process. Accordingly, at 
the beginning of the international intervention, Afghanistan saw the 
launch of a Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)55 by the UN, called 
‘Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan 
                                                           
 
 
54  E.B. Eide, A.J. Kaspersen, R. Kent and K. von Hippel, Report on Integrated 
Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations (Oslo: Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs, 2005), 4 and 13. 
55  The UN CAPs were initially created by the UN General Assembly in 1991 
(UNGA Res. 46/182, UN Doc. A/RES/46/182, 19 December 1991), 
following the plight of Iraqi Kurdish refugees in the wake of the first Gulf 
War. A CAP is a multilateral financing tool used by aid organisations to 
plan, coordinate, fund, implement and monitor their activities during 
complex emergencies that require an integrated humanitarian response. 
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People’56. However, in line with the tendency to ‘politicize’ the 
humanitarian assistance and follow the low-profile approach decided 
upon at the beginning of the intervention in 2002, «the United Nations 
submitted to a detailed review of individual programmes by national 
authorities. The United Nations subsequently supported the 
incorporation of humanitarian and recovery programmes into the 
national development framework and budget process»57.  
Eventually, the UN humanitarian assistance and the 
development aid policies established by IFIs were consolidated under a 
unified strategy. For the UN, this entailed abandoning an independent 
assistance policy in favour of a comprehensive development plan in 
which the UN itself played a secondary role. This interaction between 
IFIs and UN activities has been rather frequent in the course of the 
most recent state-building missions. During the UN missions in 
Afghanistan, East Timor, Iraq and Kosovo, the role of IFIs in the 
country’s reconstruction was partially provided by Security Council 
resolutions, revealing «an important and developing legal relationship 
between the IFIs and the UN»58. Once this integration received full 
legitimation at the strategic level, the reform process was implemented 
at the operational level according to policies and manuals for Low 
Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS), developed mostly by the WB 
and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC)59. This pattern 
                                                           
 
 
56  UN Country Team for Afghanistan, Immediate and Transitional Assistance 
Programme for the Afghan People (Kabul/Geneva: UN, January 2002), 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2002.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileN
ame/OCHA-64DJ4W-un_afg_21jan.pdf/$File/un_afg_21jan.pdf.  
57  Costy, The Dilemma of Humanitarianism, p. 149. 
58  K.E. Boon, ‘“Open For Business”: International Financial Institutions, Post-
Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law’, 39(3) New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 2007, 513-582, 515. 
59  See e.g. World Bank, Supporting Development Programs Effectively 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, November 2004), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CDFINTRANET/Resources/developm
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of combining traditional humanitarian assistance and IFIs development 
policies relies on the expected continuum between emergency and 
development. However, such concept is often misleading, as typically 
an emergency persists even when the development phase has officially 
started60. «The continuum concept also assumes that poverty is 
transitional and that development in a neo-liberal mould is an inevitable 
consequence of the spread of global capitalism and human rights 
values. Adherents tend to see development as a solution to conflict»61. 
In this respect, Afghanistan does not differ from other state-
building interventions, as it has seen a number of organizational 
models taken from OECD/WB manuals and policies applied both at 
macro and micro level, i.e., within both the strategic and the 
operational structure of the new policy-making framework. On the one 
hand, the coordination among donors and Afghan authorities has been 
characterized by the use of the ‘Consultative Group’ formula62; on the 
other hand, the formation of the National Development Budget has 
been assisted by IFIs through relevant inputs. The latter have taken the 
form of close assistance and performance monitoring of Afghan 
institutions, partially by means of joint assessment missions, as well as 
the perspective of short and medium-term financial assistance, as 
conditioned to the accomplishment of those stages described in IFIs 
manuals. It is also remarkable to note that, as IFIs policies and 
procedures themselves changed, they were immediately applied to the 
Afghan reconstruction. Therefore, as the principles of local ownership, 
alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
enteffectiveness.pdf; OECD-DAC, Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective 
Aid Delivery: Vol. 2 (Paris: OECD, 2005) 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/7/34583142.pdf. 
60  M. Duffield, ‘NGO Relief in War Zones: Towards an Analysis of the New 
Aid Paradigm’, 18(3) Third World Quarterly 1997, 527-542, at 539-540. 
61  M.C. Pugh, ‘Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: Social and Civil Dimensions’, 
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 11 December 1998, 
http://jha.ac/1998/12/11/post-conflict-rehabilitation-social-and-civil-
dimensions.  
62  See, para. 3.3.1. 
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accountability emerged at the Rome and Paris conferences on aid 
harmonization and effectiveness63, the policy-making framework was 
itself reformed and aid programmes readapted to comply with the new 
tenets. 
 
3.3 The ‘Local Ownership’: A New Mantra? 
  
Political stability and economic prosperity will 
depend on well-functioning […] institutions. 
However, well-functioning institutions depend on a 
strong sense of local ownership. Such ownership 
cannot be achieved if the owners do not know what 
they own and what they are intended to govern. 
Kai Eide (at present, SRSG in Afghanistan)64 
 
                                                           
 
 
63  In recent years there have been a number of significant international events 
that have called for a more co-ordinated assistance among donors, aimed at 
improving the quality of international aid, and so its effects on poverty 
reduction and development. Such initiatives include the 2002 Monterrey 
Consensus on Financing for Development, the 2003 Rome Declaration on 
Aid Harmonization, and the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In 
particular, the Paris Declaration, endorsed on 2 March 2005, may be 
considered as an international agreement establishing a practical, action-
orientated plan to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. 
The Declaration includes 12 indicators of aid effectiveness and specific 
targets to be met within fixed terms. Targets for 2010 have been laid down 
for 11 of such indicators (Targets are available at: 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/60/36080258.pdf). 
64  Report on the situation in Kosovo, Brussels, 15 July 2004 (Annex to Letter dated 
17 November 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2004/932, 30 November 2004, p. 11). 
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As previously discussed, the shift towards the light footprint approach 
registered at the turn of the millennium was also influenced by the 
changes occurring in the field of development aid, which started 
stressing the concept of ‘local ownership’. According to this principle, 
in order to be sustainable, a country’s development must be locally 
owned and «based on integrated strategies that incorporate key 
economic, social, environmental and political elements»65. Hence, the 
role of external partners becomes that of helping strengthen local 
capacities, rather than simply transplanting their own administrative 
and economic models into recipient countries. The local ownership 
theory stands at the very basis of the CDF, as advocated in 1999 by the 
President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn66 and also represents 
the guiding principle of the most relevant international initiatives in the 
field of development aid. 
That of local ownership is not an original idea. The principle of 
preserving local capacity and domestic decision-making in processes of 
external governance was adopted, for instance, by Britain in the 
administration of African colonies or by the administering countries 
mandated under both the Mandate System of the League of Nations 
and the UN Trusteeship System67. Besides, during the nineties, scholars 
had attempted formulating a definition of (domestic) government’s 
ownership of institutional reforms68, based on the assumption that: 
                                                           
 
 
65  OECD-DAC, Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-
operation (Paris: OECD, 1996), 13, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/35/2508761.pdf. 
66  J. Wolfensohn, A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework (A 
Discussion Draft), Washington, D.C., 21 January 1999, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CDF/Resources/cdf.pdf.  
67  Stahn, The Law and Practice, p. 348. For an analysis of both the Mandate 
System of the League of Nations and UN Trusteeship System see ibid., p. 73 
and p. 92, respectively. 
68  See e.g. T. Killick, R. Gunatilaka, and A. Marr, Aid and the Political Economy of 
Policy Change (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 87: 
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«when a government does not have the legitimate authority to implement a 
program, it will also lack political support. In such a situation the 
government may find that dependence on other forms of power (force, 
manipulation, persuasion) or of authority (coercion) will enable it to attain 
only a rather modest degree of implementation in the face of sabotage, 
indifference, nonparticipation, and minimum effort and compliance from 
the general population, despite large expenditure of resources»69. 
Currently, other authors seek a possible development model by 
dividing the concept of local ownership into a number of functional 
components70. A recent contribution lists six different senses in which 
the concept of local ownership has been used in the context of post-
conflict reconstruction: (i) responsiveness of new policies to local 
culture; (ii) consultation of local population before implementing new 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
«Government ownership is at its strongest when the political leadership and 
its advisers, with broad support among agencies of state and civil society, 
decide of their own volition that policy changes are desirable, choose what 
these changes should be and when they should be introduced, and where 
these changes become built into the parameters of policy and 
administration, which are generally accepted as desirable». 
69  O.E.G. Johnson, ‘Managing Adjustment Costs, Political Authority, and the 
Implementation of Adjustment Programs, with Special Reference to African 
Countries’, 22(3) World Development 1994, 399-411, at 406. This principle has 
been further recalled in other more recent works of the author: see O.E.G. 
Johnson, Country Ownership of Reform Programmes and the Implications for 
Conditionality (New York: United Nations,  G-24 Discussion Paper Series, 
No. 35, January 2005), 6, http://www.g24.org/un-joh05.pdf.  
70  According to Brinkerhoff, local ownership may be divided into 6 main 
components: 1) government initiative; 2) choice of policy/programme based 
on balanced consideration and analysis of options, anticipated outcomes, 
and cost/benefits; 3) mobilization of stakeholders; 4) public commitment 
and allocation of resources by domestic authorities; 5) assignment of 
resources and responsibilities over the long-term; 6) learning practices and 
programmes from other countries and selectively adapting to local 
conditions (D.W. Brinkerhoff, ‘Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way? 
Untangling Ownership and Political Will in Post-Conflict Stability and 
Reconstruction Operations’, 8(1) Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and 
International Relations 2007, 111-120, at 115-116). 
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policies; (iii) participation of local actors in the implementation process; 
(iv) accountability of international actors to domestic authorities; (v) 
overall control by international structures; (vi) respect for domestic 
sovereignty71. 
Notwithstanding such theoretical definitions, the empirical 
meaning of the local ownership concept remains ambiguous. As 
anticipated, the entire model is centred on the domestic demand for 
institutional reforms. Insufficient internal demand then represents «the 
single most important obstacle to institutional development in poor 
countries»72. Nonetheless, domestic demand for institutional reforms 
should not be generated externally. It should rather come from a 
genuine aspiration of the requesting states. In practice, however, the 
situation on field is different and although the changes in question are 
officially fully agreed upon by the government, the civil service does 
not possess the expertise nor the resources to implement them73. In 
addition, even if we may consider ownership as a pre-condition for 
true state development, stable institutional changes also require a 
qualified national leadership74, which is often absent. The latter should 
be capable to express a shared political willingness or at least formulate 
political preferences, but often, in the aftermath of a conflict, such 
capacity is simply non-existent. In other cases, local counterparts may 
be able, but not willing to carry out reforms75. Above all, a model of 
                                                           
 
 
71  S. Chesterman, ‘Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority 
in UN Statebuilding Operations’, 1(1) Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 
2007, 3-26, at 9-10. 
72  Fukuyama, State-Building, p. 35.  
73  Killick, Gunatilaka, and Marr, Aid and the Political Economy, 88. 
74  C. Lopes and T. Theisohn, Ownership, Leadership and Transformation: Can We 
Do Better for Capacity Development? (New York/London: UNDP/Earthscan 
Publications, 2003), 35, 
http://www.capacity.undp.org/indexAction.cfm?module=Library&action=
GetFile&DocumentAttachmentID=1001.  
75  A.S. Hansen, ‘From Intervention to Local Ownership: Rebuilding a Just and 
Sustainable Rule of Law after Conflict’, in C. Stahn and J.K. Kleffner (eds.), 
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development centred on the local ownership principle does not cease to 
rely on asymmetric relationships between external partners and 
domestic government. That is the reason why the local ownership is 
often indicated as the final outcome of the reform process, and not 
something which has to be present from the beginning. According to 
Chesterman: «local leadership may be desirable in development 
projects in general, but in a post-conflict situation this must be 
tempered by those concerns that brought international administration 
to the country concerned in the first place»76. Others, such as Stephen 
Krasner, stress the need for a form of ‘shared sovereignty’, to be 
exercised jointly by external actors and national authorities77. 
At the same time, the debate over the application of the local 
ownership principle risks to be purely academic. A recent authoritative 
study on state-building interventions confirms that «local ownership 
[…] is more frequently invoked in word than in deed» and «although 
‘ownership’ has long been a mantra of the development community, 
consistency has generally been limited to the lip service that is paid to 
this concept»78. This may be certainly due to the contradictions and 
dilemmas frequently faced by international authorities engaged in 
post-conflict reconstruction, as well as to the insurmountable 
difficulties generated by the tasks assigned to them. However, this also 
concerns the genuine aims of the same international actors (and among 
them, the most powerful states), which often tend to hide the pursuit of 
their own short-term political interests behind the ‘humanitarian’ 
participation to state-building missions. As a consequence, 
international assistance – military, financial and political – is largely 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace (The Hague: 
TMC Asser Press, 2008), 131-151, at 134 and 146. 
76  Chesterman, Ownership in Theory, p. 20. 
77  S.D. Krasner, ‘Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and 
Failing States’, 29(2) International Security 2004, 85-120, at 108. 
78  S. Chesterman, You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional 
Administration, and State-Building (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
195 and 198. 
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supply-driven and this basically jeopardizes the application of the local 
ownership principle79. In fact, there is usually no direct empirical link 
between aid supply and people’s needs. For instance, food aid 
requirements can be estimated this year and foodstuff delivered the 
next80. Besides, building state institutions implies the interdependent 
exercise by a sovereign authority of coercion, capital and legitimacy81. 
However, in most of the current peace support operations, the 
management of these three resources is often granted by diverse 
international institutions, while the role of local authorities remains 
rather limited. Normally, as in the case of Afghanistan, (i) foreign states 
provide military forces to control the territory, (ii) international 
economic and financial institutions guarantee basic economic resources 
and assistance for institutional reform, and (iii) a plethora of agencies, 
NGOs and other organisations back the mission’s national and 
international legitimacy through their humanitarian action, mostly for 
the benefit of the media and the world public opinion82. 
Indeed, another way to assess the local ownership of reforms is 
to consider the level of authority that local actors exercise83. A contrario, 
that means to focus on the influence exercised by international actors 
and thus on the transfer of knowledge between the same international 
actors and domestic authorities (quantitative analysis). On the other 
hand, a good research should qualitatively illustrate which 
international and domestic actors are engaged in the reconstruction 
                                                           
 
 
79  Chesterman, Ownership in Theory, p. 19. 
80  Duffield, NGO Relief in War Zones, p. 539. 
81  B.R. Rubin, ‘Constructing Sovereignty for Security’, 47(4) Survival 2005, 93-
106, at 95. 
82  Afghanistan is a clear example of this approach: the reconstruction of the 
judicial sector is mostly financed by a few trust funds managed by the 
World Bank, while the implementing activities are actually contracted out to 
a plethora of agencies and organisations. 
83  Hansen, From Intervention to Local Ownership, p. 137. 
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process, also showing the presence of spoilers84. At the end of this 
evaluation, even a ‘light footprint’ international engagement like that in 
Afghanistan could very closely resemble more complex missions such 
as those in East Timor or Kosovo. Accordingly, some authors suppose 
that originally the adoption of the ‘light footprint’ approach in 
Afghanistan would have merely represented a first step, justified by the 
circumstances of the case, and oriented towards the further 
establishment of a full administrative structure, modelled according to 
the ones in Kosovo or East Timor85. 
Probably, a real change would simply require international 
actors involved in state-building missions to «promot[e] ownership 
beyond simply assessing it»86. Conversely, this current tendency to 
affirm publicly the local ownership of reforms may represent a mere 
saving clause that the same international actors invoke in case of 
failure. As Belloni observes: «When delays, obstacles, and drawbacks 
cannot be ignored any longer, they are blamed on the local actors. 
While success has a thousand fathers, failure is an orphan. Time and 
again, lack of progress is blamed on the lack of indigenous democratic 
traditions and the influence of post-war trauma»87. Ultimately, one 
could argue that the adoption of a ‘light approach’ in reconstruction, 
decided by international policy-makers, is purely a matter of fact – a 
result of their incapacity to impose political order (also by military 
means) abroad and, a fortiori, an acknowledgement of the weakness of 
the legal and political values ‘exported’ to countries recovering from 
conflicts. 
                                                           
 
 
84  A.S. Hansen and S. Wiharta, with B.R. Claussen and S. Kjeksrud The 
Transition to a Just Order – Establishing Local Ownership after Conflict: A 
Practitioners’ Guide (Sandöverken, Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy 
Research Report, 2007), 25. 
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3.3.1   The ‘Local Ownership’ in Practice: The Consultative 
Group Formula 
Notwithstanding these rather critical remarks, both the WB, under the 
CDF approach, and OECD-DAC promote a model of development for 
LICUS that attempts to put the local ownership principle into effect. 
Such a model is based on a complex structure whose functioning may 
be briefly described as follows88. First, the requesting state prepares its 
own long-term, holistic vision for the future. Then, at the strategic level, 
the government drafts and adopts a PRSP or, at an earlier stage, a I-
PRSP, drawing a comprehensive development policy for the country. 
The PRSP is divided into macro-areas and more specific sectors of 
intervention. It also contains time-bound medium-term objectives and 
priorities89. The PRSP is complemented by sector strategies, one for each 
development sector90. 
At the operational level, a sector strategy is realized through a 
specific, time-bound and ‘costed’ set of actions and activities, included 
in a Sector Development Programme (SDP)91. Development 
programmes may be in turn financed bilaterally by means of 
loans/grants or through the creation of pooled financing mechanisms, 
                                                           
 
 
88  The model described is voluntarily restricted to bodies and documents of 
interest to this work. For a more complete description see gen. OECD-DAC, 
Harmonising Donor Practices, and World Bank, Supporting Development 
Programs. See also A.R. Eggen and D.J. Bezemer, The UNDP – World 
Bank/IMF Partnership in Achieving Millennium Development Goals: The Role of 
Poverty Reduction Strategies (University of Groningen, MPRA Paper No. 7030, 
January 2007), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7030.  
89  World Bank, Supporting Development Programs, p. 4. 
90  OECD-DAC, Harmonising Donor Practices, p. 42. 
91  Ibid., at 37. A Sector development programme is defined by the OECD-DAC 
as a specific, time-bound and ‘costed’ set of actions and activities which 
support a sector strategy. 
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involving different donors, under a multilateral approach called Sector-
Wide Approach (SWAP). There is no agreed definition for SWAP. The 
most commonly used definition is that of Mick Foster, according to 
whom a SWAP is when «funding for the sector supports a single sector 
policy and expenditure programme, under Government leadership, 
adopting common approaches across the sector, and progressing 
towards relying on Government procedures to disburse and account 
for all funds»92. SWAP is an approach, not a blueprint93, so practically it 
may be implemented in different ways. However, an effective SWAP 
should always include a national sector strategy, to be financed 
through a medium-term expenditure programme, a performance 
monitoring system, and a broad consultation mechanism involving all 
relevant stakeholders94. 
The policy-making structure which governs the reform process 
and implements sector policies included in the PRSP is composed of 
Consultative Groups (CGs). CGs are participated jointly by all the 
relevant stakeholders (national and international) within distinct 
sectors of interest, but they are chaired by the local government. The 
CGs are in turn aligned with the PRSP sectors, so that every CG 
practically represents the main policy-making forum for each 
development strategy. At the lower level, sector and thematic working 
groups are created in order to address sector programmes. Again, such 
groups are international/national mixed, but led by the relevant 
government institutions. Finally, the whole structure is monitored by a 
high-level institution (presided over by the government) in charge of 
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Development Institute, October 2000), 9,  
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93  HLSP Institute, Sector Wide Approaches: A Resource Document for UNFPA Staff, 
September 2005, 5, 
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coordinating government agencies with international partners95. The 
whole system is then basically composed of «technical-level bodies to 
facilitate practical work, donor-co-ordination bodies, ad hoc working 
groups to tackle specific issues […] and a wider consultative forum […] 
that allows participation by a range of stakeholders»96. 
As the following chapters will clearly show, this represents the 
pattern used for institutional reforms in Afghanistan and specifically 
for justice sector financing and reform. 
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4   Justice Sector Reform in Countries Recovering from 
 Conflict 
 
 
 
4.1 Justice Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Situations: A Few 
 Introductory Remarks 
The idea of justice in state-building missions has always represented 
the cornerstone of the new social order in war-torn countries. Legal 
reforms in territories recovering from conflicts do not usually follow 
the same rationale or present the same options. Each situation reveals 
unique and non-repeatable characteristics which prevent drawing up a 
‘one-size-fits-all formula’97. Relevant variables might include the 
security situation, the historical reasons for the armed conflict, and the 
starting level for the restoration, while the results of the reconstruction 
process may be deeply influenced by strategic and operational choices 
of both local and international political actors. Naturally, the 
availability of economic resources (sustained by donor commitments) 
also plays a key role, although the efficacy of financial aid may be 
ruined by a high level of domestic corruption. Afghanistan and Haiti, 
for example, are considered among the most corrupted countries in the 
world notwithstanding the international state-building missions taking 
place98. 
                                                           
 
 
97  C. Stahn, ‘The Geometry of Transitional Justice: Choices of Institutional 
Design’, 18(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 2005, 425-466, at 425; H. 
Strohmeyer, ‘Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The U.N. and the 
Creation of Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor’, 25(2) 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 2001, 107-128, at 123. 
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In addition, historically, the reestablishment of the judicial 
system in a country has mainly followed the foundation of a new 
political order, imposed at the end of a conflict. In other words, a stable 
and secure political order has always represented the «conditio sine qua 
non of post-conflict reconstruction»99. In the absence of a secure 
environment, any efforts to promote national reconciliation as well as 
to establish a functioning justice system are probably doomed to fail100. 
However, recent examples like those in Iraq, Afghanistan (by military 
means alone) and to some extent, Kosovo and East Timor (through 
massive international political apparatus) show that this ‘natural 
paradigm’ has shifted towards a new model encompassing the use of 
external institutional design to shape the new political order, which has 
not yet taken root. This seems to be a successful option when the 
foundations of the new political system are solid and the renovation of 
the political class is effectively carried out, also by means of a peace 
agreement or a formal surrender101. Nevertheless, it may turn into a 
debilitating factor when the authority in charge fails to prevail 
militarily over competing forces or otherwise when it is not accepted by 
a relevant part of the population. As it has been sharply argued, 
«contemporary international intervention takes place in weak states, 
not conquered ones»102. Other scholars point out that the same 
circumstances have always occurred during past interventions. 
According to Plunkett: 
«the reestablishment of the rule of law is reserved invariably for the 
postconflict stage. But, as in all of the recent UN peace missions – not just in 
Cambodia, but in places like Bosnia, Angola, and Western Sahara – the lines 
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blurred between when the war ends and the peace begins. Justice officials 
will inevitably find themselves in a similarly grey area»103. 
Indeed, this new credo in the Western oriented ‘rule of law’, as 
the basic precondition to secure stability and democracy, may be 
deceptive. As argued by Thomas Carothers, «the idea that specific 
improvements in the rule of law are necessary to achieve democracy is 
dangerously simplistic», as in Western countries «[d]emocracy often, in 
fact usually, co-exists with substantial shortcomings in the rule of 
law»104. Indeed, scholars mostly agree that the overall impact of legal 
reform efforts, inspired by western-oriented rule of law theories on the 
‘quality’ of justice, has been limited at best. For instance, while 
currently Russia owns a refined corporate law, drafted according to 
inputs received by US advisors, the shareholder rights are 
systematically trampled and the trustworthiness of judicial and 
administrative institutions is extremely poor105. This suggests that 
establishing the rule of law is not a panacea for solving political 
instability. According to Chandler, «‘[r]ule of law’ regulation through 
the prioritization of law above the political sphere cannot compensate 
for, or overcome, the political problems involved in peace-building and 
post-war reconstruction»106. Conversely, relegating the political process 
behind the restoration of the justice system would reverse the theory of 
rule of law as derived from the liberal democratic contract theory of 
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consent and would probably encourage arbitrary rule-making of local 
political elites107. 
Justice reform in Afghanistan has followed such trend: the 
limited accomplishments in the sector’s restoration may be considered 
in parallel with the stalemate in military operations108 and the scarce 
control of the ground by the Afghan government. According to the 
Director of US Intelligence, Michael McConnell, at the beginning of 
2008, the Karzai Government controlled just under one-third of the 
country (30-31 percent). The remaining part was split between the 
Taliban (10-11 percent) and local tribes (58-60 percent)109. In November 
2007, a less favourable analysis reported that 54 percent of 
Afghanistan’s landmass hosted a permanent Taliban presence110. 
Notwithstanding this, at the Conference on the Rule of Law in 
Afghanistan, held in Rome in July 2007, both Afghan and international 
political leaders stated that the achievement of stability in the country 
is firmly anchored to the country’s social and economic development, 
basically indicating that military operations and reconstruction need to 
move forward together111. 
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4.2 The Dilemma between a Neo-colonial or Consent-Based 
 Approach 
As previously mentioned, international interventions in Somalia, 
Bosnia, East Timor and Kosovo have been characterized by the full 
participation of international officials in the policy-making process, 
acting as a kind of trustees112. In these countries, the reform of justice 
encompassed the introduction of new laws and codes that have the ring 
of authoritarianism and appear to be dropped in from on high. Most of 
these missions have seen the use of ‘mixed’ (i.e. internationally-
nationally staffed) tribunals113. Some have been also characterized by 
the establishment of courts made up of international judges in charge 
of dealing with sensitive cases or with crimes committed by the 
previous regime, during the transitional justice phase114. Ultimately, the 
reform of justice has included a muscular imposition of human rights-
inspired legal models, directly derived from the strong idealistic 
character of military interventions which originated the civil 
reconstruction missions in the first place. However, it may be observed 
that this extensive engagement of international actors in justice system 
reform is not without risks, as it creates a ‘donor-driven justice’, 
completely separate from the country’s legal tradition, as it has 
occurred, for instance, in Rwanda115. 
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On the other hand, the post-conflict justice system in 
Afghanistan has been remodelled with a slightly different perspective, 
in line with the ‘light footprint’ approach discussed above. Such 
principle was mainly implemented by taking into account the legal and 
judicial systems previously adopted in Afghanistan, leaving the 
Afghan government in charge of restoring the sector (at least formally), 
together with international actors performing a limited coordination 
role. The same approach to justice system reform has been adopted in 
other state-building operations. This was the case with the UN missions 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti, Burundi and 
Liberia, while in Cambodia the UN went on to enact the statutory laws, 
with the acquiescence of the national authorities116.  
The first of these two approaches (the ‘dirigiste’ or ‘neo-
colonialist’)  – namely that held during international administration of 
territories – mainly consists in prearranging ‘justice packages’, ready to 
be deployed on the field in case of need117. The ‘packages’ should 
encompass both legal experts (trainers, attorneys and judges, clerks, 
etc.) and applicable norms (e.g. substantive and procedural model 
criminal codes), in order to fill the possible vacuum in the justice 
administration. The creation of such packages follows the 
recommendations contained in the 2000 Brahimi Report118. A short 
account is also included in the subsequent 2004 Report of the UN 
Secretary General on Transitional Justice119. However, the latter seems 
to show a moderate change of course, when the Secretary General 
admits that: «pre-packaged solutions are ill-advised. Instead, 
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experiences from other places should simply be used as a starting point 
for local debates and decisions»120. In trying to avoid risks of excessive 
external influence, experts suggest that it should be the national 
authorities themselves to decide which part of this pre-drafted 
legislation should be included in legal framework of their own 
country121. While in theory this principle sounds good, it still shirks the 
issue of local elites capacity to become genuinely autonomous from 
external influence in taking significant political decisions and in being 
accountable to the local population rather than to foreign actors 
involved in the reconstruction process. This seems particularly true in 
Afghanistan, where the international quasi-administrative apparatus 
deployed in the capital city has rapidly created a ‘political enclave’ in 
Kabul which is more responsive to international authorities than to 
society as a whole122. 
Scholars also focus on the political role played by the newly 
established rule of law institutions, as well as the political nature of 
programmes supported by international actors123. Tensions between 
those who deem institutional design as the core objective of the 
reconstruction process and those who lament the lack of dialogue 
between local and international actors, reflect the unresolved dilemma 
between imposition of foreign administrative templates and a true 
social contract. Indeed, on the one hand, reconstruction of the justice 
sector could be (realistically) led by international donors with a pure 
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national interest, being that of ‘lawfully’ securing the exploitation of the 
country’s resources, for instance, by «leaven[ing] …commercial courts 
with foreign judges»124. On the other hand, a limited use of ‘pre-
packaged’ codes and standby personnel would be nonetheless 
indispensable, while in the case of the UN Mission in Liberia, the 
justice system has to be rebuilt from scratch125. Yet, the fact that 
nowadays projects aimed at drafting new applicable codes in 
peacekeeping operations are still financed, may raise doubts on 
whether this ‘dirigiste’ trend has been definitively abandoned. In 
particular, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Irish 
Centre for Human Rights (ICHR), in cooperation with the Office of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) are developing four model codes 
for criminal justice, to be applied in post-conflict state-building 
operations. The model codes are a criminal code, a criminal procedure 
code, a penitentiary act and a police code126. 
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The problem between a ‘dirigiste’ and consensual approach 
appears irresolvable, since in practice every act of external institutional 
assistance towards countries recovering from conflict implies a certain 
level of cultural influence. With regard to law reforms, some scholars 
recommend adopting proportionality as the guiding principle127. 
 
4.3 The Ingredients for Success: Looking for Consensus and 
 Responding to the Local Demand for Justice 
Willing to draft a model aimed at establishing functioning and 
reformed judicial institutions in post-conflict countries, scholars come 
to the self-evident conclusion of looking for consensus and political 
legitimacy from a double domestic and international perspective128. This 
practically means that, on the one hand, the foundation of the 
international mission’s mandate should lie on firm legal basis, 
particularly including ‘lawful’ international law agreements and/or 
Security Council’s clear mandates; while, on the other hand, such 
reforms should be accepted by the population they apply to. Moreover, 
success in reforming the system of justice may be achieved only 
through a clear mandate from the authorities who de iure or even de 
facto exercise governmental power. In fact, «the collapse of formal state 
structures does not necessarily create a power vacuum; political life 
does not simply cease»129, even if it may be conducted by non-
institutional actors. 
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In order to gain domestic legitimacy (thus securing the local 
ownership of reforms), the aim of the reconstruction process should be 
that of drawing-up a ‘social compact’130 between all the relevant 
stakeholders. Scholars divide the latter into three main categories: (i) 
the population (citizens, civil society and business community); (ii) 
political authorities (political leadership – at both national and local 
level – and civil service); and (iii) members of justice and security sector 
institutions131. Signing a ‘social compact’ for justice with the local 
population, in order to promote compliance with the law and general 
stability, would in other words mean moving away from this ‘rule of 
law orthodoxy’, primarily based on the reestablishment of courts, 
towards a more balanced approach, which would comprise the ‘legal 
empowerment’ of a growing part of the population132. This should help 
create a reformist political process which would in turn lead to a more 
realistic establishment of the rule of law, potentially different from the 
original Western idea of Rechtsstaat. The UN itself has started to explore 
this approach by recommending the strengthening of community-
based justice and informal justice mechanisms133. Besides, tribal justice 
is currently fostered in Afghanistan by a specific project run by the 
UNDP, while traditional justice institutions have been successfully 
employed in the post-genocide reconciliation phase in Rwanda, 
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through the so-called ‘gacaca courts’134. However, it has to be stated that 
these informal justice mechanisms have been supported by 
international and national authorities primarily for practical reasons. 
For instance, by 2001, the Rwandan government had estimated that it 
would take state courts 200 years to try all the 100,000  individuals 
accused of participating in genocide135. 
According to the local ownership principle, the theory of peace-
building, as applied to law reforms, should indeed shift its focus away 
from the ‘supply of justice’ onto an effective ‘demand for justice’. 
Research indicates that a demand for justice must exist so that the law 
formally in force is actually put into practice and policy makers and 
law professionals respond to it136. In addition, to be successfully 
‘transplanted’ into the legal order concerned, the new body of law 
should adapt to the local conditions or contain principles already 
familiar to the local population. In turn, such a policy would probably 
strengthen the public demand for institutions to enforce the rule of law. 
On the contrary, if the new body of law was merely imposed (as in the 
case of colonisation), the initial demand for using it would probably be 
weak, conditioning the effectiveness of the overall rule of law reform. 
However, relying excessively on local ownership is not without 
risks, because even if this usually safeguards domestic culture against 
the dangers of external interference, it may still cause reduction in the 
level of individual rights protection if domestic policy makers are 
unwilling or unable to promote human rights protection or criminal 
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prosecution137. In addition, being law a cultural marker, just like 
folklore or language, it can easily turn into a divisive force138. In this 
respect, a reform which only relies on the local ownership principle 
could fuel conflict instead of ordering social life. 
 
4.4 Transitional Justice 
In post-conflict situations the internal demand for justice is normally 
associated to phases of political change and social transformations, 
following a period of widespread human rights violations. Therefore, it 
becomes essential to deal with abuses committed by the former regime, 
without endangering the political transformations that are underway. 
Since these societies are commonly seen as being in transition to 
democracy, the demand for justice mostly focuses on the full 
application of the rule of law principles. In other words, justice itself is 
‘in transition’. For this reason, such a conception of justice is often 
called ‘transitional justice’139. The practice of state-building operations 
suggests that, in order to be effective, transitional justice should include 
several measures that complement one another, under a 
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multidisciplinary approach. Scholars identify four main mechanisms 
implemented during transitional justice phases: 
«1. Trials – whether civil or criminal, national or international, domestic or 
foreign; 2. Fact-finding bodies – whether truth commissions or other similar 
national or international investigative bodies; 3. Reparations – whether 
compensatory, symbolic, restitutionary, or rehabilitative in nature; 4. Justice 
reforms – including legal and constitutional reforms, and the removal of 
abusers from public positions through vetting or lustration procedures. 
Transitional justice also intersects with other subjects such as amnesty, 
reconciliation, and the preservation of memory, as well as democratization 
and peacebuilding»140. 
These mechanisms mirror the contemporaneous adoption of 
different models of justice, which go from a retributive to a restorative 
approach. In particular, the theory of transitional justice as restorative 
justice seeks solutions to the harmful effects of inter-personal conflicts 
generated by past crimes, and has the aim of promoting redress, 
reconciliation and collective security rather than merely punishing the 
culprits, as occurs under the retributive model141. Other scholars call the 
simultaneous adoption of different justice models as ‘reparative 
justice’142. Generally, at least up until the missions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the trend was that of combining models of both criminal justice 
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and reconciliation. This implied the integration of ‘truth commissions’143 
and prosecution, without considering such measures as mutually 
exclusive. In particular, such integration took place during the UN 
missions in Cambodia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East 
Timor144. 
Conversely, in Iraq, after the US-led invasion, the transitional 
justice has been mainly retributive145, being exercised through the 
establishment of a kind of «victors’ court»146. Actually, the occupiers 
(Coalition Provisional Authority – CPA) dealt with the transitional 
justice phase only by setting up a Special Tribunal (Iraqi Special 
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Tribunal) in order to prosecute the top leaders of the previous regime. 
However, the Tribunal was immediately perceived as illegitimate by  
part of the population and the Arab leaders. In addition, the Tribunal’s 
rules of procedure appeared in sharp contrast with the civil law system 
previously in force in the country and deemed contrary to some 
relevant provisions of human rights law147. In October 2005, the 
Tribunal was renamed ‘Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal’ and its rules 
of procedures were further amended. However, such amendments 
lowered even the procedural guarantees for defendants, together with 
the Tribunal’s overall perceived fairness148. Eventually, the ‘de-
baathification’ of public institutions carried out by occupying powers 
has resulted in an institutional vacuum and in strong popular 
resentment which in turn fuelled insurgency149. The Iraqi case might be 
considered as the breaking point with the past ‘Kelsenian’ trend. In 
fact, for the first time, ‘new’ judicial and legal systems were set up 
according to a conception of justice which is not perceived to 
correspond with the highly idealized casus belli. The usual pattern of 
conducting a ‘just war’ in order to achieve a ‘just order’ has been thus 
brutally interrupted. 
 
4.4.1 Transitional Justice in Afghanistan 
With regard to the issue of transitional justice, probably the 
international intervention in Afghanistan may be considered as an 
exception when confronted with other state-building operations, since 
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in Afghanistan this phase has not been established yet150. This is mainly 
due to the ongoing armed conflict and, above all, to the fact that several 
top leaders of the Northern Alliance, who have possibly committed 
widespread human rights violations during the war, are still holding 
key posts at both a local and central government level151. The 
maintenance of the status quo has been availed to avoid destabilisation 
resulting from attempts to achieve a renewed political order, which 
seems still in the making152. As a consequence, the initial calls for the 
establishment of international or mixed national-international tribunals 
to enforce the rule of law153 and to prosecute the captured members of 
the Taliban regime154 have been gradually abandoned. In addition the 
lack of a transitional justice phase is to be imputed to the shaky political 
order established in Bonn in 2001155. Indeed, while recent peace 
settlements often included an overall agreement on transitional justice, 
the Bonn Agreement did not. The Bonn talks lacked the process of 
negotiations which generally establishes the foundation of legitimate 
centralized political power through mutual recognition among groups 
of combatants156. In other words, the Bonn Agreement created a 
transitional government without bringing to the negotiating table one 
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of the parties of the conflict: the Taliban157. An this was probably a 
mistake. As Lakhdar Brahimi himself argued: 
«It was not possible to get them in the tent at the Bonn conference because 
of 9/11 and they themselves were not eager. But immediately after that, we 
should’ve spoken to those who were willing to speak to us. That I consider 
to be my mistake – a very, very big mistake»158. 
Indeed, the absence of a transitional-justice period framework is clearly 
significant in terms of the limited ambition behind the external support 
for the reconstruction of the Afghan legal and political order. 
Efforts to establish a transitional justice phase in the country 
began in March 2002, when a human rights workshop was organized in 
Kabul. The workshop, to which President Karzai attended, rallied a 
number of representatives from the civil society and top religious 
figures. In June 2002, the Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission (AIHRC) was established by a presidential decree and 
received a mandate to «undertake national consultations and propose a 
national strategy for transitional justice and for addressing the abuses 
of the past»159. Discussions among civil society, religious leaders, 
academics and human rights activists took place in late 2003, while a 
broader consultation process was carried out in 2004. The final outcome 
of this process was a report entitled ‘A Call for Justice’160, endorsed by 
President Karzai in January 2005. The Report included opinions of 
more than 6,000 Afghan citizens from 32 provinces and refugee camps 
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in Iran and Pakistan. 69 percent of the interviewees identified 
themselves or their immediate families as direct victims of serious 
human rights violation during the war161. In addition, respondents 
displayed profound lack of trust in the Karzai Government, holders of 
public office, and to some extent in the international community, which 
failed to do something about the abuses162. 
A task force, made of personnel from the President's Office, 
AIHRC and UNAMA was hence created. The task force drafted an 
action plan, entitled ‘Action Plan for Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice 
in Afghanistan’163. The Afghan Government endorsed the Plan in 
December 2005, but it was not launched until December 2006, in 
confirmation of the sensitivity of the issue. The action plan included 
five key actions: (i) facilitating the acknowledgement of the suffering of 
Afghan people; (ii) vetting human rights abusers from positions of 
power within state institutions; (iii) truth-seeking; (iv) promoting 
reconciliation and national unity; and (v) establishing a task force to 
recommend additional accountability mechanisms. The timeline for 
implementing the actions proposed in the Action Plan was initially 
three years. However, according to the Joint Coordination and 
Monitoring Board (JCMB164), «given the limited progress […], full 
compliance with all the key action points is in serious doubt. The 
timeline […] may need to be revised and a realistic work plan for the 
implementation of the action plan agreed upon»165. As previously 
mentioned, one of the main challenges ahead is the issue of criminal 
liability of former militia commanders who now hold key political 
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posts. According to reliable resources, the Afghan Parliament currently 
sits «40 commanders still associated with armed groups, 24 members 
who belong to criminal gangs, 17 drug traffickers, and 19 members 
who face serious allegations of war crimes and human rights 
violations»166. In this respect, unsurprisingly, in February 2007 the 
Afghan parliament passed a resolution aimed at granting amnesty to 
all the individuals involved in the conflicts over the past 25 years167. The 
resolution was harshly contested by international authorities and 
human rights bodies168, as only favouring impunity for perpetrators of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, without truly aiming at 
political reconciliation. The resolution was lately embedded into a bill 
which was signed by President Karzai169. However, the legal validity of 
the amnesty law is not entirely clear170. 
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Given the poor developments of transitional justice in 
Afghanistan, the issue holds a limited significance within the whole 
justice system reform. However, due to the relevant political 
consequences of the topic, other brief remarks on the implementation of 
transitional justice in the country will be offered in the following 
chapters. 
 
4.5 Justice Reform in Countries Recovering from Conflict: 
 Common Features 
A common feature of justice reform in post-conflict scenarios is the 
fragmented consolidation process of the legal systems concerned, 
which «almost never conform to the technocratic ideal of rational 
sequences on which the indicator frameworks and strategic objectives 
of democracy promoters are built»171. This may prevent accurate 
assessment of the outcomes of any reconstruction process, because the 
performance metrics may be clogged by too many variables. However, 
some useful indicators may be identified in order to evaluate success in 
reconstruction: (i) serious crime rates (especially homicides and violent 
crimes); (ii) other crime indicators (e.g. drug and human trafficking); 
(iii) the level of political violence and insurgency; (iv) perceptions of 
security172. Naturally, the effectiveness of justice reforms also rests on 
people’s compliance with the law. Research shows that such 
compliance «depends most heavily on the perceived fairness and 
legitimacy of the laws, characteristics that are not established primarily 
by the courts but by other means, such as the political process»173. 
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However, people’s perceived fairness of a single justice system stems 
from the level of expectations and other irrational elements. In 
Afghanistan, public opinion about the judicial system remains quite 
positive, notwithstanding the parlous state of justice sector. According 
to a recent survey conducted in Afghanistan by the Asia Foundation174, 
state courts are perceived as fair and trusted by 50 percent of the 
population: a level which is reportedly even higher than the average 
level of confidence in the judicial system registered in the EU states (45 
percent)175. 
Nevertheless, it seems possible to draw up a few features that are 
common to the majority of justice system restorations in post-conflict 
situations176: 
(i) a high level of destruction of judicial buildings with 
consequent missing official records (that implies problems, 
for example, in identifying property rights); 
                                                           
 
 
174  R. Rennie, S. Sharma, and P. Sen, Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan 
People (Kabul: The Asia Foundation, 2008), 76, 
http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/418. However, the report 
highlights that the level of trust changes from region to region. It is much 
higher in the North West of Afghanistan, followed by the West and the 
central regions around Kabul. Unsurprisingly, the highest level of 
dissatisfaction with the justice system is consistently found in the South 
West. Respondents from these provinces have been also particularly reticent 
about giving a personal opinion on the court system. 
175  The highest level of confidence is registered in Denmark (79 percent); the 
lowest in Italy (32 percent). The level of public trust in the domestic justice 
system is reportedly higher in Afghanistan than in the UK (49 percent) or 
France (46 percent) (J.V. Roberts, Public Confidence in Criminal Justice: A 
Review of Recent Trends 2004-05 (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness, November 2004), 10, http://ww2.ps-
sp.gc.ca/publications/corrections/pdf/200405-2_e.pdf).  
176  R. Sannerholm, ‘Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reforms in Post-Conflict 
Societies: Beyond the Rule of Law Template’, 12(1) Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law 2007, 65-94, at 70-71. 
  
 
 
62 
 
(ii) a domestic judicial system characterized by the strong 
interference of local executive authorities (corruption and so-
called ‘telephone justice’); 
(iii) the law in force not integrally consistent with international 
human rights standards and/or its validity contested by the 
population; 
(iv) the presence of a parallel/unofficial system of justice; 
(v)  limited human and material resources. 
 
4.5.1 Collapse of the Previous Justice System 
In the aftermath of a conflict, the domestic justice system has often  
collapsed, hence, at the beginning of the intervention, peace-builders 
frequently face emergency situations. As argued by a practitioner in 
1999, «[e]stablishing the judicial system in East Timor entails building a 
system ‘from scratch’»177. Over 70 percent of all administrative 
buildings were partially or completely destroyed, while most courts 
had been torched or looted, resulting in the loss of registers, records, 
archives and other legal resources. The first recruiting campaign for 
personnel to serve in the judicial administration was carried out by 
launching leaflets from an aeroplane throughout the region178. The UN 
administration found that only about 70 Timorese citizens, who still 
lived in the country, had graduated from law school, while none of 
them had been practicing law under the Indonesian control of the 
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country179. Other sources confirm that the number of indigenous 
lawyers remaining after the referendum on independence was less than 
ten180. 
In Kosovo, it was apparent as from the very beginning of the UN 
mission that the law enforcement and judicial system had collapsed. To 
overcome the lack of buildings and personnel, a judicial mobile unit, 
comprised of nine among judges and prosecutors (including three 
Serbs) was initially established, while in three weeks their number had 
increased up to 28181. In Afghanistan the formal system of justice in 
place during the Taliban period (founded on both Islamic courts and 
tribal councils) collapsed with the downfall of Kabul in late 2001. 
Judicial buildings were almost crumbling and correctional facilities 
were close to nonexistent (excluding the Pul-e-Charkhi complex, outside 
Kabul). In addition, since July 1964, no one had made a compilation of 
the applicable laws passed during the 30 years of turbulent history, 
since due to past destructions there was no complete set of Official 
Gazette available for reference. 
 
4.5.2  Insecurity and Judicial Corruption 
The functionality of the justice system may be also threatened by the 
security situation. In Kosovo, at the beginning of the UN mission, due 
to the Miloševi• post-1989 purge of administrative personnel, only 30 
out of 756 judges and prosecutors were Kosovar Albanians. Following 
the re-entry of the Albanian refugees and displaced people, most of the 
Serbian magistrates moved back beyond the Serbian borders. The few 
who decided to stay were considered to be linked to the previous 
regime and immediately threatened, as was the case for the members of 
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the Council in charge of initial judicial appointments182. As a 
consequence, local judges are reported to have often ruled in favour of 
Kosovar defendants even though the law supported the Serbian 
plaintiffs, for fear of reprisals183. 
In Rwanda, over 300 survivors, who were also witnesses in 
genocide trials before state courts, were murdered between 1994 and 
1997, paralysing the justice system184. A solution to the threat of reprisal 
has often been found by staffing local courts with international judges, 
thus creating different types of ‘hybrid courts’185. These courts may be 
also employed during the transitional justice phase, as in the case of 
Sierra Leone (Special Court for Sierra Leone)186, East Timor (Special 
Panel in the Court of Dili)187, Cambodia (Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia)188 and Bosnia (War Crimes Chamber of the Court 
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of Bosnia and Herzegovina, established in 2005)189. In Kosovo, 
international judges serve under a two-track system. On the one hand, 
international judges are appointed to the regular courts, while on the 
other hand, special internationalised panels are created for the most 
sensitive war crimes trials190. Basically, international judges in Kosovo 
do not receive case assignments from the president of the court in 
which they sit, but from the UN administration’s Department of Justice: 
thus they act as a de facto parallel (i.e. special) jurisdiction191. However, 
the recent self-proclaimed Kosovo’s independence will soon lead to the 
sunset of the existing international legal and institutional framework. 
This will entail the replacement of the current UN Administration with 
a EU-led civilian mission (European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
Kosovo – EULEX) in charge of assisting Kosovo authorities, judicial 
authorities and law enforcement agencies192. In consequence, the 
domestic justice system will be probably reorganized, along with the 
presence of legal and judicial international staff. 
It is easy to imagine that corruption is another decisive factor 
that weakens the credibility of justice in post-war countries. According 
to the Corruption Perception Index 2007, almost all the countries, in 
which state-building missions are in charge for the legal reforms, are 
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among the most corrupt in the world193. In Afghanistan, the judiciary is 
also considered to be the most corrupt among state institutions by the 
population194. In order to overcome any destabilizing factor, the UN 
doctrine suggests vetting the bench and excluding individuals 
associated with past abuses195. However, vetting the judicial personnel 
for their impartiality or competence may entail initial judicial vacuum 
or allegations of system’s politicisation. A good compromise196 could be 
that of requiring judicial personnel to resign and reapply through a 
more transparent procedure, as done in the Br•ko District in Bosnia197. 
 
4.5.3  Reform of the Applicable Law 
The applicable law is a recurring issue in peace-building operations. In 
the first instance, the population may see the domestic law, formally in 
force, as an instrument from the previous regime and thus perceive it 
as radically unfair or illegitimate, as was the case in Kosovo. Domestic 
law may also violate international human rights law provisions, as in 
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the case of several Indonesian laws applied in East Timor, or be 
discriminatory against women, as in Haiti. Moreover, domestic law 
may be outdated and may not contain relevant crimes such as 
trafficking, money laundering and organised crime (as in the penal 
codes of Angola, dating back to 1886, and Haiti, dating back to 1925)198. 
Eventually, the presence of parallel administrative bodies, as a reaction 
to the imposition of past tyrannical or colonial rule, may entail the 
spread of non-statutory customary law. 
Whatever role they formally play in the reconstruction of the 
sector, international actors often support the re-establishment of the 
legislative framework in force prior to the previous regime, often 
«solely for practical reasons»199. This has frequently accompanied the 
repeal of those provisions of law incompatible with human rights 
standards (and with the regulations issued by the UN administration 
where appropriate), as has occurred during the UN missions in 
Kosovo, Timor Leste, Somalia and Afghanistan. In Kosovo, the UN 
administration decided on the law in force as of 1989 (pre-Miloševi• 
era). In East Timor, at the very beginning of the intervention, the laws 
in force remained provisionally those applied before the UN mission, 
even though a list of Indonesian laws – contrary to human rights – to be 
repealed, was also published200. 
Usually, domestic criminal law is the first to be abolished. The 
reform often encompasses the amendment of both substantive and 
procedural provisions. In Somalia, the application of the 1962 Somali 
criminal code was decided by the SRSG himself, although specific 
habeas corpus provisions were added to the code in order to make it 
compliant with human rights law. Eventually, the UN authorities 
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assisted local delegates in the constitution making process201. During 
the international administration of the Br•ko District, the criminal 
procedure code was redrafted. The new code was inspired by a party 
driven approach, also abolishing the investigating judge and allowing 
the judge to play a more limited role202. The UN administration in East 
Timor repealed the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code203 and enacted 
new Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure, while the UN mission in 
Cambodia set forth new substantive and procedural criminal 
provisions to be applied during the transitional period204. The UN 
administration in Kosovo followed this trend by issuing a Provisional 
Criminal Procedure Code and a Criminal Code in 2003. 
In Afghanistan, at the beginning of the international 
intervention, it was established that the interim legal system in force 
would consist of the 1964 ‘monarchical’ Constitution and of the full 
compilation of domestic laws and regulations passed since that time, 
unless in contrast with the Constitution itself or the Bonn Agreement205. 
A former Italian magistrate also drafted an interim criminal procedure 
code to be applied in Afghanistan, pending the enactment of a new 
code by the Afghan parliament206.  
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4.5.4  Parallel or Unofficial Justice Systems 
As for the existence of unofficial justice systems in post-conflict 
operations, it may be acknowledged that in many developing countries, 
customary systems operating outside the state administration «are 
often the dominant form of regulation and dispute resolution, covering 
up to 90% of the population in parts of Africa […]. Customary tenure 
covers 75% of land in most African countries, affecting 90% of land 
transactions in countries like Mozambique and Ghana»207. In 1999, 
customary law was reported to be largely spread in the countryside of 
East Timor, although the role of traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms were defined «indispensable» for the stability of the 
country’s justice system208. In Kosovo, the establishment of parallel 
judicial institutions by the Albanian population during the Miloševi• 
regime was followed by the birth of parallel municipal courts, ruled by 
Kosovo Serbs, after the UN intervention209. Two different non-statutory 
legal and judicial systems, that is, Islamic law and customary law 
(called ‘Xeer’), existed (and still exist) in Somalia at the beginning of the 
UN intervention. In particular, they represent a consolidated normative 
framework in rural areas210. A similar situation takes place in 
Afghanistan, where councils of elders, applying both customary and 
Islamic law, couple with statutory courts in the provinces outside 
Kabul211 and settle up to 80 percent of the disputes212. 
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4.5.5  Limited Human and Material Resources 
Lack of financial and human resources for the restoration of justice is a 
common feature of reconstruction missions. In this respect, the 
reestablishment of a police service is often considered more important 
than the judicial system for short-term stability: this, for instance, was 
the case of the UN mission in Somalia213. However, it has obviously 
been noted that a successful strategy may not depart from both services 
being fully operational and working in partnership214. In this respect, in 
order to give a clear idea of the priorities of the international donors in 
Afghanistan, it might be noted that until early 2005, the justice sector 
had only received 2-4 percent of the financial resources allocated to the 
entire security sector215. 
Lack of funds for the judicial system is also reported in the case 
of Sierra Leone, where the priority given to police reform and the 
establishment of the special court for the prosecution of serious crimes 
committed during the conflict, have drawn financial resources away 
from the development of the justice system216. In East Timor, the 
shortage of both physical and financial resources is reported as having 
hampered even the functioning of the Special Crime Panels established 
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within the Dili Court217. In Somalia, in order to overcome the lack of 
qualified judicial personnel, the restoration of law and order at district 
level relied on ‘neighbourhood forums’. The Australian force used to 
identify former judges who were acceptable to local community 
members, and convince them to resume their role218. 
 
4.6  Current Situation 
The goals accomplished by state-building missions in the 
reestablishment of justice do not appear encouraging. The situation in 
Africa is particularly critical. In the DRC the status of lawyers’ 
associations seems weak and access to justice is seriously restricted for 
the majority of people219. In several parts of the country, the military 
and civil justice systems are reported as non-functioning. In August 
2006, it was the president of the Congolese Military High Court to 
denounce the ineffectiveness of the court system, corruption and the 
need of law reforms. Only 60 out of 180 officially set up courts of first 
instance really exist, while only 30 of them seem to be actually 
functioning. Moreover, there is a wide gap (about half) in the number 
of judges required for the system to sustain. Such inefficiencies, 
coupled with the population’s lack of trust, have led the customary 
justice system to flourish220. 
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In Sierra Leone, functioning courts are currently concentrated in 
the sole capital city Freetown, together with most of the judges and 
attorneys (90 out of 100 practicing lawyers in the country work in 
Freetown)221. Customary law is spread all over the remaining part of the 
territory – to some extent fostered by the British colonial regime. 
According to a study of the World Bank, «approximately 85% of the 
population falls under the jurisdiction of customary law»222, which is 
also sanctioned in the Constitution. Integration between formal and 
informal systems of justice occurs within the statutory ‘local courts’, 
which apply local customary law and whose judges are appointed by 
local administrative leaders with the approval of the Ministry of Local 
Government & Community Development223. Notwithstanding this, the 
population ‘perceives the judicial system to be slow, ineffective and 
corrupt’224. 
In Somalia the UN mission (UNOSOM II) achieved limited 
success in stabilizing the security situation and in reconstructing the 
Somali justice system225. By March 1995, at the end of the UN mission’s 
mandate, 11 Appeal, 11 Regional and 46 District Courts were operating 
in the country. However, «this mean[s] that not all of the 18 Regional 
and 92 District councils had a judicial system in place to support the 
maintenance of order»226. Currently, the UNDP is managing a Rule of 
Law & Security Program (ROLS, originally established in 1997) 
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throughout the country, although its activities appear to be 
concentrated in Somaliland, due to more stable political conditions. The 
programme’s efficacy has yet to be assessed. 
In East Timor, a research by the Judicial Sector Monitoring 
Programme confirms that a high number of cases concerning sexual 
abuses or domestic violence is informally settled by village councils. 
Police sources admit that law enforcement officials often prefer to refer 
complainants of minor crimes to such forums instead of formally 
charging the suspects227. In addition, the Serious Crime Special Panels at 
the Dili Court ended their activities in May 2005 with meagre results: 
only 101 out of 440 indicted persons came before the court, while just 
87 were tried to a verdict228. The Cambodian justice system is reported 
as being in a «catastrophic state»229, while in Haiti the violent crime 
rates are among the highest in the world: the Organisation of American 
State estimates that from September 2004 to April 2005 there have been 
about 600 murders, including 19 police officers230. In Kosovo, the overall 
level of confidence in the judiciary is reported as being relatively low 
(30.8 percent), although the public perception of results differs on the 
basis of ethnic origin. Corruption is considered to be the greatest 
challenge for the system to sustain, while undue political interference 
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would still condition the courts’ rulings231. Although crime rates were 
dramatic at the beginning of the mission (in the period from January to 
August 2000 international authorities reported 14,878 criminal offences 
and arrested 3,734 persons232), the number of violent crimes has 
progressively decreased in the first three years of reconstruction233, even 
if in 2003 still one third of the prisoners in Kosovar detention facilities 
(about 400) were accused of murder234. In 2003, 6,282 persons were 
convicted for criminal offences by municipal and district courts235. 
However, these statistics do not include the judicial consequences of 
the March 2004 riots, hence figures are probably higher. 
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5  The System of Justice in Afghanistan before the US 
Military Intervention of 2001 
 
 
 
Contrary to appearances, Afghanistan owns a fairly long legal 
tradition, which may be traced back to 1923 – the year when its first 
constitution was written. Prior to that, for many centuries, the law in 
force consisted of a combination of Islamic law (sharia) and the 
pashtunwali, the code of conduct of Pashtun tribes. In the absence of a 
centralized administration of justice, disputes were mainly settled by 
the council of elders called jirgas/shuras236. These strong traditional and 
religious roots couple with a fragmented political history and culture, 
characterized by the absence of centralized state institutions. In this 
respect, the influence of religious culture has deeply conditioned the 
formation of a national state, and therefore it has been often difficult for 
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comprehensive overview of the Afghan traditional justice system, see 
International Legal Foundation, The Customary Law of Afghanistan (New 
York/Kabul: ILF, September 2004), 
http://www.theilf.org/Customary%20Laws.pdf. 
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the government to incorporate religious leaders within the state 
administrative system237. The persistence of traditional legal and social 
codes has directly opposed any attempts of social reorganization. For 
the past 150 years there has been a major confrontation between the 
urban elites attempting to expand the rule of law in the countryside 
and the rural population and the elite considering it as an arbitrary 
imposition of authority238. Although Islam has always strongly 
influenced the Afghan social and cultural life, tradition has had a 
deeper impact than religion in a number of provinces. Some of these 
traditional rules are not in accordance with Islamic principles. 
Nevertheless, they have become an integral part of the population’s 
lifestyle239.  
Indeed, the Afghan legal system has maintained its indigenous 
character, never coming entirely under the European legal influence240. 
This might help to explain, for instance, the historical lack of practicing 
lawyers in the country, since, traditionally, the Islamic law requires 
defendants to be present without defence in criminal cases, while in 
civil cases it permits a litigant to appoint an agent of one’s own choice, 
without imposing any qualification on the latter241. On the whole, the 
Afghan justice system may be defined as a system influenced by 
western legal thought (mainly French), moderate Islam (Turkey), 
radical Marxism and again radical Islam. «These influences, by and 
large, reflected the values, ideologies, and politics of the various 
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governments that Afghanistan has witnessed since its emergence as a 
politically organised society»242. 
  In consequence, a relative knowledge of Islamic law and 
jurisprudence is essential in order to conduct a study on the Afghan 
justice system. In this respect, the first paragraph of this chapter will 
briefly examine the most relevant principles of Islamic law, which may 
be of interest for this study. The following sections focus on the 
influence of Islamic law over the Afghan legal system, and the justice 
sector in the ‘pre-American era’, which comprises the study of legal 
and judicial reforms during the Taliban regime. This ‘legal path’ will 
lead to the subsequent chapter, which includes a concise history of the 
Afghan justice system and a more extended analysis of the justice 
system currently in force. The latter is the product of the post-2001 
institutional reforms, which, as regards the justice sector, culminated 
with the new 2004 Constitution, the reorganization of the judicial 
administration and the enactment of basic substantive and procedural 
laws. 
 
5.1  Brief Outlines of Islamic Law 
Islamic law243 may be considered as a combination between the 
religious and the legal phenomenon. Traditionally, it is composed of 
four major sources of law: Quran, Hadiths (actions and sayings of the 
Prophet), ijma (consensus of the scholars over specific cases – similar to 
an opinio iuris) and qiyas (cases decided by analogical reasoning). Qiyas 
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are only admitted by Sunni legal scholars, while Shiites usually use a 
technique known as aql (intellect), which relies on individual 
conscience and thus on a more independent moral judgment. What 
does basically make Islamic law different from statutory law is that it 
has not been elaborated by the state but by private schools of jurists 
(called madhab) which have been further recognized by state 
authorities. In addition, traditional Islamic culture does not respect the 
principle of separation of powers. Indeed, on the one hand, legal 
scholars (ulama) identify prescriptions and obligations through the 
interpretation of the norms contained in the Scriptures, so that this 
doctrine represents a kind of basic source of law for the Islamic 
community; while, on the other hand, they also settle disputes, acting 
as judicial authorities. In the latter case, they may act as state officers or 
privately – thus delivering a fatwa. «Law is [therefore] epitomized, not 
in a system of objective, formal, general, public, compulsory rules, but 
in the unique decision of an individual conscience (ijtihad) applied to 
the evaluation of a concrete act»244. This conception of law clearly 
clashes with the Western-oriented idea of rule of law. Ijtihad (literally 
‘endeavour’ or ‘self-exertion’) may be described as the process of 
deriving or extracting legal norms from the main sources of law. Ijtihad 
is the judge’s endeavour to formulate a rule on the basis of evidence 
found in the Scriptures. The opposite of ijtihad is taqlid (imitation), 
which instead refers to the acceptance of a rule drawn from past 
decisions of authoritative legal scholars245. 
Therefore, Islamic law is not originally composed of codified, 
universal, general principles of law, but, on the contrary, it includes a 
huge number of hypothetic and real case-law246. In addition, 
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«there is no system of judicial precedent (stare decisis) […]. Judges do not 
need to follow the decisions of previous judges, or even their own decisions 
in similar previous cases. Instead, scholars are supposed to use their vast 
knowledge of Islamic law and its authoritative sources, or the accepted 
sources of their legal school»247. 
«Muslim judges always say that a principle like deciding similar cases 
similarly would be unjust because people are different and even the 
same individual’s situations vary from moment to moment. […] To 
judge without considering context would be to violate all sense of 
justice»248. This makes it clear that, basically, Islamic law does not 
originate from ‘law sources’ but from ‘legal authorities’. In a traditional 
Islamic society, the ulama are indeed «not in theory, but in fact the 
lawmakers of Islam»249. In order to maintain power and authority, 
ulama have often opposed the codification of the law, trying to resist the 
adoption of codes and other statutes. Although, traditionally, the role 
of political elite in determining the applicable law is virtually 
nonexistent, it may have an important part to play in the success or 
failure of a religious school. On the one hand, rulers granted economic 
and political support to religious/legal scholars; on the other hand, the 
latter «constituted the linkage between this elite and the masses, 
providing an efficient instrument to the ruling elite for gaining political 
control and legitimacy»250. For instance, during the kingdom of the first 
King of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747), the ulema strongly 
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supported the new monarchy, in exchange for economic and social 
privileges251. 
With regard to criminal law, sharia only provides for a few 
Islamic offences (hudd). Due to the lack of a general theory of Islamic 
criminal law, the main distinction among Islamic crimes originally 
concerned the relative penalties. The latter are divided into hudud and 
tazir. Hudud mean ‘Allah’s restrictive prescriptions’, traditionally 
known as enclosed in the Koran, while tazir are ‘discretionally 
punishments’ applied by the qadi (judge) after balancing the 
punishment with the tort. Hudud punishments are considered to be 
given and immutable by Islamic jurists and, therefore, leave no 
discretion to the judge. Hudud are provided in cases of adultery, rape, 
fornication, theft, wine drinking and highway robbery252. Tazir 
punishments include offences like fraud, forgery, false witness, 
prostitution against nature and extortion, as well as hudud offences in 
cases when not all the conditions to proceed against the defendant are 
satisfied253. Among Islamic criminal offences, qassass (or quisas) are 
intentional crimes against the person and are based on the concept of 
retaliation (lex talionis). In such cases, the victims or their families can 
forgive the offender and accept a compensation in the form of a sum of 
money or property (diat and irsy, respectively)254. 
Currently, in all Islamic countries sharia and statutory law 
coexist. Thanks to the law reforms undertaken in the Ottoman empire 
in the IXX century, most Arab countries have further adopted 
comprehensive legal codes, that usually combine elements of French 
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and Islamic law255. While the majority of Muslim countries, including 
Egypt, Iraq and Kuwait, imported the French codes and organised their 
legal systems according to the civil law legal tradition, a few countries, 
such as Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia introduced British-inspired 
common law systems, which they supplemented with various statutory 
laws256. Generally, legal scholars (ulama) and state authorities 
(government and parliament) share the jurisdiction over the applicable 
law. Sometimes, especially where the Executive is vested by a 
monarchy or where the religious scholars are powerful enough, Islamic 
law may bind state authorities in their legislative power. In a number 
of Islamic countries sharia is also a parameter for the constitutional 
review of laws as well as for their interpretation257. Such prescription 
might represent «the belief that an Islamic state ha[s] both to sustain, 
and to be guided by, Islamic Law, conceived of as a set of God-given 
principles»258. In other Muslim nations, the constitution does not allow 
any revision of those articles concerning Islamic principles or Islam as 
state religion259. On the other hand, there are a few lay countries, such 
as Turkey, Albania and a number of former Soviet Republics (e.g. 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), which do not mention sharia in their 
Constitution. 
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While in secular countries state authorities retain the full control 
over law-making, in Islamic countries (excluding a few lay states) the 
degree of state control over particular law matters results in a 
significant parameter to assess its secularization. Normally, family law 
is under the jurisdiction of religious scholars. On the contrary, 
administrative, commercial and international law are regulated by 
statutory norms. A further distinction concerns the jurisdiction over 
civil and criminal law. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the latter are under 
the jurisdiction of Islamic scholars. Conversely, in Egypt, civil and 
criminal law are placed under state jurisdiction260. However, since 
judicial cases frequently involve more than one matter, conflicts of 
jurisdiction sometimes arise. 
 
5.2  The Islamic Tradition in Afghan Justice System 
Historically, in Afghanistan, secular law and Islamic jurisprudence 
have often coexisted, both regulating important sectors of society261. 
However, these bodies of law have sometimes intersected and 
overlapped. In particular, statutory law was expected to be in harmony 
with sharia and to supplement it, while both were supposed to overlay 
tribal codes or customs262. Sharia governed the legal system until 1925, 
when King Amanullah first introduced a criminal code and the state 
assumed the task of training ulema to become Islamic judges. The Sharia 
Faculty in Kabul, established in 1946, has been the main centre for the  
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integration of the new secular law with traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence263. 
With regard to the latter, the overwhelming majority of Afghan 
Sunnis (representing about 85 percent of the population) are followers 
of the Hanafi School264. Conversely, the Shiites (the other 15 percent of 
the population) are largely followers of the Jafari School265. The Hanafi 
School is founded on rules inspired by the Scriptures (fiqh266) and by 
traditional Muslim practices based on divine/natural law originating 
from Allah267. Since the Hanafi fiqh results in a set of rules gathered from 
the social life of old Islamic communities, it is subject to continuous 
reinterpretation for its readaptation to modern times. 
In Afghanistan, the modernization of the old fiqh was carried out 
at the beginning of the twenties by King Amanullah’s legists. Before the 
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this modernization process, qadi and assistant judges (mufti) were 
mostly Afghan clerics who had completed religious studies in their 
homeland or abroad, especially in Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan and 
Kirghizistan268. Reforms (often called the Nizamnama reforms) were also 
specifically aimed at eliminating any form of discrimination and 
reducing the influence of the ulema in the judiciary, by opening the 
judicial posts to other suitable candidates269. Amanullah was probably 
influenced by the process of secularization which was taking place in 
Turkey, under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk. The country acquired a 
written constitution and became fully independent, but some of the 
reforms were unrealistic and probably unnecessary270. In particular, a 
new penal code, which mostly consisted in codified Islamic law, was 
adopted by the King in 1925. Therefore, since «ulema were no longer 
allowed to extract their own interpretation from the religious texts, but 
had to follow the compulsory interpretation of the law, this codification 
significantly reduced their influence and undermined the position of 
the religious leadership at the tribal and village level»271. In addition, 
the introduction of administrative, commercial and reconciliation 
courts (the latter lasted only until the mid-thirties) led to the transfer of 
power from Islamic courts to these new tribunals. Unsurprisingly, 
tribal and religious leaders pushed the quasi-constitutional monarchy 
to the downfall in 1929272. 
A further period of reforms began after the adoption of the 1931 
Constitution. At that time, Afghan legal scholars began to reorganize 
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and translate old legal materials into Dari, basing their interpretation of 
the texts on the Hanafi school doctrine. However, the task was rather 
uneasy, as old sources of Islamic law were originally written in classical 
Arabic, and that made them hardly understandable for Afghans273. 
Given the threat posed by religious schools, reforms advanced more 
cautiously. Some of the most controversial legislations, adopted only a 
few years before, were cancelled and the jurisdiction of Islamic courts 
strengthened274. The principle that Islam is the religion of the state and 
that judicial decisions must respect sharia teachings was also embedded 
in the constitution275. Until the establishment of the Faculty of Law and 
Political Science and the Faculty of Sharia at the University of Kabul in 
the early forties, certificates from religious schools alone served as 
educational credentials to access the administration of justice276. Even 
after the establishment of the two faculties, the knowledge of Hanafi fiqh 
remained a prerequisite for judicial appointment, as stated in the Civil 
Procedure Code of 1957 (Art. 4)277. The latter defined a judge (qadi), as 
«the ruler of Sharia who is appointed by the sovereign or his regent, 
and who settles the disputes before him in accordance to the provisions 
of Sharia» (Art. 2). According to the code, a judge should «be fully 
knowledgeable in fiqh, especially in Hanafi fiqh and be able to apply the 
authoritative rules thereof in settling the disputes before him» (Art. 3). 
However, his knowledge should not be limited to Islamic law, as it 
should also embrace local customs (Art. 4), as well as statutory law, 
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especially those norms related to judicial affairs (Commentary to Art. 
4)278. These provisions confirm that religion continued to exercise a 
strong influence over the judicial system. 
Even with the adoption of the ‘lay’ Constitution of 1964, Islam 
and the Hanafi school of law continued to retain substantial power. 
Under the 1964 Constitution (Art. 8), the King had to be a Hanafi 
Muslim, while the parliament was required not to pass anti-Islamic 
laws (Art. 64)279. However, the same article did not require the laws in 
force to conform to sharia as such, but it included a ‘repugnance clause’, 
affirming that the same laws did not have to be «repugnant to the basic 
principles of the Islam»280. This reference to general principles, instead of 
specific rules, «provided the legislature with greater leeway to enact 
laws that presented some tension with the tenets of Islamic law taken 
literally»281. Even though statutory law, rather than sharia, became the 
primary source of law for the Afghan justice system, those matters not 
covered by statutory law were to be regulated according to the Hanafi 
jurisprudence (Art. 69). This principle is also included in the 1977 Civil 
Code and it is due «to secure justice in the best possible way»282. The 
penal code, first adopted in 1925 and then amended in 1976, goes even 
further, as it only concerns tazir crimes, leaving hudud, qassass, and diat 
to be regulated in accordance with the Hanafi jurisprudence (Art. 1). On 
the whole, even though the 1964 Constitution sought to harmonize 
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statutory and Islamic law, the lack of interpretative provisions or 
criteria to settle potential conflicts of jurisdiction kept this dichotomy 
alive283. 
During the sixties, the coexistence between Islamic and statutory 
law also reflected on the legal education. In 1968, the Supreme Court 
opened a new judicial training centre in Kabul, with the aim of 
overcoming the existing imbalance in the educational background of 
the graduates of the law/political science and sharia faculties. Indeed, 
this programme also favoured the progressive replacement of the old 
judicial elite with new cadres, having a modern legal background284. 
However, this legal elite would be decimated in the years to come, 
because of the continuous regime changes and the civil unrest. The vast 
majority of them would be either killed or imprisoned, otherwise 
would leave the country285. 
In 1973, a successful coup ousted the King Zahir Shah and took 
the former Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud to power. The 1973 coup 
was the first regime change in Afghanistan orchestrated without the 
support of armed tribes. Previously, the latter had always been «the 
arbiters of power, exercised by a tribal aristocracy, relying on tribal 
patronage networks»286. This contributed to widen the separation 
between the regime and the Afghan society. The Daoud’s regime 
enacted a new constitution in 1977. The 1977 Constitution integrated 
secular and religious values, by including a ‘repugnance clause’ in 
which basic Islamic principles were placed side by side with the 
republican order and other constitutional principles (Art. 64). In 
addition Art. 99 affirmed that courts should apply «the basic 
principles»287 (not the provisions) of Islam and Hanafi jurisprudence 
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only if no provision existed in the constitution itself or in statutory 
laws. The same reference to the ‘basic principles’ of Islam is found at 
Art. 80, which required the Afghan President to protect the basic 
principles of Islam as well as to respect the constitution and other laws 
of Afghanistan. However, the 1977 Constitution was never truly 
implemented, due to the coup d’état that overthrew President Daoud in 
1978. 
After the coup, Afghanistan entered into its fourth and last 
secularisation process288. With the adoption of the 1980 ‘communist’ 
Constitution, Islam ceased to be a source of law and even the official 
religion of the state. The constitution merely provided its «respect, 
observance and preservation»289 and gave believers the freedom to 
perform religious rituals (Art. 5). The Afghan Marxist government 
attempted to introduce an entirely lay justice system290, placed under 
the political control of the regime and in line with its ideological and 
political goals. However, frictions with both Islamic precepts and 
customary rules caused the whole system of governance to be widely 
rejected by the population291. With the 1987 Constitution, enacted by the 
new Najibullah government, Islam was back among law sources. Art. 2 
reintroduced the «principles of the sacred religion of Islam»292 as a 
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constitutional parameter. In addition, the 1987 Constitutional Charter 
explicitly provided for the Afghan President to be a Muslim (Art. 73), 
as previously reported in the 1977 Constitution (Art. 77). After only 
three years the government convened a Loya Jirga (Grand Council)293 to  
promulgate a more Islamic constitution, which renamed Afghanistan as 
an Islamic state (Art. 1). This progressive restoration of Islamic 
principles reflected the attempt made by the government to regain the 
confidence of the people. Such efforts, however, did not succeed. 
The arrival of Mujahedins in Kabul in 1992 led to a wide 
Islamization of the country. Uncertainty over the applicable law was 
widespread. Although the previous constitutions were not repealed, 
their validity was rather doubtful. In consequence, Islamic law and 
customary law were applied, being the sole available sources of law, 
especially in the war-torn countryside, where people had no access to 
courts and where statutory law was almost unknown294. Within this 
‘Hobbesian state of nature’295, the Mujahedins prepared a draft 
constitution, that was never promulgated. In the Draft Charter, Islam 
gained a certain relevance. Art. 2 specified that the legal system in force 
was to be based on the Koran. Art. 3 affirmed that laws should conform 
not only to the principles of Islam but also to the prescriptions of the 
Koran and the Hadiths. Art. 5 and 7 imposed Islamic principles as 
ruling private and public life of citizens. Art. 7 also declared Hanafi 
school as the country’s official creed, leaving no room for any other 
statutory law296. As a consequence, courts began to deliver rulings 
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according to fundamentalist principles of Islamic law297. The integral 
‘re-islamization’ of the legal order may be considered as a reaction to 
the secularization imposed by the communist regime. Indeed, the 1992 
Draft Constitution represents the antithesis of that of 1980, which was 
instead presented as a model of communist constitutional charter298. 
In 1996, the Taliban stormed into Kabul. The new regime 
imposed a theocratic state (‘Islamic emirate’) based on a political-
religious community which encompassed all the citizens. It adopted a 
radical version of Islamic law as the major source of law. As a 
consequence, the key function of law became that of protecting and 
promoting Islamic ideals and values. A Ministry of Virtue, responsible 
through its religious police for the enforcement of public morality, was 
then created. Criminal and civil cases were settled under a binary 
system. The claimant/plaintiff and the defendant had the possibility to 
choose between the jirga system or the shariat, the latter being the 
‘ordinary’ judiciary in place in the country299. Punishment became a tool 
to promote an Islamic way of life among citizens. In consequence, the 
regime reintroduced the prosecution of hudud and qassass crimes300. 
Ultimately, it imposed the complete segregation of women, according 
to «a policy based on a mixture of conservative Deobandi teachings and 
traditional Pashtunwali conceptions of a woman’s place and role in the 
society»301. 
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5.3  The Taliban Period 
As reported above, the Taliban removed any reference to the 
communist era. They founded a theocratic regime aimed at shaping the 
society as a «community of the first generation of Muslims, imagined 
with a Pashtun rural twist»302. In the wake of the capture of Kabul, the 
Taliban repealed all laws passed during the communist regimes and 
declared the 1964 Constitution to be in force, although its real validity 
is questioned303. Justice administration was basically taken back to that 
in force before the 1978 coup. The judiciary was essentially composed 
of Shariat courts established at district, provincial and central level, to 
which prosecutor’s offices (saranwali) were attached. However, powers 
and jurisdiction of these courts over both civil and criminal cases were 
limited, as religious courts were often established on an ad hoc basis in 
order to hear and decide specific cases304. Both judges and prosecutors 
were employees of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), being the whole justice 
system subjected to the government305. Unlike the justice system in 
place before the communist era, MoJ-Offices for civil rights (Hoqooq) 
were established in districts and provinces in 1999 306. Hoqooq were 
supposed to arbitrate civil and commercial  disputes, facilitating a 
mediation between the parties. They represented the first level of 
formal dispute settlement, but also consisted in a nexus between 
statutory/religious law and informal dispute resolution mechanisms, 
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as they received most of cases directly from local community 
representatives. In the case a mediation had been unsuccessful, Hoqooq 
would have referred the case to court307. 
In criminal cases, the investigating phase was mainly managed 
by the police, the prosecutor performing a limited role of liaison with 
the qadi308. Apparently, the Taliban also issued a formal criminal code, 
which included those Islamic punishments introduced in 1996309. 
However, its real diffusion is doubtful. A law on the role and powers of 
defence attorneys was enacted in 1999310. Following this law, the 
activity of legal professionals became strongly regulated and their 
association placed under the MoJ. According to the law, defence 
attorneys should either (i) hold a degree from an Afghan/foreign 
religious school or from a faculty of sharia, or (ii) have at least 10 years 
of professional and practical work experience in the MoJ (Art. 6). 
Again, the efficacy of the law in question is seriously questioned, given 
the inexistence of any functioning Lawyers’ Association in the 
aftermath of the US military intervention. It is reported that the 
Lawyers’ Association of Afghanistan established in 1985, was closed 
down by the Taliban in 1996, and was reopened in November 2001. In 
the late eighties it accounted about 5,000 members311. 
 
5.4  The Justice System 
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In order to draw a concise picture of the Afghan justice system’s 
evolution up until 2001, one may start from the pre-1978 coup situation. 
Since the 1964 Constitution (Art. 97), the judiciary has been almost fully 
independent. However, excluding the Taliban domination, it has been 
part of the MoJ for limited periods of regime change, i.e. from the 1973 
Revolution to the adoption of the 1977 Constitution, and after the 1978 
coup to the enactment of the 1980 Constitution. To some extent, the 
1977 Constitution represents a turning point in the Afghan 
constitutional history, because, for the first time, the country was 
proclaimed a republic after centuries of monarchy (Art. 20). The 1977 
Charter provided for the complete nationalisation of all the natural and 
economic resources of the country (Art. 13) and generally drew on the 
basic framework of a centralized single party-socialist republic312 
admitting a limited private property and a ‘guided’ market economy 
(Art. 17-18). Against this political background, the Constitution enlisted 
several general principles of criminal law such as the non-retroactivity, 
the prohibition of common law crimes, the personal criminal liability, 
the fair defence principle, along with the prohibition of inhumane or 
degrading punishments (Art. 30-31). The Supreme Court, together with 
the other courts, constituted the ordinary system of justice (Art. 96). 
The Supreme Court also acted as the highest administrative body of the 
Bench (Art. 102 and 112). It was granted a high level of supervisory 
jurisdiction over lower courts, also extending to their organisation, 
functioning and administrative affairs. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
held the administration of the entire budget of the judiciary. However, 
it is noteworthy that the constitution did not mention the judiciary as 
an independent state organ (Art. 96). In addition, the nine members of 
the Supreme Court (including the Chief Justice) were appointed by the 
President of the Republic, and possibly dismissed by the same 
President after a five years period (Art. 107). This would highlight an 
apparent decline in the independence of the judiciary313. 
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The courts were organised according to the 1967 ‘Law of the 
Jurisdiction and Organization of the Courts of Afghanistan’314. In 
addition to that of 1967, relevant provisions on the organization of 
courts were contained in the 1957 ‘Law of Administration of the Courts 
of Justice’315, the 1945 ‘Law of Statutory Limitations for Primary, 
Appellate and Review Hearings of Civil and Criminal Cases’316. These 
laws basically created a bi-partition of national courts, which were 
divided into general courts, including the Supreme Court, the Court of 
Cassation, the High Central Court of Appeal, provincial courts and 
primary (district) courts; and specialized courts, consisting of juvenile 
courts, labour courts, and other specialized courts established by the 
Supreme Court in case of need317. 
District courts owned a general jurisdiction, except for certain 
categories of cases, which included commercial and public security 
cases, as well as tax claims and cases of challenges of parliamentary 
elections and municipal or provincial council elections. Such cases were 
referred directly to provincial courts. The latter represented the 
intermediate-appellate level courts, receiving cases from the district 
(primary) courts. The High Central Court of Appeal, located in Kabul, 
was supposed to hear cases from all the provincial courts in the 
country318. However, this court was further abrogated in 1968 and its 
duties transferred to the Central Public Security and Commercial 
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Appeal Court in Kabul319. Within the Supreme Court, was embedded a 
Court of Cassation, in charge of reviewing the Provincial Courts’ 
decisions on issues of law, or on their conformity with the principles of 
sharia. The Court of Cassation was a court of last resort and its rulings 
could be considered as judicial precedents by the lower courts. Being 
the highest organ of the judiciary, the Supreme Court pronounced on 
issues of constitutionality as well as on the interpretation and 
application of laws320. 
The further constitutions, adopted in 1980, 1987 and 1990 
introduced only a few changes in the structure and functioning of 
courts. The 1980 Constitution reduced the independence of the 
judiciary. Judges were formally independent in their own decisions, 
but were indeed appointed by the Presidium of the Revolutionary 
Council. In addition, the Supreme Court was itself mandated to report 
to the Revolutionary Council about its performance (Art. 55-56). The 
communist regime also established a special ‘Revolutionary Court’ for 
crimes against revolution or state security. This system of special courts 
was amended and renamed several times until such special courts were 
abolished in 1990. However, this special judiciary was nothing but a 
peculiarity of the communist era and has had no influence on the 
current Afghan judiciary321. 
The Office of the Attorney General (Saranwali) was created in 
1967322 and placed under the authority of the MoJ (1964 Constitution, 
Art. 103; 1977 Constitution, Art. 106). Later, with the 1980 and 1987 
Constitutions, the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) became an 
independent organ accountable to the Revolutionary Council and to the 
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President of the Republic, respectively (1980 Constitution, Art. 59; 1987 
Constitution, Art. 119). Such provision disappeared in the 1990 
Constitution. However, both the 1987 and the 1990 Constitutional 
Charters report that the AGO is appointed by the President of the 
Republic (Art. 119 in both constitutions). The AGO organizational 
structure followed that of courts, with AGO local offices attached to the 
district appellate courts and to the High Central Court of Appeal. 
Ultimately, the organization of the AGO was regulated again in 1991 to 
comply with the institutional changes that occurred in the previous 
years323. Given the historical conditions under which this law was 
adopted, its real application in those days seems questionable. 
However, it is currently applied, pending the enactment of a new law. 
Traditionally, the Ministry of Justice has played a limited role 
within the Afghan justice system, mostly related to the drafting of laws 
and the administration of juvenile justice324. The MoJ department 
specialized in drafting laws and regulations is called Taqnin. The 
Department was initially established in 1962 to assist the Executive in 
drafting and reviewing all national legislation. Its tasks and goals were 
further detailed in 1999, under the Taliban regime325.  
The rights to a defence counsel was initially established in Art. 26 
of the 1964 Constitution and further remarked in the 1977 
Constitutional Charter (Art. 31). Since 1964, the ‘Law on the 
Administration of Government Cases’326 had established a State 
                                                           
 
 
323  Law on Structure and Authority of the Attorney General’s Office, Official 
Gazette No. 738, April 1991, 
http://www.ago.gov.af/Content/Law&Leg/Regulation/Law_on_structure
_and_authority_of_AGO.pdf. This law was further amended in 1995. 
324  W.T. Loris and A. De Maio, ‘La ricostruzione dello stato di diritto in 
Afghanistan’, 6(2) Itinerari d’impresa 2003, 191-212, at 204.  
325  Law on Rights and Privileges of Members of the Taqnin, Official Gazette No. 
787, 1999, available in Dari at the IDLO database. Taqnin’s tasks and goals 
are reported at MoJ website, http://www.moj.gov.af/?lang=en&p=e5.  
326  Law on Administration of Government Cases, Official Gazette No. 12, 10 
March 1964. 
  
 
 
97 
 
Attorney’s Office within the MoJ. In consequence, the legal profession 
was regulated by the 1972 Advocates Law327. The constitutional 
provisions on the right to a defence counsel were included in the first 
articles of the Advocates Law (Art. 1-2). The latter also acknowledged 
the right to free legal aid for indigents (Art. 10). The Bar, however, was 
not an independent body, but was committed to the MoJ. In fact, the 
Law also stipulated the creation, within the MoJ, of a ‘Control 
Committee’, in charge of admitting candidates to the Bar and take 
disciplinary measures against the defence attorneys (Art. 4 and 35). To 
enter the Bar, the qualifications required were minimal, and included a 
degree from the Faculty of Sharia or Law and Political Science, 
otherwise an official sharia madrassa (Islamic school), or even a mere 
certification of proficiency by the Control Committee (Art. 5). The 
Taliban regime also issued an ‘Advocates Law’ in 1999328. As earlier 
mentioned, the latter maintained the Bar within the MoJ (Art. 3) and 
reduced the qualifications for candidates, who now could become 
defence attorneys with a simple degree from an official Afghan or 
foreign religious school, or with at least 10 years of professional and 
practical work experience at the MoJ (Art. 6). Licenses were issued by 
the MoJ as well (Art. 8). 
 
5.5   The Applicable Law 
As previously anticipated, in Afghanistan, substantive and procedural 
laws have always been influenced by both Islamic rules and principles. 
The possibility of applying Islamic jurisprudence along with statutory 
norms can be attributed to several factors. One is the lack of a proper 
legal education for judges and prosecutors, most of whom had 
obtained a degree at the Faculty of Sharia, instead of the Faculty of 
Law/Political Science. In addition, notwithstanding the launch of 
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several law reforms in the sixties and seventies, laws were not easily 
accessible to all the judicial personnel, so many judges and prosecutors 
either had a basic knowledge of their contents, or were reluctant to 
apply them329. In addition, from July 1964 to early 2002 no one had ever 
made a compilation of all the Afghan laws and regulations. Since 1963, 
laws were published in the Official Gazette (Rasmi Jareda). However, in 
2001, international experts sent on site realized that a complete set of 
gazettes was simply inexistent. Those maintained in the MoJ and at the 
Kabul Law Faculty had been largely destroyed during the civil war, 
while the modest library of the Supreme Court mainly kept foreign law 
texts330. This does not mean that, at least on paper, the Afghan legal 
system was not a modern and a comprehensive one. The years going 
from 1973 to 1978 deserve to be remembered as the most intense period 
of codification in the whole Afghan legal history331. 
Indeed, in the wake of the adoption of the 1977 Constitution, 
penal, civil and commercial substantive332 and procedural333 codes were 
in force in the country. The Penal Code of 1976 and the Civil Code of 
1977 covered important aspects of social justice and represented the 
«major attempts to cope with elements of secular law, based on, but 
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superseded by other systems»334, namely the Islamic and the traditional 
law systems. With regard to criminal law, the 1976 Penal Code, which 
is still in force nowadays, considers both Islamic and secular offences. 
Art. 1 shows a clear distinction between crimes and penalties which are 
to be dealt with either according to the Hanafi jurisprudence or the 
provisions included in the penal code itself. It therefore legitimises de 
facto the infliction of hudud penalties, which are clearly at odds with the 
ordinary principles of human dignity and thus contrary to both the 
1964 Constitution (Art. 31 – in force at that time) and a number of 
Afghanistan’s international legal obligations. The remaining tazir 
crimes are regulated according to the penal code and based on 
unremarkable European principles of criminal law335. The 1976 Penal 
Code also includes crimes to be punished by death, which are divided 
into two main categories: crimes against the security of the state and 
certain cases of aggravated murder. Other crimes punishable by death 
could be found in the 1987 ‘Law on Crimes against Internal and 
External Security’, of Soviet inspiration336. 
Concerning the criminal procedure law, the 1965/1974 Criminal 
Procedure Code (CPC) was later influenced by the 1979 ‘Law on the 
Discovery and Investigation of Crimes’337 (further amended in 1981). 
Under the latter, the secret services enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction to 
investigate the most serious crimes – such as those against external and 
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internal security – certain political crimes,  kidnapping and the taking 
of hostages338. The prosecution of crimes was mandatory339. However, 
norms concerning preliminary investigations were rather unclear. 
During the investigation phase, the 1965 CPC addressed the interaction 
between police and prosecutors (Art. 14), as did both the 1967 Law on 
Attorney General Office (1967 AGO Law, Art. 8) and the 1978 Law on 
Discovery and Investigation of Crimes. Under the 1965 CPC, the 
prosecutor directed the investigations, while crime detection was the 
duty of both the police and the prosecutor  (Art. 15-17). On the 
contrary, the 1967 AGO Law distinguished between the tasks of the 
police and the prosecutor more clearly, the former being in charge of 
crime detection and initial investigations, with the latter reviewing the 
work of the police and presenting the case to the court (Art. 12-13). The 
1991 ‘Law on Structure and Authority of the Attorney General’s Office’ 
(1991 AGO Law) returned to a wider role of a prosecutor, who was 
now in charge of participating in the discovery and investigation of 
crimes together with the police, also instructing police officers to 
perform specific actions (Art. 19). 
Once the crime investigation was commenced, the police were 
obliged to inform and report the prosecutor after 24 hours (Art. 17, 1965 
CPC and Art. 12, 1967 AGO Law). The time-limit for provisional arrest 
by the police was 72 hours, after which the arrested persons had to be 
taken before the Prosecutor, who could extend the detention up to an 
additional seven days (Art. 29, 1965 CPC; Art. 19, 1967 AGO Law). 
Further pre-trial detention had to be authorized by a court and 
generally it could not exceed three months (Art. 86, 1965 CPC). In 
special circumstances the detention period could be extended, but 
within the maximum time-limit for pre-trial detention of nine months 
(Art. 87, 1965 CPC). The 1965 CPC also provided a maximum time-limit 
for the investigations, which normally did not exceed six months for 
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the most serious crimes. However, this period could be extended for an 
additional three months in particular situations (Art. 88). 
As reported earlier, the Afghan civil law has also been influenced 
by Islamic and customary principles. In this respect, Art. 1 of the 1977 
Civil Code (currently still in force) states that in the absence of a 
statutory norm, the courts shall decide a case in accordance with the 
principles of Hanafi jurisprudence. Local customs may represent a law 
source of third instance in case the litigation may not be solved under 
statutory or Islamic law. However, customs must not be in 
contradiction with the statutory law or with the principles of justice 
(Art. 2). Islamic legal thought has also influenced the theory of civil 
liability, which introduces an objective liability for any civil damage: 
the simple fact of causing a tort implies an obligation to repair (Art. 
758-759)340. Conversely, at the time of its enactment, the Afghan civil 
code already acknowledged the compensation for moral damage (Art. 
778). As regards civil procedural law, the influence of Islam on the 1957 
Civil procedure code has already been discussed in previous 
paragraphs. The code was further modified in 1990341 by softening those 
provisions related to the Islamic background of judges. They should 
now have «grasp and understanding of the effective laws of the 
country and of the rules of the Islamic law», together with the 
«complete awareness of the general culture, manners and customs of 
the society» (Art. 498). This is because, in the absence of clear statutory 
rules, decisions were to be issued «according to the fundamental 
principles of the Islamic law» (Art. 501). The oath remained central 
among evidence, even if it could not be used in specific separation 
cases (Art. 113). The testimony was entirely regulated according to 
Islamic law (Art. 321 and 337). In addition, higher courts remained 
committed to Islamic law in reviewing the decisions of lower courts 
(Art. 451). 
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At the end of this brief picture of the pre-2001 Afghan system of 
justice, we must advise the reader that there are no guarantees that the 
entire justice system was effectively functioning as described above. 
Lack of data and official reports undermine the effectiveness of any 
research on the matter. The only available data on the Afghan justice 
system in the ‘pre-American’ period was reported by Marvin 
Weinbaum in 1980342. According to Weinbaum, at that time, the Afghan 
legal community was comprised of about 1,200 individuals: 715 judges, 
170 prosecutors, 162 defence attorneys (not all licensed, as provided by 
law), 50 professors and some 100 lawyers in the various departments of 
the MoJ. However, much of this legal community was concentrated in 
Kabul. In the provinces, the lack of legal professionals was profound. 
Only one defence attorney (out of 28) was reported to reside in one of 
the 20 provinces. The remaining lawyers practiced in Kabul and Herat. 
At least one judge was assigned to each of the 220 district courts of the 
country, while panels of three judges existed in the provincial capital 
cities. In nearly 100 district courts the prosecutor office was missing. If 
we compare this data with the population of Afghanistan in 1980343 
(around 15,200,000 inhabitants) and with its geographic extension 
(647,500 km² – as big as France), results are not encouraging. Adding 
the status of the internal ways of communication, which made it (and 
still make it) particularly difficult for the parties to a case to reach the 
nearest district court, it is more than likely that most of disputes were 
solved by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR), i.e. taking 
the cases before jirgas/shuras. On the one hand, the justice system could 
be then regarded as being almost completely in the hands of local 
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actors; on the other hand, it had never been considered as fair and 
impartial by the local population. In early 2002, a few months after the 
beginning of the intervention in Afghanistan, the international 
community realized that it was not necessary to re-construct the justice 
system, but to build one up for the first time344. 
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6  Phase One – From Tokyo to London: The ‘Lead 
 Nation Approach’ 
 
 
 
It is not yet clear that defeat in war may 
legally become the means of forcing a people 
to become free 
John D. Montgomery345 
 
In November 2001, an international coalition led by the United States 
overturned the Taliban regime. The Taliban immediately withdrew in 
the territories along and beyond the Pakistani border. In the years to 
come, they would resurge and start a long and exhausting guerrilla 
warfare against the new Afghan government and its international 
allies. After the Taliban’s defeat, in the first days of December 2001, the 
representatives of the winning factions met in Bonn under the auspices 
of the SRSG Lakhdar Brahimi to draw up the political future of 
Afghanistan. The Bonn meeting was established following a formal 
invitation issued by the Security Council in Resolution 1378 of 14 
November 2001. After harsh negotiations among the parties and under 
substantial pressure by the international partners, the Afghan delegates 
signed an agreement on 5 December 2001346. The agreement was further 
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welcomed by the Security Council in Resolution 1383 of 6 December 
2001. 
The Bonn Agreement laid down the foundations of the new 
political order in Afghanistan. It established an Afghan Interim 
Authority (AIA), which consisted of an Interim Administration, a 
Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency 
Loya Jirga, and a Supreme Court of Afghanistan, as well as other courts, 
as set up by the Interim Administration (Art. I(2)). The Interim 
Administration consisted of a Chairman, five Vice Chairmen and 24 
members (Art. III(A)(1)). It was inaugurated on 22 December 2001 with 
a six-month mandate. Within this deadline, an Emergency Loya Jirga 
would convene in Kabul to elect the members of the new Afghanistan 
Transitional Authority (ATA), which would include a Transitional 
Administration as its executive branch. Following on from that, the 
Transitional Administration would appoint a Constitutional 
Commission (Art. III(C)(6)) and convene a second (Constitutional) Loya 
Jirga within 18 months from its establishment. This process would open 
the door to the first free political elections in the country, to be held 
within two years from the first Emergency Loya Jirga (Art. I(4-6)). 
The Emergency Loya Jirga took place in June 2002347. Involving 
over 1,600 delegates, who represented various ethnic groups and 
political factions within Afghanistan, the Loya Jirga elected the new 
Transitional Administration, and Hamid Karzai as its President348. In 
consequence, relying on the text drawn up by the Constitutional 
Commission, the provisional government drafted the new Constitution, 
which was released in early November 2003 and was adopted with 
                                                           
 
 
347 See for an analysis L.P. Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road to 
Reconstruction’, 14(1) Journal of Democracy 2003, 82-99, at 92-94. 
348  See A. Saikal, ‘Afghanistan after the Loya Jirga’, 44(3) Survival 2002, 47-56, at 
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amendments by the Constitutional Loya Jirga on 4 January 2004. The 
Presidential elections took place on 9 October 2004 and Karzai was 
elected again as President of Afghanistan. Finally, parliamentary 
elections were held on 18 September 2005, finalising the transition to a 
constitutional democracy, as provided for in the Bonn Agreement349. 
 
6.1   Initial Reforms after the Bonn Agreement  
The Bonn Agreement declared (Chapter II) that, until the adoption of a 
new constitution, the interim legal system in force in Afghanistan 
would consist of the 1964 Constitution and the full compilation of 
domestic laws and regulations passed since that time, if not in contrast 
with the Constitution or the Agreement themselves. In addition, such 
norms had to be deprived of the provisions concerning the monarchy 
and in general to be in line with the international agreements to which 
Afghanistan was a party350. Probably, the reference to the 1964 
Constitution was «an attempt to connect the peace process with 
                                                           
 
 
349  The constitutional process reportedly cost US $ 13 million while US $ 145.4 
million was spent for the presidential elections (78.4 million on voter 
registration and 67 million on the presidential election per se). The 
presidential elections were held with a three-month delay on the Bonn 
timetable (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Humanitarian and 
Reconstruction Assistance, p. 57). 
350 At that time, Afghanistan was a party, inter alia, to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (accessed on 24 January 
1983), to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (accessed 
on 24 January 1983), to the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (accessed on 6 July 1983), to the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (signed on 4 February 1985, ratified on 1 April 
1987), and to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (signed on 27 
September 1990 and ratified on 28 March 1994). The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was signed on 14 
August 1980 but never ratified. A list of multilateral treaties ratified by 
Afghanistan is available from the IDLO database. 
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memories of a more stable Afghanistan»351. This is in a way similar to 
the solution adopted by international authorities in East Timor and 
Kosovo. However, what makes it different is that the Bonn Agreement 
specifically incorporates only international legal obligations to which 
Afghanistan is a party, rather than the entire corpus of internationally 
recognized human rights standards, as in previous interventions352. The 
powers of Interim Authority were limited to the repeal or amendment 
of existing norms, without the possibility of passing new laws353. 
Accordingly, in February 2002, the Interim Authority repealed all laws 
and regulations inconsistent with the 1964 Constitution and the Bonn 
Agreement by means of a specific decree354. 
Helped by UNAMA, the Interim Administration was requested 
to «establish a Judicial Commission to rebuild the domestic justice 
system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, 
the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions»355. In addition, a Human 
Rights Commission – lately renamed ‘Afghan Independent Human 
Rights Commission’ (AIHRC) – was established to support the 
constitutional process with the assistance of the UN356. The Judicial 
Commission was initially created in May 2002357, then dissolved and re-
                                                           
 
 
351  S. Chesterman, Justice under International Administration: Kosovo, East Timor 
and Afghanistan (New York: International Peace Academy, September 2002), 
9, http://www.ipacademy.org/pdfs/JUSTICE_UNDER_INTL.pdf.  
352  Ibid., p. 10. 
353  Bonn Agreement, Art. II(1)(i). 
354 Legislative decree of interim administration regarding repealing of decrees 
and legislative documents prior to first of Jadi 1380 (February, 2002), 5 
February 2002, available at the USAID-ARoLP database. 
355  Bonn Agreement, Art. II(2). 
356  As provided in the Bonn Agreement, Art. I(6). 
357 Interim Administration of Afghanistan, Decree No. 1243, 21 May 2002, 
available at the USAID-ARoLP database. 
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established in November 2002358 with the name of Judicial Reform 
Commission (JRC), consisting of ten diverse and better-credentialed 
members. The initial dissolution was probably due to frictions among 
the three main actors within the Afghan justice system, namely the 
Supreme Court, AGO, MoJ). In fact, «there was reportedly strong 
competition and recrimination between the Ministry of Justice and the 
Supreme Court, as both wanted to control the appointment of judges, 
and the Ministry of Justice wanted to control the Attorney-General’s 
Office»359. 
The JRC identified a list of priorities for the justice sector 
(included into a ‘Master Plan’), which comprised a compilation of 
Afghan laws, their reformation in line with international standards and 
international law, the progressive rehabilitation of the justice sector, the 
establishment of a constitutional court, and intensive legal training for 
the personnel involved in the sector360. However, the JRC apparently 
failed to persuade the Afghan authorities (namely the Constitutional 
Commission or the same government) to decide structural changes 
within the justice system361. The impossibility of major amendments 
were confirmed by the initial statements of the Commission’s 
Chairman, Bahauddin Baha (currently a ‘moderate’ member of the 
                                                           
 
 
358  Formation of the Judicial Reform Commission and its duties, Presidential 
Decree No. 153, 2 November 2002, available at the USAID-ARoLP database. 
359  J.A. Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan (Stanford, CA: 
CDDRL Working paper No. 19, 1 September 2004), 8, http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/20714/Reestablishing_the_Judiciary_in_Afghanistan.
pdf.  
360 R. Mani, Ending impunity and building justice in Afghanistan (Kabul: AREU, 
December 2003), 15, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNP
AN016655.pdf. 
361  B.R. Rubin, H. Hamidzada, and A. Stoddard, Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond: 
Prospects for Improved Stability Reference Document (The Hague: Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations, April 2005), 42, 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050400_cru_paper_barnet
t.pdf.  
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Supreme Court), referring to the necessity of aligning the Afghanistan’s 
legal system with traditional Islamic law362. Reportedly, the JRC also 
represented, in many instances, the arena in which different donors 
confronted each other for the leadership in the sector, rather than 
representing an avenue for reconciling the interests and prerogatives of 
justice institutions363. The JRC failure to address the institutional 
changes within the justice sector, «turned the commission into an easy 
scapegoat for the international community when it became apparent 
that no real reform or reconstruction could happen without the direct 
involvement of the Afghan permanent justice institutions and their 
political will»364. The JRC was lately dissolved in 2005, to coincide with 
the end of the ‘Bonn process’365. 
The Bonn Conference was followed by a donor conference in 
January 2002 in Tokyo, held at ministerial level and co-chaired by 
Japan, US, EU and Saudi Arabia366. The Conference collected 
approximately US $ 4.5 billion in aid of the country’s reconstruction. 
                                                           
 
 
362  M.A. Drumbl, ‘Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for the 
Women of Afghanistan’, 42(2) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 2004, 
349-390, at 365-366. 
363  Tensions are reported, for example, with regard to the adoption of the 
Master Plan by the JRC. The Plan identified 30 projects to be completed over 
an 18-month period. It was largely written by American consultants 
seconded to the Commission, although the latter was entirely financed by 
Italy. Reportedly, these circumstances gave rise to frictions between the 
Italian Embassy and the US authorities (Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial 
System, p. 12). 
364 UNDP, Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities – 
Afghanistan Human Development Report 2004 (Kabul/New York: UNDP, 
2004), 145, http://www.cphd.af/nhdr/nhdr04/nhdr04.html.  
365  Decree on Dissolution of the Judicial Commission, Official Gazette No. 862, 
22 September 2005, available at the USAID-ARoLP database. 
366 International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, 
Tokyo, 21-21 January 2002, 
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Pledges were made by more than 60 countries and IFIs, covering the 
period 2002-2006. US $ 1.8 billion were allocated for 2002, while another 
US $ 1.7 billion was pledged for 2003367. The EU Member States and the 
European Commission pledged US $ 546 million for 2002 and US $ 2.1 
billion through 2006368.  In addition to their financial commitments, 
several Group of Eight (G8) states were entrusted with the ‘lead’ in the 
reform of specific sectors within the ‘Security and Rule of Law’ area – 
the US for the armed forces, the UK for counter-narcotics, Japan for 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), Germany for 
the police sector and Italy for the justice sector. Italy was therefore 
tasked with being the ‘lead nation’ in this field, providing financial 
assistance, coordinating external commitments and overseeing 
reconstruction efforts in the rule-of-law sphere369. 
At the Bonn Conference, an ‘Implementation Group’ was also 
established as a high level monitoring institution370. It first convened in 
Kabul on 10-11 April 2002 and then in October of the same year. In 
April 2002 the government released the National Development 
Framework (NDF), which «became the main mechanism of 
coordination and agenda setting during the transitional period and was 
                                                           
 
 
367  Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Fact Book, 2004 – Afghanistan (Dulles, 
VA: Brassey’s Editions, 2004), 2. 
368 The European Union’s contribution to the reconstruction process of 
Afghanistan, Brussels, EU Doc. IP/02/113, 22 January 2002, 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/afghanistan/intro/ip02_113.htm.  
369  For an extended and detailed analysis of the role of Italy in the reform of the 
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Reform in Afghanistan (Princeton University, NJ: Bachelor Thesis at the 
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 9 April 2008), 
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the basis for the Afghanistan’s state-budget»371. The NDF was 
comprised of 12 national development programmes372. The reform of 
justice was then conceived as a segment of a wider ‘Security and the 
Rule of Law Programme’, which was in turn encompassed within the 
‘Governance and Security’ pillar. Programme groups, programme 
secretariats and programme working groups were also established and 
aligned with the NDF. 
In December 2002, the programme groups were replaced by 
consultative groups, mandated to coordinate key government agencies 
and donor organizations within the NDF and the full range of national 
reconstruction programmes. Justice was one among the five working 
groups in CG No. 2, entitled Security & Rule of Law. Such working 
groups were modelled on the five ‘leads’ decided at the Bonn 
Conference. Every CG and working group included a focal point, 
designated by the lead Ministry, which replaced the existing 
programme secretariat373. The CGs met at least monthly and their work 
was regulated by specific Terms of Reference (ToR) agreed upon by the 
participants and accepted by the Chair Ministry. This procedure, 
adopted according to the ‘local ownership’ principle, was also followed 
in the establishment of working groups and would be implemented in 
the future for the creation of any other consultative body. Due to its 
                                                           
 
 
371 Y. Hasegawa, ‘The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: 
Impartiality in New UN Peace Operations’, 2(2) Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding 2008, 209-226, at 218. 
372 National Development Framework (NDF), Kabul, April, 2002, 
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373 CG No. 2 (Security & Rule of Law) included 5 working groups: 1) Afghan 
National Army; 2) DDR; 3) National Police; 4) Justice; and 5) Anti-narcotics. 
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relevance, the working group on justice was named ‘consultative 
group’ as well. 
 
6.2   The Role of Italy 
The Justice Sector Consultative Group (JSCG) was created in January 
2003, although its formal ToR were only agreed upon in 2005. The JSCG 
was chaired by the MoJ, while Italy, being the ‘lead nation’, became the 
donor focal point. In addition, both UNAMA and Italy were granted 
the chairs of ad hoc working groups on specific topics. Within the JSCG, 
the role of Italy was basically that of: «maintain[ing] close contacts and 
exchanges with other donors with a view to sustaining interest in 
justice issues among donors. This include[d] working with UN 
agencies to facilitate donor coordination activities. Italy [should] also 
cooperate with other agencies in seeking out the best available sources 
of international expertise»374. In Tokyo, the choice probably fell on Italy 
because Italy had been involved in the Afghan political life since the 
early seventies. In fact, at the time of the 1973-coup which overthrew 
him, King Zahir Shah was in holiday in Italy. He lived in Rome until 
April 2002, leading the Afghan opposition from abroad. Exactly in 
Rome, the anti-Taliban groups of the Afghan diaspora met up in late 
November 2001, before leaving for Bonn to sign the agreement on the 
country’s political future. Italy was also one of the founders of the so 
called ‘Geneva G4 Group’, composed of states interested in the political 
development of Afghanistan375. 
Therefore, according to the commitments undertaken in Bonn, 
Italy was in charge of leading and coordinating justice sector reform 
and funding activities. In view of that, in December 2002 a pledging 
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conference on justice was held in Rome. The Conference registered 
commitments for approximately US $ 30 million376. Later on, in 
February 2003, a former anti-mafia magistrate and Executive Director 
of UNDOC, Giuseppe Di Gennaro was appointed as ‘special advisor’ to 
the Italian government for the sector’s reconstruction. At the same time, 
Italy opened a dedicated office in Kabul, called ‘Italian Justice Project 
Office’ (IJPO), led by Di Gennaro himself. The IJPO was an 
independent office, subsidiary to the MFA but distinct from the 
Embassy of Italy in Kabul, financed with funds from Cooperazione 
italiana377. The IJPO mission was to provide assistance to the Afghan 
justice institutions (Supreme Court, AGO, MoJ) as well as to the JRC. Di 
Gennaro resigned in July 2004. His resignation was reportedly due to 
«lack of understanding with the Italian ambassador in Kabul and the 
carelessness of the Italian government», as well as to security 
concerns378. Frictions and lack of coordination between the IJPO and the 
Italian Embassy would be constant in future years. Di Gennaro was 
replaced by a ‘special coordinator’, Jolanda Brunetti Goetz, a retired 
ambassador recalled to duty, who would lead the Office until 
September 2006.  In consequence, the post of special coordinator was  
abolished, while «the IJPO was downsized and committed to the First 
Secretary of the Italian Embassy in Kabul»379. The IJPO waned in 
November 2007 with the establishment of the Italian Development 
Cooperation Office (known by the acronym UTL – Unità Tecnica Locale 
– in Italian), led by Maurizio Di Calisto. That of justice then became one 
                                                           
 
 
376  Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial System, p. 12. 
377 Directorate of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge for 
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of the development programmes run by the UTL. However, to some 
extent the autonomy from the political guidance of the Embassy was 
restored, because even though the UTL is part of the Embassy, it is 
autonomous in managing development projects, and its director is 
answerable to the MFA – Directorate General for Development 
Cooperation. 
As regards the reform strategy elaborated by Italian authorities, 
the first aim was to restore the ‘formal’ justice sector, as well as provide 
to physical restructuring. Secondly, it approached the informal justice 
sector by fostering the promotion of the basic human rights principles 
in provinces and villages far from Kabul. Accordingly, at the 
beginning, the Italian reconstruction projects focused on three main 
areas: (i) legislative reform, (ii) training and capacity building, and (iii) 
rehabilitation of infrastructure380. Thereafter, Italy carried out projects 
aimed at reforming provincial and district justice institutions, namely 
(iv) the ‘Provincial Justice Initiative’ – which was supposed to provide 
the training for the judicial personnel and the promotion of the basic 
legal principles in the provinces – and (v) the project ‘Access to Justice 
at the District Level’ – intended to foster human rights awareness in 
local communities, in order to achieve a more conducive environment 
for the further acceptance of statutory law. 
The Italian leadership was put into practice under a pluralistic 
approach, so that other countries and international organizations also 
contributed to the reform of justice with both human resources and 
funds. In addition, it is remarkable to note that up until 2008, Italy has 
basically financed and carried out only bilateral projects, 
notwithstanding the fact that a number of activities have been often 
funded and given out by contract to international organizations and 
institutions, such as UNDP, UNODC, UNIFEM, UNICEF, UNOPS, 
IOM, IDLO, IMG and ISISC. Other projects, especially those regarding 
the restoration of judicial infrastructure and the reform of the 
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applicable law, have been implemented by the IJPO itself381. In the first 
period of activity (2002-2003) the IJPO prepared an intervention 
strategy based on a careful assessment of the legislation in force as well 
as of human and structural resources at disposal. A first report, 
concerning the conditions of the judicial administration in ten main 
Afghan districts was released in June 2003382. In a second phase, once 
the survey on the criminal law in force was completed, a further 
comparative study on the applicable law in other Islamic countries was 
carried out in order to seek comparable models. On the basis of these 
researches, the process of legislative reform could finally take place. 
 
6.3   The 2004 Constitution 
According to the Bonn Agreement (Art. I(6)), a nine-member 
Constitutional Commission was appointed by the ATA President 
Karzai on 5 October 2002. The Commission produced a preliminary 
draft constitution by mid-April 2003, which was submitted to the 33 
members of the Constitutional Review Commission. From April to July 
2003 the latter launched a mix of public education and consultation 
programmes inside the country as well as in the refugee camps in Iran 
and Pakistan, aimed at informing the population of the constitutional 
process and obtaining some feedback. A total of 484,450 questionnaires 
was distributed and more than 500 public consultation meetings took 
place383. This operation was clearly intended to expand the overall 
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consensus of both the population and the tribal groups over the 
initiative. However, commentators lamented a lack of transparency and 
inclusiveness, influenced by an «opaque and secretive» appointment 
process of the same Constitutional Commission384. Moreover, the draft 
constitution prepared by the Constitutional Committee was not 
released during the initial consultations and this generated suspicions 
of external impositions385. On 14 December 2003, the 502 delegates of 
the Constitutional Loya Jirga convened in Kabul and took three weeks 
to reach a final compromise. The Constitution was then signed and 
promulgated by President Karzai on 26 January 2004386. 
The 2004 Afghan Constitution may be considered a milestone in 
the country’s ‘transition paradigm’387. However, a successful study of its 
text, cannot avoid considering the historical and political conditions 
under which it was drafted. Such circumstances, in fact, have led to a 
constitution which opens the door to the country’s modernization, 
without excluding references to Islam in many parts. This may be due 
to several factors. First of all, after 22 years of civil war (officially ended 
in 2001), as well as the atomisation of the society in tribal groups and 
the divisions between Sunnis and Shiites, the Islamic religion was 
probably the sole shared value around which the population could 
rally388. In addition, the lack of political plurality and the quest for 
legitimisation of new political movements born from the ashes of the 
militia groups, generated a political dynamic orientated towards 
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Islamic values and ideals389. Indeed, the country’s political history had 
always lacked real political organisations with well-defined political 
goals. After the 1964 Constitution, the process of creation and 
legitimisation of political parties was very slow and candidates 
presented themselves individually at elections. For this reason, they 
were not involved in any kind of political project and only defended 
particular interests, concluding different political alliances at anytime. 
The communist regime worsened the situation. The 1977 Republican 
Constitution did not admit any political party other than the 
communist one and the powers of the president exceeded even those of 
the king in the previous constitution390. 
In this respect, the drafters of the 2004 Constitution were 
probably aware that what led to the failure of the majority of past 
constitutions was that these merely presented a way to serve the 
interests of the rulers in power, rather than contained shared principles 
and values391. As a consequence, they referred to the most modern 
constitutional charter the country had ever had, i.e., that of 1964, while 
they also attempted to follow the political path drawn up in the Bonn 
agenda. The outcome essentially remains a «relatively liberal Islamic 
constitution»392. Even though it was described by a UN officer as «a 
package deal that contains potential contradictions to spark future 
conflicts»393, the 2004 Constitution may be generally considered a 
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«break with the past»394 and, in the way, a good result for the country’s 
political transition395. The influence of international actors was mainly 
exerted on balancing the recognition of the state as an Islamic republic 
and the lack of any explicit reference to sharia in the text396. 
The first three articles of the 2004 Constitution describe the role 
of Islam within Afghan institutions. Art. 1 defines the country as an 
Islamic Republic397. Art. 2 specifies that Islam is the state religion, 
although the followers of other religions are almost free («within the 
bounds of law») to perform their religious ceremonies. Art. 3 is one of 
the most important provisions of the new constitutional text, as it 
introduces a ‘repugnance clause’. Under this article, the legal system 
may not contain norms that «contravene the tenets and provisions of 
the holy religion of Islam». As previously explained, while the 1964 
Constitution referred to a mere incompatibility with «the basic 
principles of […] Islam» (Art. 64), and thus admitted laws and 
regulations in contrast with subsidiary Islamic norms, the 2004 
Constitution apparently affirms the prevalence of the Hanafi 
jurisprudence over statutory law398. If one reads this provision together 
with that in Art. 121, which explicitly grants the power of judicial 
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review to the Supreme Court, it appears clear how powerful the latter 
may be in terms of political influence over government decisions399. 
Striking a balance with previous articles, Art. 130 establishes that 
courts shall apply statutory norms in cases under consideration, while 
Islamic jurisprudence would be applied residually. This principle is 
also confirmed in Art. 7 of the Law on organization of courts of 2005400. 
It should induce a stronger degree of objectivity into the analogical 
reasoning and interpretation of Islamic norms by judges401. Yet this 
maintains the Islamic criminal law as well as a part of the Islamic 
family law in force, which can be easily considered in contrast with Art. 
7 of the same Constitution, under which the international human rights 
treaties signed by Afghanistan binds on state affairs402. The latter 
provision seems itself in contrast with Art. 3 of the Constitution, as a 
number of «tenets and principles» of Islamic law may be held contrary 
to international human rights instruments403. A further contradiction 
                                                           
 
 
399  Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial System, p. 9. The author draws up a parallel 
with the Council of Guardians in Iran. 
400  Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Courts of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, Official Gazette No. 851, 21 May 2005, available at the USAID-
ARoLP database. 
401  Finkelman, The Constitution and Its Interpretation, p. 2-3. 
402  Art. 7(1) states: « The state shall observe the United Nations Charter, inter-
state agreements, as well as international treaties to which Afghanistan has 
joined, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights». 
403  For instance, hudud punishments or restricted civil rights for women are 
clearly in contrast with human rights law. See on the matter Riphenburg, 
Afghanistan's Constitution, p. 34 and 38. According to Niaz Shah, Art. 27 
«could prove to be a strong constitutional shield in the case of honour 
killings in which the perpetrators commonly resort to taking the law into 
their own hands» (N.A. Shah, ‘The Constitution of Afghanistan and 
Women’s Rights’, 13(2) Feminist Legal studies 2005, 239-258, at 245). For a 
broad survey on the relationship between Islamic legal tradition and human 
rights law see R. al-Sayyid, ‘Il pensiero musulmano contemporaneo e i diritti 
dell’uomo: pluralità di posizioni e confronto con l’Occidente’, in A. Pacini 
(ed.) L’islam e il dibattito sui diritti dell’uomo (Turin: Fondazione Giovani 
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may be possibly found at Art. 27, which introduces the principles of 
legality and non-retroactivity of criminal law. It could be argued that 
Islamic provisions are not statutory laws and thus they do not fit into 
such basic principles404. The role of religion is also reported in Art. 17, 
under which the state is held to promote religious teachings, and in 
Art. 45, where it is provided that «the state shall devise and implement 
a unified educational curricula based on the tenets of the sacred 
religion of Islam […] and develop religious subjects curricula for 
schools on the basis of existing Islamic sects in Afghanistan». It should 
be noted that previous constitutions did not make any reference to 
religion with regard to education405. The respect for both Islamic principles 
and constitutional values is also stressed in the articles concerning 
political parties (Art. 35). However, once again this provision leaves the 
question of the primacy between Islamic and statutory law in the case a 
political party’s manifesto contravening Islamic tenets open, but focuses 
on the promotion of human rights406. The relevance of ethnic groups, 
together with the minority of Shiia followers, is provided in Art. 4 and 
Art. 131, respectively. Under Art. 131, Afghan courts can apply the 
principles of Shiia law when both parties are followers of the Shiia sect. 
Art. 4 includes a list of the ethnic groups «the nation of Afghanistan 
shall be comprised of». While a norm similar to Art. 131 is contained in 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
Agnelli, 1998), 137-154. On the human rights status quo in Afghanistan after 
the Bonn agreement, see N. Niland, ‘Justice postponed: The marginalization 
of human rights in Afghanistan’, in A. Donini, N. Niland and K. Wermester 
(eds.), Nation-building Unraveled? Aid, Peace and Justice, (Bloomfield, CT: 
Kumarian Press, 2004), 61-82. 
404  Deledda, The death penalty, p. 5. 
405  Saboory, The Progress of Constitutionalism, p. 20. On the contrary, the 1964 
Constitution promoted a «balanced and universal education in Afghanistan» 
(Art. 34). 
406  P. Häberle, Diritto costituzionale nazionale, unioni regionali fra stati e diritto 
internazionale come diritto universale dell’umanità: convergenze e divergenze 
(Rome: Associazione italiana dei costituzionalisti, 11 May 2004), 
http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/materiali/anticipazioni/diri
tto_universale/index.html.  
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Art. 12 of the 1979 Iranian Constitution407, Art. 4 is totally new, as no other 
Afghan constitution has ever given relevance to ethnos408. 
The 2004 Constitution also includes provisions declaring any 
discrimination based on gender as illegal, as well as equal rights and 
duties of citizens before the law (art. 22). The constitution also guarantees 
the participation of the female community in the public sector as well as 
in the parliament and government. According to the constitution there 
must be an average of two women representatives per province in the 
Wolesi Jirga (the lower house), and one half in the Mesrano Jirga (the upper 
house – Art. 83 and 84). Under Art. 58, the AIHRC becomes a 
constitutional organ. The AIHRC has now the authority to receive 
complaints about human rights violations but its powers are limited, as 
it can, at best, merely refer a case to judicial authorities and provide 
legal assistance to the victims. According to Art. 157, the supervision 
over the implementation of the constitution should be entrusted to a 
special independent commission. Such commission’s powers and 
duties mirror those of the ‘Constitutional Council’ established under 
Art. 146 of the 1987 Constitution409. With regard to the death penalty, in 
line with the ICCPR, Art. 23 of the Constitution asserts the right to life, 
envisaging at the same time the possibility of its deprivation by the 
provision of law. However, capital punishment, decided on the basis of 
a decision issued by a competent court, requires the prior approval of 
the President to be enforced (Art. 129)410. 
 
                                                           
 
 
407  Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, adopted on 24 October 1979, in 
force since 3 December 1979 (as amended on 28 July 1989), 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html 
408  Saboory, The Progress of Constitutionalism, p. 20. 
409  Saboory, The Progress of Constitutionalism, p. 21. 
410  The author notes how similar provisions were already present in the 1964 
(art. 101), 1977 (art. 105) and 1990 (art. 115) Constitutions (Deledda, The death 
penalty, p. 4). 
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6.4   The (New) System of Justice 
Compared with the provisions included in the previous 1967 
‘Law of the Jurisdiction and Organization of the Courts of 
Afghanistan’, Articles 116-136 of the 2004 Constitution do not introduce 
any effective change to the organization of the court system, apart from 
the disappearance of the Court of Cassation and its absorption into the 
Supreme Court. Such inclusion in the judicial apparatus apparently 
reflects an insertion of common law institutions and bodies (mainly 
derived from the American legal system) into the domestic legal 
order411 – which was historically «modelled closely on civil law 
jurisdiction, but incorporating some elements of Islamic procedural and 
substantive laws and some Islamic rules of evidence»412. At first, it 
might appear as a convenient solution, given the context of the 
introduction of a purely presidential government system413. Besides, 
during the drafting of the new Constitution, the presidential advisors 
rejected the proposal made by the Constitutional Commission for a 
separate constitutional court – a typical civil law body – as it could 
resemble the Council of Guardians in Iran. On the contrary, they 
pushed to grant the power of constitutional review to the Supreme 
Court: however, an organ that «has always been dominated by ulama 
trained in Islamic jurisprudence rather than constitutional law»414, 
frustrating their initial intent of fostering the country’s modernization. 
                                                           
 
 
411  According to Professor Papa, this insertion of legal models derived from the 
Northern American common law system into the Afghan legal order is 
currently taking place «at the cost of the legal and linguistic heritage of the 
continental Europe, and, in a minor way, of the Islamic law» [author’s 
translation] (Papa, Afghanistan, p. 332). 
412  Lau, An Introduction to Afghanistan, p. 36. 
413 C. Pinelli, The New Afghanistan’s Difficulties: The Case of the Supreme Court 
(Kabul: Presentation at the Conference ‘Reforms of the Judicial Institutions 
and Public Administration in Afghanistan’, 25 March 2006), p. 2, on file with 
the author. 
414  Rubin, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, p. 15. 
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The ‘new’ justice system drawn up by the Constitution primarily 
consists of the judiciary, the Attorney-General, and the Ministry of 
Justice. The judiciary, in particular, comprises the Supreme Court, 
courts of appeal and primary courts. 
 
6.4.1   The Organization of Courts 
The Supreme Court remains the apex of the Bench, retaining full 
administrative powers over the sector, and also represents the court of 
last resort. The nine members of the court, including its chairman, are 
proposed by the Wolesi Jirga and appointed by the president of the state 
(Art. 117 of the 2004 Constitution)415. The president also appoints 
ordinary judges, on the proposal of the Supreme Court (Art. 132), thus 
respecting Islamic tradition, according to which only the ruler of the 
Islamic community can choose a new judge416. The Supreme Court is 
responsible for reviewing cases forwarded by the courts of appeal and 
for confirming the legality of the decisions made in the lower courts. 
Rulings may be reversed if they are contra legem or even contrary to the 
principles of sharia417. The Supreme Court may reverse a judgement 
basing its decision on any legal grounds even if such breach of law is 
not mentioned in the appeal418. The Supreme Court is also responsible 
for the appointment and dismissal of the whole administrative 
personnel of the judiciary as well as for the preparation and 
implementation of the budget of the Bench, subject to the further 
approval of the National Assembly as a part of the national budget 
(Art. 124-125). Furthermore, the Supreme Court can propose draft laws 
concerning the regulation of judicial affairs to the National Assembly419. 
                                                           
 
 
415  2005 Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Courts, Art. 17. 
416  Rubin et al., Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond, p. 42. 
417  2005 Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Courts, Art. 6(2) and 28(1). 
418  2005 Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Courts, Art. 26(1). 
419  Ibid., Art. 24(2). 
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As previously mentioned, this broad autonomy for the Supreme Court 
has always been present in the constitutional history of Afghanistan. 
Apart from the top administrative and disciplinary powers 
(under Art. 3 and 121 of the 2004 Constitution), the Supreme Court 
retains the power of judicial review in respect of any norms of the legal 
system, if it holds them to «contravene the tenets and provisions of the 
holy religion of Islam»420. Therefore, the Court is vested with the main 
role of coherently adapting old Islamic rules and jurisprudence with 
the current principles of human rights and rule of law. The 
Constitution also permits the members of the Supreme Court to own an 
educational background in Islamic jurisprudence other than secular 
law (Art. 118). In line with the Constitution, the 2005 Law on the 
Organization of Courts allows graduates in secular law or sharia to be 
appointed as judges. In addition, it even extends the possibility for 
individuals with a degree from an Islamic high school (madrassa) to 
serve as judges in provincial courts for the first three years (Art. 58(2)). 
However, recent developments would indicate a shift from this 
tendency to the system’s ‘Islamization’. In Spring 2006 the Afghan 
parliament rejected Fazel Hadi Shinwari, the Saudi-backed Chief 
Justice421, who was replaced by Karzai with Abdul Salam Azimi, 
described as a ‘moderate’ Islamic scholar and one of the key drafters of 
the 2004 Constitution. Following on from this, the entire Supreme 
Court was substituted with the appointment of new ‘moderate’ 
                                                           
 
 
420 M. Haars, ‘Shari’a in Afghanistan’, 69(2) Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
und internationales Privatrecht 2005, 351-355, at 351. 
421  According to the ICG, 
«under his guidance the court has appointed scores of non-university 
trained Muslim clerics to all levels of the court system. Shinwari has failed to 
follow the 1964 Constitution and applicable laws, exceeding the 
constitutionally allowed number of judges on the Supreme Court and 
creating a fatwa council to issue extra-judicial religious proclamations» 
(International Crisis Group, Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and Transitional 
Justice (Kabul/Brussels: ICG Asia Report No. 45, 28 January 2003), 10, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1631).  
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members422. This substitution had been previously requested by a 
group of European diplomats, bringing a diplomatic démarche to 
President Karzai, demanding the reform of the Supreme Court423. The 
importance of such a changeover lies in the broad powers conferred to 
the Chief Justice within the new legal system424. For instance, the latter 
appoints the 36 judicial advisors to the Supreme Court425 and is also in 
charge of proposing, to the President of Afghanistan, the candidate to 
the post of Head of the Administration Office of the Judiciary426. 
The courts of appeal have inherited the powers and functions of 
the old provincial courts. They are in charge of reviewing all 
evidentiary and procedural aspects of claims. They can amend, 
overturn, change, approve or nullify the lower court judgments and 
orders (Law on Court Organization, Art. 33). Primary courts lie under 
the jurisdiction of the courts of appeal. Commercial and juvenile courts 
are established in provincial centres, separate from other primary 
courts, which are instead located both in districts and provincial centres 
(Art. 40, 44-45). The primary courts of the provincial centres retain 
jurisdiction over ‘public’ crimes, crimes against public security, and 
criminal cases related to traffic accidents – the latter to be ruled by 
specific traffic violation tribunals (Art. 42). There are no juries but the 
courts should be generally composed of three members (Art. 6). 
With regard to the powers and organization of the AGO, to date, 
the 1991 AGO Law remains in force, so that in principle there should 
not be changes in the overall functioning of the prosecutor’s offices. A 
new law is currently being drafted by the AGO and it is circulating 
among the Afghan authorities. However, while the Legislative Plan 
                                                           
 
 
422 J.A. Their, ‘Order in the Courts’, New York Times, 28 August 2006, 
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423 Baldauf, The West pushes to reform. 
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presented by the Taqnin for the year 1386 (March 2007/March 2008) 
included the new AGO law among the bills to be discussed by the 
parliament, the 1387 Legislative Plan (March 2008/March 2009) does 
not even mention it427. According to Amnesty International, the fact that 
the Attorney General’s Office remains responsible for both the 
appointment and overseeing of public prosecutors, may entail a lack of 
oversight of misconduct and lead to a conflict of interests428. Following 
the country’s legal tradition, the MoJ remains a minor player within the 
justice system, as it is generally responsible only for law drafting, 
providing legal assistance to the Executive, and supervising the overall 
functioning of the public administration429. 
 
6.4.2 Law Reform 
As previously considered, while in many areas there has been a clear 
pragmatic compromise with existing institutions and practices, the 
reform of the Afghan law has been characterized by visible external 
input. These measures could be seen as helping to enforce the authority 
of the central state, but it would also seem that these externally-driven 
legal interventions may feed into and reproduce centre-periphery 
struggles. On the whole, law reform may be considered as the most 
evident outcome of the ‘lead nation’ approach in Afghanistan. Besides, 
since the Bonn Agreement did not changed the law in force, at the 
beginning of the intervention it resulted mandatory to collect Afghan 
laws and other documents in order to put an end to the situation of 
                                                           
 
 
427  According to the Head of the Taqnin Department, in March 2008 a draft law, 
drawn up by the AGO, was circulating among the Afghan authorities 
(Presentation of the Draft Legislative Plan for the year 1387, Kabul, MoJ, 12 
March 2008). 
428 Amnesty International, Afghanistan: Re-establishing the rule of law 
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legal anarchy. In preparation for an assistance programme financed by 
Italy, IDLO started collecting Afghan legal material in late 2001. The 
outcome of this extensive research was a database of more than 2,400 
texts in Dari and Pashto, and 100 in English, dating from 1921 to 2001430. 
Moreover, between 9 March 2002 and 6 March 2007, 119 new items of 
civil, commercial, criminal law, as well as the criminal procedure law 
were added to this large corpus iuris431. In January 2007, the Ministry of 
Justice declared that 188 new legislative documents had been adopted, 
with an average of 37 laws and regulations passed each year, i.e., three 
per month432. Reform initially avoided concentrating on substantive 
provisions, given the sensitivity of issues such as the influence of Islam 
over family and criminal law. Nevertheless, lawmakers attempted to 
focus on procedural law in order to indirectly affect the enjoyment of 
substantive rights by individuals.  
An  Interim Criminal Procedure Code (ICPC) was prepared by 
the Head of the IJPO, Giuseppe Di Gennaro, assisted by US consultants, 
and further adopted by the Afghan government433. The code has been 
the source of some controversy, due to the relatively limited input or 
support for the initial draft by the Afghan justice institutions that only 
adopted it under strong external political pressure434. While such 
foreign-supplied pressure does not seem surprising, given the current 
Afghan government’s extreme reliance on international actors for 
continuous economic and military support, commentators argue that 
                                                           
 
 
430 Database available at 
http://www.idlo.int/English/External/IPAfghanLaws.asp.  
431  UNODC, Thematic Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Provided to 
Afghanistan by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vol. 4 – Rule of 
Law Programme (Vienna: UNODC – Independent Evaluation Unit, May 2008), 
3, http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/2007-afghanistan4.pdf.  
432  Data presented at the IV JCMB Meeting held in Berlin on 30th January 2007, 
http://www.moj.gov.af/?lang=en&lang=en&p=events&nid=177.  
433  Interim Code of Criminal Procedure for Courts, Official Gazette No. 820, 25 
February 2004, available at the USAID-ARoLP database. 
434  Miller & Perito, Establishing the Rule of Law, p. 8. 
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the potential perception of the code as a foreign imposition of law 
might have fuelled the conflict between the centre and the provinces, 
which has plagued the country throughout the twentieth century435. The 
code has been defined by the Italian Undersecretary of State as «a 
simplified text designed to make the work of the criminal police and 
judges easier and compliant with international human rights»436. It 
consists of 98 articles which reproduce the bulk of provisions in the 
Italian criminal procedure code. The right to defence for suspects and 
accused, as well as the right to be notified of this right in the pre-trial 
phase are both provided in Art. 5(7), 18 and 19. Other basic norms to 
prevent arbitrary arrest and pre-trial detention are listed at Art. 4, 6, 30, 
34, and 35, while provisions on the right to call and examine witnesses 
are contained in Art. 49 and 51. 
However, the code leaves some critical questions unresolved; for 
example, it fails to clarify the duration of pre-trial detention for arrested 
individuals, and to provide an effective mechanism for reviewing the 
legality of the arrest itself. As for the latter issue, the ICPC only 
includes a general possibility for the accused to denounce violations of 
procedural provisions in the pre-trial phase, together with the duty of 
the Court to assess the legality of the arrest at the first hearing (Art. 
16(1) and 53(3)(b)). As concerns pre-trial detention, while the 1965 code 
provided for a maximum time-limit of nine months (Art. 87), the 2004 
code is not clear enough on that point. Under Art. 36, following the 
arrest, «the arrested person shall be released if the Saranwal has not 
presented the indictment to the court within 15 days», while during the 
trial the court can extend the detention for two additional months at 
primary and appeal level, and for five additional months at the 
Supreme Court level (Art. 6(2)). Hence, such provision does not 
address the period between the arrest and the trial. Eventually, the 
code does not repeal the entire previous 1965 Criminal Procedure Code 
                                                           
 
 
435 F. Ahmed, ‘Judicial Reform in Afghanistan: A Case Study in the New 
Criminal Procedure Code’, 29(1) Hastings International and Comparative Law 
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436 Hon. Margherita Boniver, talk held in Doha (Qatar) on 18-19 May 2004, 
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but only those provisions which are incompatible with it (Art. 98). As a 
result, magistrates have to evaluate the validity and the effectiveness of 
any single rule, raising questions over the applicable law in the internal 
legal order. 
Precisely, in criminal law reform, the supply-driven approach 
created a situation where experts from different countries developed 
different laws and programmes, sometimes contradicting each other, 
and generating considerable confusion437. Let’s consider, for instance, 
the powers of police and prosecutors in the investigation phase. The 
2004 Constitution, in Art. 134, apparently separates the discovery of 
crimes from further investigations, affirming that «the discovery of 
crimes is the duty of the police, and investigation and prosecution are 
conducted by the Attorney General’s Office in accordance with 
provisions of the law». The duty of the police to discover crimes is also 
reported in the Police Law, adopted in 2005438. However, the ICPC 
extends the powers of prosecutors, who may also discover crimes by 
themselves (Art. 22) and direct the police during the investigation 
activities (Art. 23). In fact, the police are duty bound to report any 
notitia crimins to the Saranwal within 24 hours (Art. 21). Again, as 
regards the pre-charge detention, the maximum time-limit that used to 
be 10 days in the 1978 Law on Investigation and Discovery of Crimes, 
was reduced to 24 hours in the ICPC (Art. 31) and extended again to 72 
hours in the 2005 Police Law (Art. 15 and 25), generating confusion 
among legal professionals. Unsurprisingly, according to a report issued 
by UNAMA in late 2005, the application of the ICPC has been «highly 
problematic». Reportedly, the least applied provisions were exactly 
those related to the duration of pre-trial detention, together with the 
right to legal assistance for the defendant. Ultimately, UNAMA 
                                                           
 
 
437 A. Wilder, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police 
(Kabul: AREU, July 2007), 50, http://www.areu.org.af.  
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confirmed the existence of cases concerning prosecution of women for 
conducts that were not defined as crimes under (statutory) law439. 
Naturally, law reform has extended beyond the criminal law 
area. Other two important codes, drafted with major input from the 
IJPO, were the juvenile code and the penitentiary code, both adopted 
by the Afghan government in 2005. As for the reform of juvenile justice, 
following a proposal of UNICEF submitted to the Italian authorities in 
January 2003, a drafting team, coordinated by the IJPO, released a 
Juvenile Code in early 2005, which was turned into law in March of the 
same year440. The Juvenile Code raised the age of criminal liability from 
7 to 12 years (Art. 5), and made it clear that a child is anyone under the 
age of 18 (Art. 4). According to the code, juvenile courts shall hear cases 
concerning not only crimes committed by minors but also cases of 
children who are at risk and in need of care and protection (Art. 29). 
The investigation and prosecution of juvenile crimes are under the 
responsibility of special juvenile prosecutor offices, to be established in 
Kabul and in provincial capital cities (Art. 9). In addition, the code 
specifies that punishments for minor offenders should be proportional 
to the penalties applied to adults for the same crime, and should take 
into consideration the age of the accused (Art. 39(1)). A fine is given to 
a minor’s legal representative for failing to appear along with him/her 
before the juvenile prosecutor office, once summoned (Art. 25(1)). 
A penitentiary code – drafted in collaboration with Italian and 
UNODC officials – was adopted by the Afghan government in May 
2005441. The code makes a distinction between ‘prisons’ and ‘detention 
centres’: the latter are reserved for accused individuals awaiting trial, 
while prisons are for offenders convicted after a final decision (Art. 6-
7). According to the code, the human rights enjoyed by detainees and 
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prisoners may be «partially restricted» only when «order, discipline 
and security of the detention centres and prisons are in jeopardy», and 
even in such cases with the approval of the General Director of the 
prisons and the Minister of Justice (Art. 4). Moreover, the code 
provides that «the accused individuals and prisoners above 18 and 
below 25 shall be held separately in detention centers and prisons» 
(Art. 9(3)). Forced labour is not permitted, hence the prisoners and 
detainees who decide to work for private companies during their 
detention must be remunerated (Art. 33(3)). Punishments and the use 
of force in case of disorders are listed in Art. 43 and Art. 46. 
 
6.4.3  Training and Capacity-Building 
Training and capacity-building activities have been carried out by a 
number of organizations which have largely acted as contractors and 
sometimes as sub-contractors of foreign governments. Since the 
beginning of the international intervention and up until mid-2005, this 
field was mainly covered by organizations financed by Italy. The main 
Italian contractor in this area was IDLO442. IDLO has in turn contracted 
out part of the activities to other organizations, such as, inter alia, the 
Istituto Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali (ISISC), based in 
Siracusa (Italy)443. Other Italian contractors in this area included 
UNODC, UNDP and UNICEF, while UNIFEM444 played a minor role. 
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Part of the strategy for local capacity-building involved tackling the 
lack of judicial personnel by training groups of local trainers (the 
‘training the trainers’ method) which would keep costs down, enabling 
nationals to undertake training work at the fraction of the price of 
hiring international staff (as in other state-building missions, for 
example, in the Balkans and East Timor). At first, training was intended 
to assess and improve the legal background of Afghan judicial and 
legal personnel, focusing on the new laws and regulations adopted, 
under a clear top-down and supply-driven approach. Predictably, the 
training activities started in Kabul, with the aim of being further 
exported to the provinces and possibly to the districts. 
When the new criminal procedure code came into effect, the IJPO 
organized an intensive training course on new procedural norms in 
collaboration with ISICS445. Based on a memorandum with the 
University of Kabul (where the lessons took place), a course was 
organised in the period May-June 2004, involving 100 judges, attorneys, 
judicial police officers and lawyers. The goal of the training was to 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
project included the training of 20 defence attorneys and the organization of 
courses for 2,300 persons in 23 provinces (See Cooperazione Italiana allo 
Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali, 
http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgcs/italiano/Speciali/Af
ghanistan/attivitamultilaterali.htm). A further project, entitled ‘Violence 
Against Women in Afghanistan’ was financed by Italy in 2007. Bilateral 
projects ended in March 2008, with the establishment of the ‘Elimination of 
Violence Against Women Special Fund’ as a part of the international UN 
Trust Fund in Support of Actions to Eliminate Violence Against Women. 
UNIFEM will administer the fund for the first 2 years before handing this 
role over to a national organization. The fund is managed with the assistance 
of an Advisory Board composed of 11 members, among whom the Ministry 
of Women Affairs and Ministry of Education. Following its establishment a 
number of donors committed US $ 3 million to the fund. 
445 Project: ‘Training the Trainers Course on the Interim Criminal Procedure 
Code’, implemented by ISISC in May/June 2004. See Cooperazione Italiana 
allo Sviluppo, Le attività bilaterali, 
http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgcs/italiano/Speciali/Af
ghanistan/attivitabilaterali.htm.  
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create a qualified group of Afghan legal professionals who could 
subsequently provide training to colleagues throughout the country. 
Previously, as an IDLO sub-contractor, ISICS had organized a 300 
hours in-depth training course in civil, criminal, administrative and 
commercial law, and its participants were previously selected by the 
JRC and the Supreme Court446. 450 participants, including judges, 
prosecutors and MoJ staff, more than 50 of whom women447, attended 
this course from July 2003 to December 2004. This group was divided 
into 15 smaller groups of 30 participants each. Five groups were from 
Kabul and ten groups were from the provinces. Each of the participants 
received 300 hours of practical training over a period of 16 months, in 
order to put the lessons, learnt during the training, into practice within 
the courts. For the criminal law part, programme trainers were 
Egyptian judges, prosecutors and academics, chosen because of the 
similarity between the Egyptian and the Afghan legal system. 
Subsequently, two international study tours were organised in Egypt 
and Italy so that a selected group of participants could receive 
additional training448. Financed by Italy, UNDP carried out the training 
of 120 judges and 130 law graduates, to be employed within justice 
institutions449. UNODC provided the training (also in English language 
and computer skills) of judicial and legal personnel working in the field 
                                                           
 
 
446  Project: ‘Interim Training for the Afghan Judiciary’, implemented by ISISC 
(as IDLO subcontractor), from July 2003 to October 2004. The cost of the 
project was US $ 3 million (ibid.). 
447  M. Lombardo Pijola, ‘In Afghanistan con un obiettivo: dare vita ad un 
sistema giudiziario’, Messaggero, 17 February 2006, p. 2. 
448 The first study tour was organized in November 2003 and involved 20 
members of the Afghan judiciary, 5 of whom were women. The participants 
also visited the National Judicial Studies Centre in Egypt and ISISC in Italy. 
The second study tour was organised in July 2004. A selected group of 
Afghan legal professionals spent a week at ISISC headquarters, engaging in 
an intensive seminar on current human rights problems in the country. 
449  Project: ‘Rebuilding the Justice Sector of Afghanistan’, implemented by 
UNDP in 2003-2005. Italy invested in the project US $ 2.75 million 
(Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali (cit.)). 
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of juvenile450 and penitentiary justice451. UNODC further realized 
training courses in management, informatics and English language for 
MoJ staff (10 participants in 2003, and about 90 in 2004-2005), as well as 
for 71 officers in Gardez, Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif and Jalalabad. In 2003, 16 
senior officers from the Central Prison Department attended study 
tours to Germany and Italy, with a follow-up workshop attended by 40 
staff452. Ultimately, in 2006 UNODC run training courses outside Kabul 
for staff from all Afghan provinces453. 
Other projects concerned the diffusion of the new legislation and 
the judicial framework in provinces and districts. Financed by Italy, 
ISISC implemented a new strategy called ‘Provincial Justice Initiative’ 
(PJI)454, aimed at improving the judicial administration in the provinces. 
Once again, the PJI was based on the ‘training the trainers’ 
methodology. It also focused on mooting and the practical knowledge 
of criminal procedure. In practice, the PJI prepared a core group of 
trainers who used ISISC methodology and material to run capacity 
                                                           
 
 
450  Project: ‘Reform of the Juvenile Justice System’, No. AFG/R40, training 
provided in 2003. Italy spent US $ 1,026,000 for this project (Cooperazione 
Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali (cit.)). A list and a brief 
description of UNODC projects in Afghanistan is available at 
http://www.unodc.org/afg/en/projects_ongoing.html.  
451  Project: ‘Reform of the Penitentiary System in Afghanistan’, No. AFG/R41, 
training provided in 2004-2005. The whole project cost around US $ 2 million 
(Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali (cit.)). 
452  See UNODC, Thematic Evaluation of the Technical Assistance, p. 18. Project: 
‘Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Capacity Building’, No. AFG/R41, 
activities realized in 2004. On the whole, Italy spent US $ 3,137,000 for this 
project (Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali (cit.)).
453  Project: ‘Reform of the Penitentiary System, Extension to the Provinces’, No. 
AFG/R87. The Italian government contributed to the project with US $ 5 
million (Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali (cit.)).
454 Project: ‘Provincial Justice Initiative’, Phase 1 of the project was realized in 
December 2004 – March 2005. Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività 
bilaterali (cit.) 
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building programmes for judicial staff in the provinces. The PJI started 
in December 2004 with a pilot project of three months in the provinces 
of Gardez, Paktia, and Balkh, involving about 50 local justice operators  
in each province (18 judges, 18 prosecutors, 8 judicial police, and 6 
defence lawyers)455. 
With the Italian support456, UNICEF prepared a comparative 
analysis between the code and the International Convention on 
Childhood Rights, issued at the beginning of 2005, and a study on the 
rights of children under customary law. Finally, the new didactic 
curricula of the Faculties of Law/Political Science and Sharia were 
developed by UNDP in 2005, with the final goal being that of 
harmonizing teachings within the two faculties457. 
  
6.4.4  Judicial Infrastructure 
At the beginning of the international intervention, the status of judicial 
infrastructure was appalling. Both Kabul and the main cities in the 
                                                           
 
 
455  Embassy of Italy in Kabul, Pilot phase Provincial Justice Initiative ends up, Press 
Release, 23 March 2005, http://www.unama-
afg.org/news/_pr/_english/Others/2005/05mar23-
PJI%20press%20relaese.doc.  
456 Project: ‘Juvenile Justice and special protection measures for children in 
conflict with the law’, activities implemented in 2003-2005. Italy provided € 
700,000 for the project (Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività 
multilaterali (cit.)). 
457  Project: ‘Rebuilding the Justice Sector of Afghanistan’ (see Cooperazione 
Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali (cit.)). The new curricula were 
submitted to the University of Kabul and to the Ministry of Higher 
Education in 2005 and were to be first applied as from March 2006. 
However, at the moment they are still not used, pending the adoption of 
new curricula in other faculties. 
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provinces lacked functioning judicial and correctional facilities458. 
Efforts in this area have been massive and included a large number of 
donors. It is unfeasible to give the exact account of projects in this area, 
but we may concentrate on those activities carried out under the Italian 
‘Lead’. Again, some of the projects were implemented directly by the 
IJPO, whereas others were contracted out to a few organizations and 
agencies. 
In September 2005 Italy started the restoration and rehabilitation 
of the National Security Court, which was completed five months 
later459. In addition, financed by Italy, the UNDP (and UNOPS as its 
subcontractor) completed the construction of different judicial facilities 
in the provinces of Kunduz, Badakshan, Nangarhar (court buildings), and 
Herat (multi-functional centre). In Kabul, the library of the law faculty 
was restored, while the AGO (Anti-Narcotics Department) and the MoJ 
received renovation works460. Within the UNODC ‘Reform of the 
Juvenile System’ project, a Juvenile Justice Department was established 
within the MoJ in 2005. In addition, the Kabul Juvenile Court was 
restored and building works for a new ‘closed’ juvenile rehabilitation 
                                                           
 
 
458  Amnesty International, Afghanistan: Crumbling Prison System Desperately in 
Need of Repair (Kabul/Geneva: AI Index ASA 11/017/2003, July 2003), 20, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA11/017/2003. According to 
the Kabul University’s Center for Policy and Human Development, apart 
from the Pul-e-Charkhi prison, in 2007 there were the 242 district detention 
centers throughout Afghanistan, with 6,156 persons under provisional arrest 
(204 women) and 4,423 inmates serving their sentence (86 women) (See 
CPHD, Bridging Modernity and Tradition, p. 78-79). Other sources report that 
14 of 34 provincial prisons (42 percent) were located in rented homes 
(Bassiouni and Rothenberg, An Assessment of Justice Sector, p. 26). 
459  Project: ‘National Security Court’, carried out from September 2005 to 
February 2006. The cost of the project was US $ 180,000 (Cooperazione 
Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività bilaterali (cit.)). 
460  Project: ‘Justice institutions’ premises rehabilitation’, activities carried out in 
2003-2005 (Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali (cit.)). 
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center (CJRC) started in the north of the city461. Within another project, 
centred on the rehabilitation of correctional infrastructure, UNODC 
provided equipment and refurbishment of the Central Prison 
Department, which was transferred in the meantime from the Ministry 
of Interior (MoI) to the MoJ. During 2004, as part of the same project, 
UNOPS (as a UNODC subcontractor) and its local contractors started to 
restore both the Female and the Male Detention Centres in Kabul. 
Other works were completed in block one of the Pul-e-Charkhi detention 
complex, located just outside Kabul462. With a separate project, in 2004, 
Italy attempted to build a new block for the MoJ, but the project has not 
been implemented so far, due to bureaucratic difficulties on the Italian 
side463. Another project provided for the construction of additional two 
prisons in Gardez and Mazar-e-Sharif, as well as the realization of a 
national database of inmates464. However, both prisons have not been 
completed yet at the time of writing for lack of funds465. Ultimately, 
Italy financed a UNICEF project for the construction of an ‘open’ 
                                                           
 
 
461  Project: ‘Reform of the Juvenile Justice System’, No. AFG/R40. 
(Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali (cit.)). Activities 
commenced in 2003. The CJRC was completed in 2005 but its hand over to 
the Afghan authorities was done only in 2007, due to lack of equipment and 
trained personnel. The structure is currently in need of additional works. 
462  Project: ‘Reform of the Penitentiary System in Afghanistan’ (see 
Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali (cit.)). The 
transfer of the Central Prison Department from the MoI to the MoJ took 
place in 2003. Other building works started in 2004. The restoration of the 
Pul-e-Charkhi prison was completed in 2005. The Female Detention Centre 
was handed over to the Afghan authorities in January 2008. 
463  Italy initially provided US $ 177,000 for this project (see Cooperazione 
Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività bilaterali (cit.)). 
464  Project: ‘Reform of the Penitentiary System, Extension to the Provinces’. 
465  UNODC, Thematic Evaluation of the Technical Assistance, p. 25-26. 
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juvenile rehabilitation centre in the same site of the ‘closed’ centre and 
a few Juvenile Primary Courts in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif and Jalalabad466. 
 
6.5   Assessment 
On the whole, during this first phase, the justice system reform was 
often criticised as being too slow, compared with other areas of 
activity467. However, in order to evaluate the situation of justice in 
Afghanistan during the period 2002-2006 and the impact of 
international policy-interventions being undertaken, one should 
consider that the restoration of the justice system started from a very 
weak base. Moreover, justice sector reform cannot be seen in isolation 
from the overall context. The elements that normally form the core of 
domestic security, namely the police, military, and justice system, 
should be regarded as intertwined and interdependent. In the first 
instance, the central government’s lack of capacity to reduce the power 
of warlords and to extend its control over the country inevitably 
undermined the effective implementation of reform projects468. There 
has also been conflicting aims and priorities among prominent 
international policy stakeholders. For example, while the UN and Japan 
were actively involved in the demobilization of non-regular militias469, 
                                                           
 
 
466 Project: ‘Support the Reform of the Juvenile Justice sector and the 
development of a child-right based legislative framework in Afghanistan’. 
The project also included training and legal awareness activities. The ‘Open 
Juvenile Rehabilitation Center’ was handed over to Afghan authorities on 23 
November 2006. It has not been used for about two years. The first children 
were sent in the ‘open’ centre during Spring 2008, on provisional basis, 
according to decisions of the Kabul Juvenile Court. 
467 I. Ingravallo, ‘L’azione internazionale per la ricostruzione dell’Afghanistan’, 
59(3) La comunità internazionale 2004, 525-550, at 549. 
468  Jones et al., Establishing Law and Order, p. 99 and 103. 
469  S.G. Simonsen, ‘Ethnicising Afghanistan?: Inclusion and Exclusion in post-
Bonn Institution Building’, 25(4) Third World Quarterly 2004, 707-729, at 726. 
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the US policy of paying warlords to fight the Taliban by proxy 
increased the power of regional tribal leaders470. 
With the lack of a clear national plan or a common policy among 
the different players involved in the process of reconstruction471, the 
final implementation strategy resulted from a mixture of orientations. 
As noted earlier, this is a common feature of most state-building 
interventions, where the reconstruction of the justice system has, so far, 
often been led by improvisation rather than by principles472. In the case 
of Afghanistan, instead of bridging the gaps between national 
institutions, international stakeholders turned into «additional factional 
players in the arena»473. This initially prevented the shaping of a unique 
strategy to guide reforms, also fragmenting the process into «a 
constellation of overlapping and often incompatible programmes 
advanced independently»474. In fact, while the Bonn Agreement had 
drawn benchmarks and timetables for political changes,  since the 
beginning of its implementation, no coordinating mechanisms were 
provided to harmonize these political measures475. The injection of a 
massive international semi-administrative apparatus, with more than 
40,000 Afghans working for international NGOs and agencies476 
undoubtedly caused problems in coordination and undermined 
common efforts. In this regard, it is reported that the «absence of 
systematic coordination» between the multilateral programmes 
established by international agencies, together with the bilateral 
                                                           
 
 
470  Goodson, Afghanistan’s Long Road, p. 90. 
471  Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial System, p. 11. 
472  S. Chesterman, ‘Rough Justice: Establishing the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict 
Territories’, 20(1) Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 2005, 69-98, at 70. 
473  Sedra, Security Sector Reform, p. 100. 
474  Ibid. 
475  B.R. Rubin, ‘Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing 
Sovereignty for Whose Security?’, 27(1) Third World Quarterly 2006, 175-185, 
at 184. 
476  Goodhand, Afghanistan in Central Asia, p. 78. 
  
 
 
140 
 
operations of Italy and other donors, «delayed implementation, caused 
a lengthy negotiation process and lack of synergy between 
interventions»477. If links and coordination among donors were rather 
poor, the liaisons among the local justice institutions (Supreme Court, 
AGO, MoJ) were not better. Instead of implementing a sort of 
mutually-reinforcing strategy to govern the sector at best, relationships 
between such institutions has been reportedly «quixotic at best and 
hostile at worst»478. On the whole, the system has clearly suffered from 
inadequate leadership on the Afghan side479. 
Indeed, instead of struggling with reforming institutions which 
are refractory to change, so as to kick-start the process of 
reconstruction, the international community appears to have preferred 
to bypass local authorities in the establishment of a Judicial Reform 
Commission, by staffing it with English speaking Afghans returning 
from Western countries. As a consequence, the JRC has avoided taking 
hard political decisions, which would carry little weight without the 
direct involvement of Afghan institutions. As a result, the JRC has 
become a forum for turf wars between the donors more than one for 
facilitating dialogue among the different domestic stakeholders in the 
justice institutions. 
The plurality of stakeholders involved in the reconstruction 
process generated a bundle of reciprocal interactions which could 
hardly survive without frictions. For instance, tensions are reported to 
have occurred between the JRC (including the JRC consultants of the 
USAID-funded Asia Foundation) and the Italian authorities in the 
drafting of the January 2003 judicial sector rebuilding strategy, entitled 
‘Rebuilding the Justice Sector of Afghanistan’. Frictions concerned the 
‘leadership’ in the final draft480. Since the 2002 Rome Conference, there 
                                                           
 
 
477 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Humanitarian and Reconstruction 
Assistance, p. 69. 
478  Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial System, p. 8. 
479  Horner, The Italian Pillar, p. 73. 
480  Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial System, p. 12. 
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have also been reports of opposition, from UNAMA and other donors, 
to Italian attempts at defining a top role for the IDLO in the sector. In 
one occasion, a document concerning a strategic analysis on judicial 
reform, drafted by the IDLO and distributed to the conference 
attendees by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was never tabled 
for discussion481. According to Antonella Deledda, former IJPO 
executive officer: «Rather than building on each other[’s] successes, the 
different programmes of nations and international organizations [have] 
spent […] most of the energies of their staff in fighting each other and 
trying to blame others for the collective failures»482. 
The lack of coordination also partly derives from UNAMA’s 
patchy performance, reflecting the limited mandate of the United 
Nations in Afghanistan. In fact, UNAMA is usually defined as a 
‘hybrid’ UN ‘integrated mission’, to mark the distance from previous 
operations, such as in Kosovo, characterized by broad powers of 
government483. However, the limited impact on the ground was not 
purely a technical problem in lack of coordination, to be laid at the door 
of the UN, Italy or the US. The problem was at heart a political one, 
deriving from the lack of clear strategic goals, which would be drawn 
up in the next months. This political problem was then given a 
technical or organizational form in the absence of a clear and mutually 
recognized sharing of tasks between all the actors concerned in the 
post-conflict phase. Integration is successful only when a common 
strategic objective is delineated and all the relevant actors achieve a 
general understanding of their mandates and functions484. If the 
leadership (either Afghan or international) which has to identify needs 
and priorities at the operational level lacks accountability and clear 
                                                           
 
 
481  International Crisis Group, Afghanistan: Judicial Reform, p. 9. 
482  Quoted in Horner, The Italian Pillar, p. 85. 
483  Eide et al., Report on Integrated Missions, 13 and 15. 
484 E.A. Weir, Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the 
Humanitarian Imperative (Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping 
Training Centre, Monograph No. 4, June 2006), 13, 
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lines of responsibility then coordination and the ‘integration’ of tasks 
may merely add to misunderstandings and contribute to evasion and 
buck-passing485. 
Moreover, it is reported that the practice of recruiting consultants 
to be seconded into the Afghan public administration has sometimes 
delayed the effective starting of activities. Observers addressed 
criticism towards Italy for its initial approach after taking the 
‘leadership’ of the sector, considering the ‘subcontracting’ of Italian 
judicial reform assistance to IDLO as responsible not only for delaying 
the process but also for not fully engaging all the relevant government 
institutions (the MoJ in particular) in the reforming activities486. 
However, the problem cannot be so easily solved. Promoting a 
reduction in the number of foreign consultants in the Afghan public 
administration, allowing the Afghan government to decide 
autonomously, appears insufficient unless considered in a broader 
dimension. Are national authorities really able to set up a truly 
functioning public administration? The answer to such a question 
brings us back to a more generic and still unresolved issue, regarding 
the successful transferring of strong institutions to countries recovering 
from conflicts. 
Therefore, on the whole, this ‘lead nation’ approach has been 
characterized by «a lack of close coordination, an imbalance in the level 
of committed resources, and the absence of a unified developmental 
concept»487. It generated a donor-oriented system, with broad 
bilateralization of planning and programming. Under this bilateral 
scheme, donors were supposed to perform justice reform by 
influencing the political will of local authorities through direct financial 
and technical support. However, on the one hand, financial assistance 
was initially even too fast, given the country’s slow absorption 
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capacities; while, on the other hand, the changes in national politics 
have been partial at best488. 
Generally, the substantial failure of bilateral aid may be due to 
the limited powers, financial capacities and expertise of the selected 
‘lead nations’. According to the Rand Corporation research director in 
the field of state-building, James Dobbins, «Italy simply lacked the 
expertise, resources, interest and influence needed to succeed in such 
an undertaking»489. Recently, Italy was also criticised by the 
International Crisis Group490. Other studies are less critical, and confirm 
that «Italy has done a respectable job», considered «its minimal 
expertise and the immense challenge it faced»491. Indeed, in the first 
period of activities, the Italian authorities were reported to have 
implemented their own projects after limited consultation with their 
Afghan counterparts, even though the latter’s efforts to coordinate 
reconstruction, without Italian support, have been unsuccessful492. For 
instance, in the case of personnel training, reports lamented the lack of 
coordination between IDLO and the JRC-backed Legal Education 
Centre (LEC) in Kabul – the former training judges and prosecutors, 
while the latter provided training for lawyers493. It must be considered 
that this coordination gap is a basic consequence of the overall absence 
of political will, shown by both the Afghan government and the 
international actors, with regard to this sector. Besides, the failure of 
the ‘lead nation approach’ in Afghanistan is not only restricted to the 
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justice sector. Lack of success concerns all the ‘leads’, and it is probably 
due to very similar reasons494. Nevertheless, what is disconcerting, «is 
how long it took for the international community to realize that Italy 
was not up to the task of leading this ‘fundamentally important sector’, 
and for others to step in and provide leadership and resources»495. 
On the other hand, doubts arise on whether one may really talk 
about an Italian ‘lead’ in the justice sector reform. Some data on 
funding activities reveals a very different situation. For 2001-2003, only 
about US $ 25 million were allocated to the reconstruction of the justice 
sector, by mainly Western donors, although the overall request of the 
Afghan government amounted to $ 190 million up to 2006496. The 
Afghan 2003-2004 budget request for justice sector funding was US $ 27 
million and was almost entirely covered by the Italian government 
with a contribution of US $ 20 million. Up until 2006, Italy had invested 
about US $ 57 million in reform and reconstruction projects in 
Afghanistan497, US $ 45 million in 2001-2005, and US $ 12 million in 
                                                           
 
 
494  According to Emma Sky, fellow in the War Studies Department at Kings 
College, London: «The lead nations [were] seeking to implant a Western 
liberal democratic model on Afghanistan without regard to the 
circumstances, capacities and traditions of the country» (E. Sky, 
‘Afghanistan Case Study: The Lead Nation Approach’ in L. Nathan et al., 
Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Guide For Donors (London: Crisis 
States Research Centre, January 2007), 59-67, at 62, 
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2006498. In practice Italy invested around US $ 10 million per year in the 
reform of Afghan justice during that period499. Conversely, according to 
the Rand Corporation, in 2004 the United States provided 
approximately the same amount (US $ 10 million) to the judicial sector, 
out of a total of US $ 2.1 billion assistance to the country500. However, 
this data is probably underestimated, as shown in chapter seven. 
Indeed, other sources confirm that in May 2004, USAID (the US 
international cooperation agency) alone granted to one of its 
contractors, namely Management Systems International (MSI), US $ 
16.8 million under a project called ‘Accelerating Success Initiative’. 
With the money received, 
«MSI provided technical assistance and logistical support to the 
constitutional commission and its secretariat and to the constitutional loya 
jirga that took place in December 2003. […] MSI also built or rehabilitated 7 
of 10 targeted courthouses by September 30, 2004; helped review, draft, and 
track the status of legislation; surveyed and compiled laws and legal texts; 
mapped courthouse administration functions; and conducted training for 
about 300 legal professionals»501. 
This data clearly shows that, even in the first years of the international 
intervention, the leadership over the sector’s reconstruction was 
exercised de facto by the US. Besides, it is evident that the US economic 
potential is remarkably bigger than the Italian one, and so are its assets 
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on field.  With its money, expertise and organizational capacity the US 
could (and still can) influence the political will of local actors (including 
justice institutions) hundreds of times more than other donors. 
Moreover, this difference in financial and economic resources spent by 
the US and other donors in the reform of justice would, in the next 
years, increase to such an extent that the projects being carried out by 
international actors other than the US would only be a fraction of the 
entire assistance to the sector. According to the ‘Donor Activity Matrix’ 
included in the first attachment to the National Justice Programme502, 
by March 2008 the US had started 280 different justice reform activities 
(216 at provincial level and 64 at national level), out of a total of 396 
initiatives put in place on the whole by donors within justice sector (71 
percent)503. 
A further assessment may be done on the number of functioning 
courts and the qualification of judicial and administrative personnel, 
bearing in mind that the available data is partial and that justice reform 
may take time before achieving visible effects. However, figures will 
not change significantly in future years, notwithstanding the increased 
international efforts in the reform of Afghan justice. In this respect, 
generally, authoritative critics affirm that judiciary was an area in 
which no controversies arose during the consultations for the drafting 
of the constitutional charter504. This may appear to be somewhat of a 
paradox, but can be explained by the fact that the relevant actors, both 
internal and external, agreed that the sector could not immediately be 
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reformed in depth and that the existing balance of powers between 
political and judicial elites should be maintained. This compromise is 
also reflected in the continuing traditional independence enjoyed by 
the Afghan Bench, often described as a «self-perpetuating caste»505, and, 
in this period, «dominated by religious conservatives who have more 
in common with the Taliban than with Karzai»506. On the other hand, it 
may be noted that, undeniably, «[a] strong and independent judiciary 
can have a destabilizing effect on a legal system whose very 
foundations are unsettled and considered controversial»507. 
In a 2005 report, Amnesty International described the judicial 
system as being «ineffective, corrupt and susceptible to intimidation 
from armed groups», with courts that hardly functioned in rural areas. 
Judges and lawyers were frequently portrayed as being ignorant of the 
applicable law and accused of turning a blind eye even to the most 
severe cases of discrimination against women508. An earlier report of 
Amnesty indicated that a little over 2,000 judges were serving in 2003, 
together with approximately 3,000 prosecutors attached to Afghan 
courts. With regard to the judges, only around 20 percent of them were 
properly qualified and less than 2 percent were women509. In the same 
period, it is reported that there were no women among the 100-plus 
senior judges and that most of the female judges were employed in 
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and the New Afghan Constitution’, 64(4) Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 2004, 917-927, at 926. 
508 Amnesty International, Report 2005 (London: Amnesty International, AI 
Index No. POL 10/001/2005, 25 May 2005), 36. 
509  Amnesty International, Afghanistan: Re-establishing the rule of law, p. 7, 12 and 
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administrative sections510. Other sources report that in early 2006 the 
judiciary was composed of 1,500 judges, among which only 60 were 
women511. In addition, in 2005, according to statistics obtained from the 
Supreme Court, only 100 judges had university degrees in law and 
political science; 500 had a degree in sharia; 200 had a 12th or 14th grade 
education; 250 had below a 12th grade education; while 523 posts were 
vacant512. Due to the lack of judicial personnel, in 2004, 9 percent of the 
courts and 12 per cent of the prosecutor offices were run by 
administrative personnel only. However, the administrative staff were 
in short supply too, since in the same period the number of court 
administrative personnel was approximately 60 percent of the number 
of judges and the number of administrative staff in the prosecutor 
offices was approximately 23 percent of the number of prosecutors, 
posing a serious challenge to the administration of the courts513. During 
the first years, the sector’s reconstruction was mostly concentrated in 
Kabul. In 2003 only 35 percent of judges were located in the provinces 
due to low pays and poor working conditions514. In 2004, out of the total 
number of prosecutors, 44 percent worked in Kabul, 30 percent in the 
provincial capitals, and only 26 percent in the districts. In the case of 
judges, 31 percent served in Kabul, 23 percent in the provincial capitals 
and 46 percent in the districts. It was also estimated that women judges 
represented only 3 per cent and women prosecutors 5 per cent of the 
                                                           
 
 
510 C. Johnson, W. Maley, A. Thier and A. Wardak, Afghanistan’s political and 
constitutional development (London: Overseas Development Institute, January 
2003), 26, 
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donne in Toga’, Sole 24 ore, 2 April 2006, p. 4. 
512  UNAMA, Afghan Justice Sector Overview (December 2005), p. 8. 
513 UNAMA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Considerations on Criteria and Actions 
for Strengthening the Justice System (Kabul: UNAMA – RoL Unit, 8 February 
2004), 19, on file with the IJPO. 
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entire professional staff515. Corruption among judges and prosecutors 
was another difficult problem, which would characterize the sector in 
the years to come. This can be explained by the low salaries for judges 
and civil servants, which in 2004 amounted to around US $ 28 per 
month for state employees, US $ 50 for an ordinary judge, and US $ 80 
for a Supreme Court judge516, but it might also be down to the general 
lack of experience in public administration. The status of the Bar was 
obviously really poor: reportedly in 2005 only 170 lawyers were 
registered and licensed within the MoJ, while other sources  confirm 
that those practicing were even less – approximately only 50517. In 2006, 
according to the AIHRC, from a sample of 8,000 interviewed persons, 
about 60 percent did not have confidence in the justice system518. 
As considered above, the legal system still permits both Islamic 
and secular offences and penalties519, together with an Islamic family 
law which can be easily considered to contradict the international 
                                                           
 
 
515  UNAMA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, p. 19. 
516  Ibid., p. 20; Chesterman, Justice under International Administration, p. 43. 
517  UNAMA, Afghan Justice Sector Overview (December 2005), p. 5.  
518  S. Samar, Presentation held at the Conference ‘The Reform of the Judicial 
Institutions and Public Administration in Afghanistan: A Possible 
Roadmap’, (Kabul, Serena Hotel, 25-26 March 2006), on file with the IJPO. 
519  The application of Islamic law in criminal proceedings has recently come to 
the forefront with the cases of Abdul Rahman (an NGO worker sentenced to 
death for apostasy and then fled in Italy), Perwiz Kambakhsh (a young 
journalist sentenced to a 20-year prison term for blasphemy) and Ghows 
Zalmay (a former journalist and AGO spokesman arrested for an 
unauthorized translation of the Koran). See respectively: M. Knust Rassekh 
Afshar, ‘The Case of an Afghan Apostate – The Right to a Fair Trial Between 
Islamic Law and Human Rights in the Afghan Constitution’, 10 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 2006, 591-605; Abdul Waheed Wafa, ‘No 
Death Sentence for Afghan Journalist’, New York Times, 21 October 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/world/asia/22afghan.html?hp; A. 
Kroeger, ‘Afghan Koran distributor arrested’, BBC News, 4 November 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7077892.stm.  
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human rights treaties signed by Afghanistan and the 2004 Constitution. 
There remains a clear contradiction in the founding principles of the 
justice system, which is the result of two complementary efforts: 
strengthening domestic institutional capacity through the introduction 
of Western legal norms and international human rights protections and 
the need to restore legitimacy to the central authorities by adapting the 
justice system to Afghan rural and Islamic traditions and conventions. 
These compromises are partly a reflection of the short-term approach 
taken for the development of the sector in this first phase. 
However, at the same time, the most relevant laws adopted in 
2002-2006 were influenced by external actors – Italy above all. As noted 
earlier, this was the case of the ICPC, the 2005 Juvenile Code, and the 
2005 Law on Prisons and Detention Centres. With regard to the ICPC, 
the procedural rules included in it seem consistent with the Afghan 
civil law legal tradition and are intended to merely offer some basic 
legal safeguards to be applied in the course of trials. The code has been 
issued after an intense period of study, specifically aimed at integrating 
the new procedural norms with the substantive provisions of the 1976 
Penal Code, still in force. The whole process has been conducted with 
the aim of avoiding giving the impression that the code has just been 
dropped in from above. Nevertheless, the international authorities have 
not merely introduced a new procedural code but have also influenced 
the relevant substantive norms. Guarantees for suspects and the 
arrested may profoundly affect the practical  enjoyment of individual 
rights deriving from substantive law. Moreover, the code imposes 
methods and safeguards when obtaining evidence which clearly 
contradicts traditional Islamic rules of evidence (which give central 
importance to the oath and oral testimony in criminal and civil trials). 
In the end, the code might provide a circuitous way to influence the 
handling of trials for religious offences (still possible under the current 
Afghan criminal code), which would be hampered if the process was 
forced to follow Western legal standards. 
Nevertheless, scepticism and allegations of inconsistency have 
been expressed by some commentators, with regard to the code’s 
implementation plan, especially concerning the low number of judges 
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and prosecutors involved initially520. Other critics have suggested 
redrafting the criminal procedure code with the aid and participation 
of a diverse council of Afghan ulema and tribal leaders, in order to 
guarantee a broader consensus on the initiative521. 
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7 Phase Two – From London to Paris and Beyond: 
 Implementing  the Local Ownership Principle in 
 Justice Sector Reform 
 
 
 
7.1   The End of the Bonn Process 
A major evolution within the justice sector policy-making structure 
began in 2005. Early that year, the government started preparing its 
long-term vision, which was included in the Afghanistan first 
Millennium Development Goals Country Report, presented in 
September 2005 at the UN World Summit in New York522. On 15 August 
2005, an MoJ policy paper entitled ‘Justice for All’523 was delivered at a 
national justice consultative conference, held in Kabul. The document, 
which was further revised and finally adopted on 10 October 2005, 
represented the primary medium-term development strategy for the 
justice sector, covering a period of up to 12 years. It established initial 
targets for justice system reform, along with programming and funding 
requirements, which were set out in 1-3, 3-5 and 5-10 year time-frames. 
Its drafting involved staff from the MoJ, AGO, Supreme Court, as well 
as international advisors from the UN (UNAMA and UNDP) and other 
international actors524. In the same month a ‘Law Reform Working 
Group’ was established under the auspices of the JSCG in order to 
                                                           
 
 
522  Government of Afghanistan, Millennium Development Goals Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan Country Report 2005: Vision 2020 (Kabul: GoA, 2005), 
www.ands.gov.af/src/src/MDGs_Reps/MDGR%202005.pdf. 
523  Government of Afghanistan, Justice for All: A Comprehensive Needs Analysis for 
Justice in Afghanistan (Kabul: Ministry of Justice, October 2005), 
http://www.rolafghanistan.esteri.it/NR/rdonlyres/B0DB53D0-A1F9-468E-
8DF0-3F485F1959A7/0/JusticeforAll.pdf. 
524  CPHD, Bridging Modernity and Tradition, p. 120. 
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manage and coordinate international and national input into the 
legislative draft process. Italy joined the group together with UNDP, 
USAID and UNAMA. However, the implementation of ‘Justice for All’ 
started only in December 2005, with the creation of six working groups 
and one advisory group, once again participated by relevant national 
and international stakeholders. Some of the working groups 
established sub-working groups525. 
Other crucial developments occurred at the London Conference 
on Afghanistan, which took place at the end of January 2006. The 
conference saw the signing of the Afghanistan Compact526 and the 
presentation of the Interim Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (I-ANDS)527, which also represented the country’s I-PRSP. The 
former was basically a political agreement between the Afghan 
Government and the international community towards the 
achievement of 42 benchmarks within a five-year term. The Compact’s 
rule of law component was made up of 4 benchmarks, which mirrored 
those within the I-ANDS. Such benchmarks were related to the 
adoption and dissemination of new codes and laws, the establishment 
of functioning justice institutions, the adoption of anti-corruption 
procedures, as well as the construction and rehabilitation of judicial 
infrastructure528. The London Conference gathered pledges for 
                                                           
 
 
525  UNAMA, Afghan Justice Sector Overview (Kabul: UNAMA-RoL Unit, April 
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approximately US $ 10.5 billion, to be disbursed within five years. The 
Compact was eventually endorsed by the Security Council, which also 
welcomed the I-ANDS adoption529. In line with the World Bank’s CDF 
model, the event also created the Joint Coordination and Monitoring 
Board (JCMB, effectively established in April 2006), designed to 
monitor progress towards the achievement of the benchmarks included 
in the Compact530. The JCMB composed of 28 members, three fourths of 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
i) By end of 2010, the legal framework required under the constitution, 
including civil, criminal and commercial law, will be set up, distributed to 
all judicial and legislative institutions and made available to the public. 
ii) By end of 2010, functioning institutions of justice will be fully operational 
in each province of Afghanistan, and the average time to resolve contract 
disputes will be reduced as much as possible. 
iii) A review and reform of oversight procedures relating to corruption, lack 
of due process and miscarriage of justice will be initiated by the end of 2006 
and fully implemented by the end of 2010; by the end of 2010, reforms will 
strengthen the professionalism, credibility and integrity of key institutions of 
the justice system (the Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary, the Attorney-
General’s Office, the Ministry of the Interior and National Directorate of 
Security). 
iv) By the end of 2010, justice infrastructure will be rehabilitated; and prisons 
will have separate facilities for women and juveniles. 
529  See UNSC Res. No. 1659, UN Doc. S/RES/1659, 15 February 2006. 
530  More specifically, the JCMB is mandated to: 
i) provide high-level oversight of progress in the implementation of the 
political commitments of the Afghanistan Compact; 
ii) provide direction to address significant issues of coordination, 
implementation, financing for the benchmarks and timelines in the 
Compact, and any other obstacles and bottlenecks identified either by the 
government or the international community; 
iii) report on the implementation of the Compact to the President, National 
Assembly, the UN Secretary General, the donors, and the public. 
(JCMB Terms of Reference, available at 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/JCMB_TOR_-_English.pdf).  
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whom are international actors531. The remaining seven include the most 
relevant Afghan Ministers532, who therefore represent the minority of 
participants, even though the Afghan government co-chairs the Board 
together with UNAMA. The JCMB meets at least four times per year 
and its meetings are preceded by the preparatory meetings of 
consultative and working groups. 
Following the London Conference, the CGs were reformed to 
align with the I-ANDS structure, having two main functions: to 
coordinate the implementation of the I-ANDS itself, and to assist in 
preparing the national budget. The new policy-making structure was 
reformed accordingly. Still nowadays, it consists of a Government 
Oversight Committee (OSC), a Consultative Group Standing 
Committee (led by the Ministry of Finance, lately replaced by a 
Coordination Team – CT), eight Consultative Groups (one for each I-
ANDS sector, grouped in turn into three macro-pillars), five Cross-
Cutting Thematic Groups (one for each cross-cutting sector), and 28 
working groups. The CGs receive indications from the WGs. Such 
indications are further collected into reports to be sent to the OSC 
through the CT533. The information within these reports is eventually 
used for presentations given during the JCMB quarterly meetings. 
                                                           
 
 
531  The 21 members include UNAMA as the Co-chair; the US, the UK, Japan, 
Germany, the EU, and India, being the six largest development assistance 
contributors;  Pakistan, Iran and China, as neighbouring states; other 3 
regional countries, namely Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Russia; ISAF and the 
Coalition Enduring Freedom, providing strong military support; 4 
additional major troop contributors, namely Canada, the Netherlands, Italy 
and France; and 2 IFIs which largely invest in the country, i.e. the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank. 
532 The government representatives are the Senior Economic Advisor to the 
President (as the JCMB Co-Chair), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
Minister of Finance, the Minister of Economy, the National Security Advisor, 
the Minister of Education, and the Minister of Justice. 
533 Government of Afghanistan, Consultative Group Manual: Terms of Reference 
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Among the CGs, CG No. 2, entitled ‘Governance, Rule of Law 
and Human Rights’, has approximately 75 members, more than a half 
of whom are international experts534. It is divided into eight working 
groups, one of which is the (Advisory) Rule of Law Working Group 
(RoL WG), chaired by the MoJ, with UNAMA and Italy being key 
international partners. The RoL WG itself includes sub-working groups 
on particular topics. Since March 2007, all the WGs and sub-WGs were 
renamed Technical Working Groups (TWGs). The TWGs included 
within the RoL WG are now: 1) Law Reform (divided into a Criminal 
Law Committee and a Civil Law Committee); 2) Justice Physical 
Infrastructure; 3) Justice Institutions and Judicial Reform (divided into 
three committees on the reform of Judiciary, AGO and MoJ, 
respectively); 4) Legal Education and Training (sub-WGs on Legal 
Higher Education, Professional Training, Establishment of the National 
Legal Training Centre); 5) Access to Justice and Legal Aid; and 6) 
Corrections (sub-WGs on Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Prisons, 
Training, Administrative Reforms, Establishment of a High Maximum 
Security Facility at Pul-e-Charkhi Prison). In addition, the RoL WG 
established a ‘Technical Advisory Group on Women and Children in 
Justice’ (TAG) to mentor and monitor gender mainstreaming in the 
sub-WGs. The TAG is being co-chaired by UNICEF and UNIFEM. CG 
No. 2 also includes other working groups somehow related to justice: 
land registration/reform, human rights (including transitional justice), 
counter-narcotics and anti-corruption535. 
The opening of the London Conference may be deemed as ‘the 
end of the Bonn process’, since it concluded the constitutional 
transition with the settlement of the new Afghan parliament in 
December 2005536. However, although at that time the basic pillars of 
the new justice system could be considered established, the local 
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ownership of sector reform was still missing. With the increasing 
number of IFIs activities within the Afghan ‘reconstruction market’ and 
the growing US financial and material assistance, the role of ‘lead 
nations’ was rapidly reconsidered to that of ‘key partners’. 
Notwithstanding the increasing use of pooled financing mechanisms – 
i.e., the trust funds administered by WB and UNDP537 – to support the 
reform of Afghan public administration, justice sector development 
was still passing through a myriad of single projects, each advancing 
independently. The need for more coordination among donors led to 
the establishment of the International Coordination Group for Justice 
Reform (ICGJR) on 31 October 2006, in order to improve donor 
communication regarding justice sector policies. In consequence, the 
International Coordination for Legal Training (ICLT) was constituted 
on 7 May 2007, as an ICGJR sub-working group, with the aim of 
coordinating the plethora of legal training programmes operated by a 
number of international agencies and organizations. However, 
improving coordination among donors did not necessarily entail the 
improvement of the local ownership of reforms as well. Indeed, the 
path towards its achievement still lacked a fundamental step, that of 
the Afghan government adopting a clear strategy for sector 
development. 
 
7.1.1 The Status of Justice before the Rome Conference 
                                                           
 
 
537  See i) the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) – a multi-donor 
trust fund administered by the World Bank and funded by 27 donors, which 
has mobilized over US $ 2.4 billion by March 2008; ii) the Law and Order 
Trust Fund (LOTFA), administered by the UNDP and funded by 15 donors, 
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other law enforcement agencies; and iii) the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund 
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The last updated data on the status of justice in Afghanistan dates back 
to early 2007, before the Rome Conference. It can be noted that figures 
had slightly changed since 2004.  Data is mainly gathered from an in 
depth survey carried out in 2007 by the Kabul University’s Center for 
Policy and Human Development, which sketched a discouraging 
picture of the Afghan justice system538. According to the Supreme 
Court, there should exist 442 courts in Afghanistan (34 provincial 
courts and 408 primary courts), with 1,415 judges. However, in 2007 
only 356 courts were really functioning (81 percent)539, while the 
number of working judges was only 1,107, given the numerous 
vacancies540. This means that in 2007 in Afghanistan there were an 
estimated 21,317 persons per judge. 58.6 percent of judges served in 
primary courts, 30.5 percent in provincial appeal courts, and the 
remaining 10.9 percent in the Supreme Court. Women judges 
represented only 3 percent of the Bench541. About 56 percent of judges 
had a university degree. 44 percent had a degree in Islamic law, while 
only 11.6 percent had a university degree in law/political science. 
Remarkably, 7.7 percent of judges had a non-legal educational 
background, 16.1 percent were educated in madrassas, and, above all, 
20.5 percent had only primary, secondary or high school education. 
Half of judges (54.8 percent) did not have access to legal books or 
codes, 82.8 percent ignored Supreme Court’s decisions, while 36.3 
percent did not have sufficient access to the laws and regulations in 
force. As a consequence, rulings were (and still are) largely based on 
the judge’s personal opinion. Yet in 2007, most of the cases discussed in 
                                                           
 
 
538  If not otherwise specified, data are gathered from CPHD, Bridging Modernity 
and Tradition, p. 70-80. 
539  Bassiouni and Rothenberg, An Assessment of Justice Sector, p. 26 
540  12 percent of existing judges were appointed before 1978. 
541  In addition, the number of female candidates to the post of judge is rather 
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there were 635 applications for 200 posts. However, only 30 applicants were 
women, and only 17 of them passed the admission test. 
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the Afghan courts concerned criminal law (42 percent). There then 
followed civil law cases (37 percent), public security cases (14 percent), 
and commercial cases (7 percent)542. Judicial infrastructure required 
(and still requires) urgent assistance. In 2007 almost all the Afghan 
court houses (97.8 percent) were in need of construction or 
rehabilitation. Ultimately, in 2007 there was a back-log of 6,000 appeal 
cases awaiting adjudication. 
The MoJ, in 2007, employed 1,919 people. However, only 1,325 
positions were filled, 90 of which by women. 42 women were 
employed in professional posts at the MoJ headquarters in Kabul and 
seven in the provinces. 80 percent of the MoJ staff had a high school 
diploma, while only 13 percent had a university degree. The remaining 
7 percent had less than a high school diploma. The AGO had 4,900 
employees, but there were only 74 women out of 2,500 prosecutors. 
Only one of 34 provincial prosecutors was a woman. Other 247 female 
officers worked as administrative and support staff. Some 80 districts 
lacked a prosecutor office, while reportedly a large number of 
prosecutors did not have a university degree in law or sharia. For 
instance, over half of the 238 prosecutors who worked at AGO 
headquarters in Kabul had a degree in law or sharia. Conversely, in the 
AGO provincial office of Kabul, only 37 percent of the 282 prosecutors 
had a university degree. In other AGO provincial offices, less than 20 of 
prosecutors were graduates. Still in 2007, salaries of judges and 
prosecutors were rather low. Salaries of judges ranged from US $ 50 to 
142 per month, while prosecutors were paid an average salary of US $ 
60 per month543. 
With regard to the status of the Bar, in 2007 there were 236 
lawyers registered with the MoJ but only a few of them provided legal 
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aid to indigents544. A new law creating an independent bar association 
was adopted in December 2007. As a consequence, candidates are now 
required to meet a number of conditions for accreditation, respect a 
code of conduct and be subject to disciplinary procedures set up by the 
new Afghan Bar Association545. The number of registered lawyers is 
now approximately 600, 130 of them being women546. The status of 
juvenile justice was not encouraging as well. A research, made in 2007 
but published in June 2008, surveyed 247 minors detained in juvenile 
rehabilitation centres. According to such research, 12 percent of boys 
and 32 percent of girls were charged with adultery or sodomy, while 24 
percent of girls were held in custody for running away from home, and 
14 percent of girls were simply lost or without a refuge547.  
 
7.2  From Rome to Paris and Beyond 
The process of gradually empowering national actors with the decision 
over the reform of justice evolved with the Conference on the Rule of 
Law in Afghanistan, held in Rome at the beginning of July 2007548. The 
event represented a cornerstone for the evolution of sector policies and 
                                                           
 
 
544  19 lawyers who provide legal aid currently work at the Supreme Court 
Legal Aid Office and in a few NGOs. 
545  Advocates Law, Official Gazette No. 934, 17 December 2007, available at 
http://www.moj.gov.af/?lang=en&p=e14.  The law was signed by 
President Karzai on 29 November 2007 and entered into force on 17 March 
2008. 
546 The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and 
security, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/63/372 – S/2008/617, 
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547  UNICEF Afghanistan and AIHRC, Justice for children. The situation of children 
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paved the way to a new process of reforms, oriented towards the full 
Afghan ownership. At the Conference, it was decided to set up, as a 
part of the upcoming ANDS, a National Justice Sector Strategy (NJSS) 
to be implemented by a National Justice Programme (NJP) 549, 
elaborated under the SWAP logic. The NJP, in particular, was initially 
conceived as a SDP – derived from the sector strategy. The Programme 
would be finalized with the assistance of the World Bank and funded 
in significant part through the ARTF, thus establishing a real pooled 
financing mechanism for justice development. Accordingly, the ‘Justice 
Sector Reform Project’ (ARTF Justice Project), financially sustained by 
the ARTF and administered by Afghan authorities, with the overall 
control performed by donors and the WB, was established. 
Operationally, such a multilateral approach was intended to gradually 
replace the ‘bilateralization of aid assistance’550 experimented at the 
beginning of the international intervention. This would have implied 
an evolution from a ‘supply-driven’ to a ‘demand-driven’ approach, 
characterized by the capacity of Afghan Government to articulate a 
plan for sector development, which in turn would have expanded the 
local ownership of reforms. 
In addition, at the Rome Conference donors agreed to adopt a 
coordinated approach for the reconstruction of justice at central and 
provincial levels. To this aim, it was decided to establish a Provincial 
Justice Coordination Mechanism (PJCM), chaired by UNAMA, as well 
as to finance 15 high priority, quick implementation projects presented 
by Afghan justice institutions (five projects each). In the state-building 
theory, this method to collect funds (also called the ‘wedding registry’ 
budget) is normally portrayed as an interim step towards the full 
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autonomy of government to prepare a proper development budget551. 
Each Afghan justice institution also presented its development strategy 
for the years to come552. 
However, the process of adoption of both the NJSS and the NJP 
was rather extensive and problematic. At the Rome Conference, a 
seminar for their adoption was planned to take place in October of the 
same year in Kabul. As the conditions for its organization were lacking, 
all the stakeholders began to concentrate most of their efforts on 
coordinating documents and policies, in order to shape a more rational 
and coherent policy-making system. Eventually, after extensive 
consultation, on 23 February 2008 the ANDS final draft was circulated 
among stakeholders. It included the Draft NJSS as an attachment. A 
month later (24 March 2008), the NJP final draft was presented to the 
donors during a special session of the ICGJR. As initial criticisms by 
both the IMF and the WB about the ANDS document appeared in the 
media553, the National Development Strategy was completely redrafted 
and simplified554. The document lost all its attachments, which were 
                                                           
 
 
551  M. Carnahan, N. Manning, R. Bontjer and S. Guimbert (eds.), Reforming 
Fiscal and Economic Management in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 2004), 24. 
552 The strategies of the Supreme Court, AGO and MoJ are available at 
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i_uffici. 
553  J. Boone, ‘Afghan failure to meet IMF target casts doubt on debt relief’, 
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three ANDS macro-pillars (i.e. security, governance and rule of law, 
economic development). More emphasis is placed on the Provincial 
Development Plans, in order to stress the alleged wide diffusion of the 
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National Action Plan (NAP) was maintained. A new matrix, drafted by the 
JCMB, on the achievement of the NAP targets was further added (Appendix 
II). The expected results reported in the matrix consist of the Afghanistan 
Compact’s benchmarks and several other targets, to be met by 2013 – the 
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kept separate and individually adopted by relevant government 
agencies. On 21 April 2008, the ANDS was finally approved by the 
President of Afghanistan and submitted to the Boards of both the IMF 
and the WB, being also the country’s PRSP. On the very same day, the 
final version of the NJSS was presented for approval to the Afghan 
justice institutions, which signed the document in May. Soon after, the 
NJP was practically embedded into the NJSS document as an 
attachment. The ANDS was eventually presented to the donor 
community at the Paris Conference on Afghanistan, which took place 
on 12 June 2008555. The ANDS contains a short paragraph explicitly 
dedicated to justice system reform, which summarizes the three main 
policy reform goals included into the NJSS and NJP556. Remarkably, the 
ANDS explicitly affirms that «donors should not attempt to impose an 
external judicial system that may not be accepted throughout the 
country»557. At the conference, participants pledged US $ 21.4 billion for 
the implementation of the new development strategy. However, the 
Afghan government was not able to produce a National Public 
Investment Programme (PIP) together with the ANDS, as it is normally 
required for a PRSP. A PIP, generally turns sector strategies into a 
multi-year programme of expected costs and financing sources. Indeed, 
a PIP is required to highlight funding gaps, so that additional financial 
resources may be collected during a Donor Pledging Conference, like in 
Paris. In consequence, the MoF could have integrated the ANDS sector 
strategies into the 1388 (2009/2010) Afghan development budget. On 
the contrary, once again in Paris funds were given blindly. 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
end of the ANDS. With regard to justice system reform, the verbose 
description of the NJSS macro-goals disappears from the text. In addition, 
the table with the NJP key objectives has been rationalized (p. 68). 
555  International Conference in support of Afghanistan, Paris, 12 June 2008, 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-
files_156/afghanistan_498/international-conference-in-support-of-
afghanistan-paris-12th-june-2008_6366/index.html.  
556  ANDS, p. 65-69. 
557  Ibid., p. 69. 
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Accordingly, both the NJSS and NJP were not ‘costed’, apart from the 
ARTF Justice Project. 
 
7.3 The National Justice Sector Strategy and the National 
Justice Programme 
7.3.1  The NJSS 
The NJSS is a comprehensive five-year strategy for justice system 
reform, which provides a systems approach to planning and 
programming. The Strategy builds on the three strategies presented 
individually by the Afghan justice institutions at the Rome Conference. 
Indeed, the full independence and autonomy of the Supreme Court, 
AGO and MoJ is taken into due account in the document. In line with 
the local ownership principle, the NJSS focuses on stimulating the 
internal ‘demand for justice’. It is acknowledged that such demand 
depends in part on access to justice, and in part on the credibility of 
justice institutions. Accordingly, the Strategy is divided into three 
macro-goals: i) improving institutional capacity to deliver sustainable 
justice services; ii) improving coordination and integration within the 
justice system and with other state institutions; and iii) improving the 
quality of justice services. Such major targets are structured into sub-
programmes. The developing strategies, the expected results and the 
potential difficulties, together with the detailed roles and the functions 
of Supreme Court, MoJ, AGO and NLTC, are then highlighted in each 
sub-programme. However, the NTLC has a minor role and its tasks are 
described rather vaguely. Briefly summarized is also the role of PJCM. 
Among the amendments to the applicable law, the adoption of the new 
criminal procedure code by 2009 is considered a priority558. The 
document also envisages a first review of the provisions of the civil 
procedure code and the civil code relating to divorce, child custody, 
                                                           
 
 
558  NJSS, Chapter 3, p. 3. 
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and conditions for marriage559. Conversely, there is no reference to the 
amendment of substantive criminal law. 
Remarkably, the NJSS does not address the issue of traditional 
and community-based ADR, which are then excluded from any 
‘institutional’ development plan, though required in the ANDS560. The 
issue was examined during the consultations which led to the final 
adoption of the Strategy but its full inclusion into the document 
encountered fierce opposition by the Afghan justice institutions. In the 
end, the relationship between the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ justice system 
was left to a policy document to be further developed by the 
Government561. The Strategy envisages traditional ADR essentially like 
an arbitration. According to the NJSS, Afghan people can lawfully 
recur to jirga/shuras only in civil law disputes, with the agreement of 
all litigants and in the absence of any kind of discrimination. Final 
decisions are to be consistent with Islamic law, the Constitution and 
human rights562. Another pretty sensitive issue, namely transitional 
justice, is touched on in a single paragraph. On the point, the NJSS 
generically mentions the Government’s Action Plan for Peace, 
Reconciliation and Justice, but does not refer to vetting the Afghan 
public administration of those officers linked with past abuses. As for 
the adoption of a specific law on the matter, the Strategy only affirms 
the possibility of «drafting legislative documents, as necessary». 
Prosecution policy is limited to «assisting, where appropriate, 
investigations and prosecutions being conducted outside Afghanistan 
[italics added] on abuses committed in Afghanistan or by Afghans». 
Ultimately, it is important to note that the NJSS also includes 
provisions on the establishment of truth-seeking mechanisms563. 
                                                           
 
 
559  Ibid., Chapter 4, p. 6. 
560 ANDS refers to «the necessary interaction and with the informal justice 
systems, which are prevalent throughout the country» (p. 65). 
561  NJSS, Chapter 4, p. 5. 
562  Ibid., p. 6-7. 
563  Ibid., p. 9-10. 
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7.3.2  The NJP 
The NJP represents the NJSS implementation mechanism. It 
«identifies objectives and outputs associated with each of the expected 
outcomes articulated in the NJSS, and establishes mechanisms that will 
allow the Government and donors to define specific projects designed 
to achieve the outcomes»564. The NJP rationale is rooted in the need for 
a coordinated approach to assistance in the justice sector, avoiding 
fragmentation, duplication and overlapping of reform projects. The 
NJP is based on two major funding options, being the pooled financing 
mechanism established via ARTF (ARTF Justice Project) and the 
‘classic’ bilateral approach, which characterizes the projects enlisted in 
Part Four of NJP. Accordingly, the document is composed of four parts: 
1) an introductory chapter; 2) a logical framework of actions, expected 
results and bottlenecks; 3) the ARTF Justice Project (which represents 
the Programme’s multilateral funding channel); and 4) a matrix of 
future activities to be carried out bilaterally by donors. In addition, the 
document encloses two attachments. The first reports all the current 
and recently completed reform programmes, organized according to 
the NJSS sub-programmes. The second attachment contains: i) those 
parts of NAP and the ANDS monitoring matrix – both attached to the 
ANDS document as well – related to justice sector reform, including the 
Afghanistan Compact’s benchmarks and several other targets to be met 
within five years (annexes I and II, respectively); ii) a list of existing 
reform projects, chosen by the Afghan government, to be financed 
through the core or external budget (annex III); iii) a list of programmes 
and projects at provincial level identified as priorities in the Provincial 
Development Plans565. 
                                                           
 
 
564  NJP, p. 16. 
565  Provincial Development Plans represent the outcome of a sub-national 
consultation process undertaken by the ANDS Secretariat. Provincial 
Development Plans subdivide  justice sector priorities into four different 
tiers, which are excerpted for reference in the second attachment. 
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The NJP implementation structure is composed of three main 
bodies, namely the Programme Oversight Committee (POC), the Board 
of Donors (BoD), and the Programme Support Unit (PSU). In addition, 
Programme Units (PUs) should be established within each justice 
institution. POC and BoD form the NJP strategic level. The PSU acts at 
the operational level, while the PUs work at the tactical level, being in 
direct contact with the Supreme Court, the AGO and the MoJ. The POC 
oversees project implementation. It comprises the Chief Justice, the 
Minister of Justice, the Attorney General, and the Minister of Finance. 
The PSU is responsible for the effective execution of the ARTF Justice 
Project, in compliance with the Grant Agreement between the World 
Bank – the ARTF administrator – and the MoF. The PSU will also serve 
as the secretariat of the POC and will monitor and coordinate the NJP 
implementation. The BoD is composed of those states and agencies 
willing to finance justice sector reform. However, the Board should at 
minimum include the ARTF Justice Project’s donors, as the BoD advises 
the POC on its strategic direction and potential challenges. To this aim, 
the BoD and POC meet at least quarterly. The POC generally 
supervises the work of the PSU. To this aim, inter alia, it receives, 
reviews and eventually endorses the PSU reports on NJP activities and 
financial status566. The POC should liaise with the BoD and the PJCM on 
the status of activities. 
The PSU has the double role of coordinating the plethora of 
bilateral projects and managing the ARTF Justice Project. In practice it 
connects the two NJP ‘souls’, namely the bilateral and the multilateral 
parts, within the same operational framework. Indeed, on the one 
hand, the PSU coordinates and monitors the implementation of both 
the NJSS and NJP, also serving as the POC secretariat. On the other 
hand, it is responsible for the ARTF Justice Project’s execution and 
management. The PSU consists of: i) a director, who is appointed by the 
POC and answerable to it; ii) a programme coordinator, responsible for 
the coordination and monitoring and evaluation of NJSS and NJP (in 
practice the coordination of bilateral and multilateral projects); iii) four 
senior local and/or regional experts; iv) two regional and/or 
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international experts in procurement and financial management; and v) 
two or three junior assistants. Furthermore, national and international 
consultants may be added to the PSU staff. The project director is 
recruited through an international call. The programme coordinator 
and the PSU staff are hired on a competitive basis by the POC, subject 
to the World Bank clearance567. With regard to bilateral projects, the 
PSU shall work as a tracking and coordination body, identifying 
potential duplications. In fulfilling these tasks, the PSU shall coordinate 
with the PJCM central office in Kabul. The process for the insertion of 
new bilateral projects into the NJP is rather easy. Since activities are 
normally agreed upon between the donor and the justice institution 
concerned, the donor is supposed to communicate the establishment of 
the new project to the PSU, which in turn should forward the 
communication to the POC for review. The latter would then either 
identify potential duplications and thus advise the donor and the 
ICGJR on the matter, or instruct the PSU to insert the planned activity 
into the matrix contained in the NJP – Part Four. At the time of writing 
(October 2008), the PSU is still to be established. However, procedures 
for the appointment of staff were started. 
The PSU works closely with the PUs, established within the 
Afghan justice institutions. PUs are only concerned with the 
implementation of the ARTF Justice Project. Each PU is led by the 
institution’s head of administration, who is supported by an assistant 
and several staff members. The latter may include international 
consultants. PUs should facilitate the cooperation between justice 
institutions and the PSU, being the vehicle for the transfer of the know-
how generated through the ARTF Justice Project from the PSU to the 
institutions. In particular, the PUs should assist the Afghan authorities 
in procurement and financial management procedures within the 
respective justice institutions. 
The first part of the NJP draws an overall picture of the 
reconstruction activities within the Afghan justice sector. It also 
contains a rather detailed presentation of the Programme and a 
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description of justice sector’s funding mechanisms. In particular, the 
document stresses the PJCM role, especially with regard to the 
coordination of bilateral projects at provincial level, but excludes 
Traditional ADR from the current development activities568. The logical 
framework in Part Two subdivides each of the three NJSS macro-goals 
into two component. Such components are further broken down into 
specific objectives, which are in turn associated with a variety of key 
outputs. However, due to programmatic reasons569, the NJP log-frame 
does not entirely reflect that of NJSS. In order to show the required 
coordination between the two documents, the first part of the NJP 
reports the list of macro-goals and sub-programmes included in the 
NJSS with the corresponding row numbers of the NJP log-frame 
annotated in parentheses570. Conversely, Part Two still lacks the costs of 
single outcomes, and neither identifies the Government agencies tasked 
with leading implementation of each project, nor enlists international 
partners and related funding sources. Some key outcomes are 
articulated in the NAP matrix as ‘policy actions’. For the latter, 
institutional responsibility and projected timeframes have been 
assigned. In line with the local ownership principle, Part Two further 
specifies that priority is to be given to the activities envisaged in the  
Provincial Development Plans and in the ARTF Justice Project571. 
The third part of the NJP consists of the ARTF Justice Project 
proposal, further agreed upon by the World Bank. Phase One of the 
Project officially started in early July 2008, with the establishment of the 
POC and the final agreement among the Supreme Court, the MoF, the 
                                                           
 
 
568  Ibid., p. 18-19. 
569 It is important to note that the NJSS and NJP have been drafted separately. 
In addition, due to delays in the official adoption of the NJSS, the NJP was 
eventually drawn up so as to be implemented even in the absence of a 
strategy of reference. 
570  NJP, p. 35-40. 
571 The NJP clearly states that «in developing their own activities and making 
funding commitments, donors are requested to take these prioritised 
activities into account» (ibid., p. 19). 
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MoJ, and the AGO on the Committee’s presidency, which was granted 
to the MoJ.  Phase One is aimed at implementing a set of quick-impact 
sub-projects, visible to the Afghan citizens, in preparation for the 
subsequent more robust and longer-term Phase Two. The ARTF Justice 
Project  is articulated as a standard development project proposal to 
access World Bank funds. The Project’s most relevant part is a log-
frame containing specific activities to be financed through the ARTF, as 
well as related outputs, outcomes and costs572. The Project also contains 
a detailed description of the reform activities to be undertaken. The 
total amount of the ARTF Justice Project – Phase One is US $ 27.75 
million. The Project has three components which are differently 
financed: i) enhancing the capacity of justice institutions; ii) 
empowering the people; and iii) strengthening implementation 
capacity573. Most of the funds (US $ 16.9 million) will be absorbed by 
new judicial infrastructure.  The funds will flow from the ARTF grant 
account to a designated account opened at the Afghanistan Central 
Bank. Such account will be operated by a Special Disbursement Unit 
(SDU) of the MoF – Treasury Department.  Requests for payments from 
the designated account shall be made to the SDU by the PSU when 
needed. Requests may include direct payments to consultants, 
consulting firms or suppliers. The latter may be also paid directly 
through the ARTF grant account, following authorization by the SDU574. 
Procurement will be carried out in accordance with the World Bank’s 
standard guidelines and procedures, which include open competitions 
and bids. Details of each contract are contained in a procurement plan 
agreed upon by the Afghan government and subject to revision at least 
once a year575. 
Even though the NJP should have a strong multilateral 
orientation, its multilateral part, namely the ARTF Justice Project, pales 
                                                           
 
 
572  Ibid., p. 100. 
573  Such components will receive US $ 23.6, 2.4 and 1.75 million, respectively. 
574  NJP, p. 110-111. 
575  Ibid., p. 115. 
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in comparison to the very long list of future bilateral projects included 
in NJP – Part Four. According to the latter, 221 new bilateral projects 
will be implemented in the next future. About 83 percent of these 
projects (183) will be carried out by the US576. This indisputably proves 
the US leadership in justice sector reform. 
According to Daniele Canestri, former advisor to the Italian 
Development Cooperation Office in Kabul and specialist on justice 
system reform, the adoption of a multilateral approach in financing 
sector reconstruction will be of great help for donors. In his opinion, 
this approach will increase the financial resources allocated for the 
reform of justice, limit the waste of money (as funds will certainly be 
spent better than now), improve the division of roles between 
international and national stakeholders, and generally refocus the 
interventions of donors. He notes that the NJP itself may be considered 
as a «difficult compromise», being the result of numerous, and 
frequently opposite, instances. In this respect, the fact that the 
document still lacks sector priorities and costs in the second part, 
would be mainly due to the ‘environmental factor’ – that is the 
possibility that the situation may rapidly evolve as a consequence of 
the shaky control of the territory by the Afghan government – which 
would prevent a serious and accurate description of needs at any 
level577. 
 
7.4   Reform Activities  
7.4.1  Counter-Narcotics Law 
                                                           
 
 
576  JSSP will carry out 30 projects, ARoLP 148 projects (138 at sub-national 
level), and CSSP 5 projects. Other donors will include Norway (9 projects), 
Italy (8 projects), the UK (6 projects), UNODC (6 projects), Germany (5 
projects), the EC (2 projects), UNDP (1 project), and UNAMA (1 project). 
577  Interview with Daniele Canestri, Pisa, 5 November 2008. 
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An important change in the organization of courts during this period 
was the creation of the counter-narcotics primary and appellate courts 
in Kabul, having jurisdiction across the whole country. Under the 
February 2006 Law on Counter-Narcotics578, such tribunals have 
jurisdiction over all cases which concern possession of a sufficiently 
large quantity of narcotics (i.e., more than 2 kg of hard drugs or 10 kg 
of opium). The law also provides for the creation of a Saranwali special 
branch, located in Kabul, in charge of prosecuting drug and drug-
related offences. The law establishes a complex handover proceeding 
by which, following the arrest, the accused is transferred from a 
province to Kabul for questioning and interrogation. The further 
creation of a dedicated special police unit (Counter-Narcotics Police of 
Afghanistan – CNPA), directly answerable to the Kabul headquarters, 
which can also perform undercover and covert actions/ appears to be 
an attempt to centralize the investigations, placing them under the 
central government’s political umbrella. 
Previously, in May 2005, a Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) 
had been established with the objective of prosecuting drug-related 
crimes across the country. Set up in cooperation with the UK (which is 
the Afghan government’s key-partner on the issue), the US and 
UNODC, the task force should facilitate the training of investigators, 
prosecutors and judges, as well as modernize and strengthen anti-
narcotics laws. Police officers, prosecutors and judges work all together 
in a self-contained court (Counter-Narcotics Tribunal – CNT – which 
includes primary and appellate courts) and prison in Kabul, called the 
Counter-Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC)579. As of June 2008, the CJTF 
has 150 staff members (including 35 CNPA officers, 28 prosecutors, 14 
judges, and 43 clerks), working together with mentors and trainers 
                                                           
 
 
578 Counter-Narcotics Law, Official Gazette No. 875, 4 February 2006, 
http://www.cjtf.gov.af/Documents%20of%20CJTF/CN%20Law/drug_law.
pdf.  
579  Sedra, Security Sector Reform, p. 99. 
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mostly provided by the US and the UK580. Police officers refer cases to 
prosecutors who have 30 days to charge a suspect before the counter-
narcotics primary court581. Reportedly, between May 2005 and June 
2008, the CJTF investigated and prosecuted 1,486 cases (995 cases 
occurred in Kabul, and 491 in the provinces), resulting in the conviction 
of 587 defendants, the acquittal of 181, and the referral to treatment 
centre of 46 persons. During the same period, the CJTF also reviewed 
890 cases from other Afghan courts, resulting in the conviction of 
another 968 individuals. Since May 2005, CJTF investigations have led 
to 1,555 convictions582. 
Like the interim criminal procedure code, the establishment of 
the CNT can be seen as a way of strengthening the authority of central 
government over the provinces. However, the external support given 
to the centre may be counterproductive in that these legal practices 
may be discredited as Western impositions or, otherwise, if central 
government leaders abuse their control (particularly over drug 
policing) to undermine political and business rivals in the provinces 
this may discredit international legal assistance. A new anti-drug law, 
drafted by the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, is due to be approved by 
the National Assembly within 1387 (March 2008-March 2009). 
 
                                                           
 
 
580  Advanced training for CJTF officers was also provided by ISISC with the 
support of UK and UNODC (ISISC, The Provincial Justice Initiative in 
Afghanistan: Progress Report, December 2004 – July 2006 (Siracusa, IT: ISISC, 
2006), p. 4, http://www.isisc.org/public/PJI%20Progress%20Report.pdf).  
581  UK Government, The Criminal Justice Task Force – Lessons Learned, Paper 
presented at the Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, Rome, 3 July 
2007, http://www.rolafghanistan.esteri.it/NR/rdonlyres/1035039D-EBB5-
421A-9790-78B8CABE7B0F/0/CJTFDiscussionPaper.pdf.  
582 CJTF, CJTF Latest Achievements: Second Quarter (April-June 2008) (Kabul: CJTF 
Communications Department, 2008), 
http://www.cjtf.gov.af/Documents%20of%20CJTF/News/CJTF%20Quarte
rly%20Achievements%20April08%20-Eng.pdf.  
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7.4.2   Training and Capacity Building 
Notwithstanding the change at the strategic level towards a 
multilateral approach in the reform of justice, since 2005 most of aid 
has continued to pass through bilateral projects. Training and capacity 
building activities represent a clear example of such tendency. We may 
consider a few examples taken from the projects financed by Italy. In 
July 2005 IDLO began the implementation of a project583, entirely 
financed by the Italian government, including training and assistance 
to the staff of the Kabul Faculty of Law, training of 350 judges and 350 
prosecutors, development of curricula for the upcoming National Legal 
Training Centre (NLTC), and assistance/training to the MoJ in 
legislative drafting. Initially, the training component for judges was 
supposed to involve 170 new judges for stage training, and an 
additional 180 senior level judges for specialised training. The latter 
included a three month training on criminal law, commercial law, civil 
law and either labour or international criminal law. The training 
component for prosecutors would have included, 120 junior 
prosecutors and 230 senior-level prosecutors for specialised training 
(including financial crime and anti-terrorism)584. In 2006, the specialized 
training courses were taught by international legal advisors only. 
However, local personnel was gradually involved in the training 
activities, as in 2007 Afghan trainers gave 50 percent of classes. In 2006, 
Afghan trainers taught 40 percent of lessons held for the MoJ staff and 
60 percent in 2007. Notably, in 2008 the basic training course for the 
MoJ officers was completely held by Afghan personnel585. 
On the whole, according to IDLO, the 2006 stage was completed 
by 173 judges, while 188 judges completed specialized training. Of the 
planned 350 prosecutors, only 330 (half of whom coming from the 
                                                           
 
 
583  Project: ‘Enhancing the Capacity of Legal Professionals’. The project cost € 5 
million and was implemented up until February 2007 (Reed et al., IDLO 
Italian-Funded Projects, p. 23). 
584  See Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali (cit.). 
585  Reed et al., IDLO Italian-Funded Projects, p. 32-33. 
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provinces) were effectively trained due to the decision taken by AGO in 
2006 to abort IDLO training in favour of training by the US State 
Department-funded Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP)586. The 
project also included the drafting of a ‘prosecutor’s handbook’, 
intended to be a first point of reference on matters relating to criminal 
procedure law and practical skills. However, its development resulted 
«in abbreviated outputs in the shape of a Prosecutor’s manual and an 
archive in early 2007 rather than as planned in May of 2006. A planned 
resource center was not completed»587. Neither the capacity building 
activities in the faculties of law and sharia were fulfilled. Instead, IDLO 
trained 90 law students in commercial and penal law. The training in 
legislative drafting started in April 2006 and included 155 MoJ officials 
from the Hoqooq and Taqnin departments. The assistance to the NLTC 
was never provided588 due to the withdrawal of the Supreme Court and 
the AGO from the Center itself in early 2008. 
A second IDLO training project, also financed by Italy, was 
implemented from March 2007 to August 2008, although an extension 
has recently been granted. It included the training of 127 judges and a 
stage for additional 210 judicial candidates589. Under this programme, a 
donation of 200 books was made to the Faculty of Law in Kabul while 
the faculty of Sharia received a new library, along with 600 new 
volumes. With the funds received, IDLO also provided assistance to the 
Legal Aid Organization of Afghanistan (LAOA) for the training of 
Afghan lawyers590. This project was further merged by IDLO with 
                                                           
 
 
586  Ibid., p. 29. 
587  Ibid., p. 30. 
588  However, IDLO continues to assist the NLTC through the secondment of 
two advisors to the NLTC Interim Board and to the Interim Director, 
respectively. 
589 Project ‘Increasing Afghanistan’s Capacity for Sustainable Legal Reform’ 
(IACSLR). The project’s budget is € 6 million (Reed et al., IDLO Italian-
Funded Projects, p. 23 and 29). 
590  According to IDLO, as of August 2008 the LAOA had already trained over 
100 public defenders (Reed et al., IDLO Italian-Funded Projects, p. 31). In 2007 
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another project financed by the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA)591. The latter project was to provide specialised training 
for 250 judges and 75 senior prosecutors592. However, in the end, the 
specialized training reached approximately 237 judges. Additional 
courses in commercial law, civil law and computer research were 
organized for 155 MoJ staff (including the Hoqooq and Taqnin 
Departments) and for 106 National Assembly staff members593. 
In September 2005, the PJI second phase started in the provinces 
of Herat, Badakshan and Nangarhar. In February-March 2006 the training 
activities were extended to the provinces of Wardak and Baghlan, under 
the PJI-Phase 3. A fourth phase was implemented in March-September 
2007 in Parwan, Jowzjan and Ghazni594. In order to complement the PJI, 
Italy and the European Commission co-financed a project run by 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
the LAOA was also financed bilaterally by Italy to review criminal cases 
involving minors detained in Kabul. The cost of the project was € 35,000 
(Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività bilaterali (cit.)). 
591  Project ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law in Afghanistan’. The project’s initial 
cost was US $ 6.5 million. However, in July 2008 it was granted an additional 
US $ 100,000 cost extension (Reed et al., IDLO Italian-Funded Projects, p. 38). 
592  According to Charles Jakosa, former IDLO Chief of Party in Afghanistan, the 
project included: i) the training of 250 judges and 75 prosecutors; ii) a 
‘training of trainers’ programme for 18 senior judges; iii) a moot court 
exercise at Kabul appeals court; iv) a 12-month defence attorney training 
course for 68 law graduates and a 2 full-semester courses in lawyering skills 
for university students; v) further defence attorney training courses for 19 
lawyers from the Supreme Court and Legal Aid Office; and vi)  practical 
lawyering skills training for 20 professors from Kabul University 
(Afgha.com, Interview – Charles Jakosa: A justice system is a reflection of a culture 
(Kabul: Afgha.com, 9 July 2007), http://www.afgha.com/?q=node/3495).  
593  Reed et al., IDLO Italian-Funded Projects, p. 31. 
594  30 percent of posts in ISISC courses were reserved to women. Italy financed 
the first three phases of the PJI with US $ 183,000. Additional US $ 150,000 
were provided for the remaining three provinces (see Cooperazione Italiana 
allo Sviluppo, Le attività bilaterali (cit.)). 
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UNDP, entitled ‘Access to Justice at the District Level’ (AJDL)595. The 
project was directed to Afghan rural communities which lack formal 
judicial structures, in order to educate the population about new legal 
reforms. Considered as a programme of ‘judicial literacy’596, it was 
aimed at teaching the rural population on how to have practical access 
to justice. Currently this informal approach is being also successfully 
implemented in other countries, such as India, where state apparatus 
scarcely reaches small villages located in the countryside597. «Rather 
than dismantle customary structures, the programme should empower 
villagers to defend their rights within existing local structures»598. 
According to this project, knowledge and respect for human rights 
within these communities could be attained using ‘informal’ 
persuasion methods599, as well as more direct methods, for example, 
teaching the same principles in local schools during classes600. By means 
of this informal approach, the project was also intended to reform the 
                                                           
 
 
595  Project: ‘Access to Justice at the District Level’, developed in November 2005 
and financed in 2006. The cost of the project is € 6 million, with a € 5 million 
contribution from Rome over 30 months (Cooperazione Italiana allo 
Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali (cit.)). See in detail 
http://www.undp.org.af/WhoWeAre/UNDPinAfghanistan/Projects/dcse
/prj_ajdl.htm.  
596 Karen Jorgensen, former UNDP Country Director, quoted in IRIN, 
Afghanistan: Efforts to improve access to justice in rural areas (Kabul: IRIN, 15 
February 2005), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=28219.    
597  See gen. on the matter M. Galanter and J.K. Krishnan, ‘Bread for the Poor: 
Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India’, 55(4) Hastings Law 
Journal 2004, 789-835; R. Moog, ‘The Study of Law and India’s Society: The 
Galanter Factor’, 71(2) Law and Contemporary Problems 2008, 129-138. 
598  Senier, Rebuilding the Judicial Sector, p. 8. 
599 According to initial intentions of the organizers, such informal methods 
would include radio programmes, romantic novels, soap operas, theatrical 
performances by companies of strolling actors and wall pictures. 
600  Like teachings in elementary school or during seminars held by local 
mullahs, focused on children and women’s rights according to the Koran. 
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informal judicial activities, exercised by jirgas/shuras, within a legal 
framework respectful of both human rights and village institutions. 
The AJDL was supposed to run for 30 months and cover 60 districts. 
However, contrary to initial intents, the project started only in late 2006 
and mostly concerned ‘ordinary’ training activities and restoration of 
judicial infrastructure601. The initial training activities were carried out 
by ISISC – as UNDP sub-contractor – in the provinces of Balkh and 
Herat. Other human rights and legal awareness activities are now 
carried out by a number of Afghan NGOs. Reportedly, further 
initiatives will be implemented in Baghlan, Jawzjan, Kunduz, Samangan,  
Badakshan, Takhar and Nangarhar602. Delays and lack of results are 
probably due to the shaky security situation and dearth of skilled 
personnel to implement the activities on field. However, the project’s 
substantial failure may be also ascribed to the competition with a 
similar project run by USAID-ARoLP. Remaining funds (about US $ 2-3 
million) will be probably channeled into a new ‘Joint Access to Justice 
at the District Level Project’, to be run jointly by UNDP, UNAMA, 
UNODC, UNIFEM, and UNICEF603. 
Training projects have often involved the military, especially in 
the provinces. An example is the Wardak Provincial Justice Initiative, 
which was established in early 2006 under the auspices of the 
Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) with the support of 
JSSP, and  chaired by the local governor. JSSP in collaboration with the 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), also organized Provincial 
Justice Conferences (PJC) in various provinces. The PJC were initially 
held in Jalalabad, Ghazni, Parwan, Logar and Bamiyan and were attended 
                                                           
 
 
601  See Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali (cit.). 
602 For an updated report of AJDL activities see UNDP Afghanistan, Access to 
Justice at the District Level (November 2005 – December 2008), Quarterly Project 
Report: 1 April – 30 June 2008, 
http://www.undp.org.af/WhoWeAre/UNDPinAfghanistan/Projects/2ndQ08Reports/
2008-08-05%20-%20Second%20Quarter%202008%20Progress%20Report%20-
%20AJDL.pdf.  
603 See the project’s proposal at 
http://sdnhq.undp.org/opas/en/proposals/suitable/1526.  
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by senior officials from the MoJ, MoI, AGO, the Supreme Court and 
representatives from the international community604. In addition, a 
number of PRTs are conducting ad hoc human rights and justice 
initiatives. For example, reportedly the German-led PRT in Kunduz, 
during 2008 should provide training to about 220 Afghan judges, 
prosecutors and attorneys on basic law principles and family law. The 
project will be implemented in conjunction with the Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, based in 
Heidelberg605. 
 
7.4.3  The NLTC and other Judicial Infrastructure  
The reconstruction activities undertaken during this second phase of  
justice reform have naturally included the construction or the 
restoration of judicial buildings and offices. Judicial and correctional 
facilities often require additional supplies of equipment, especially in 
the provinces and districts. Again, interventions have been exclusively 
bilateral. Italy alone financed the construction of the NLTC606, choosing 
UNOPS as implementing partner, which in turn contracted out the 
building works to an Afghan contractor. The NLTC was supposed to 
«set standards for legal training in Afghanistan and provide access to 
legal careers across government institutions […] such as the Supreme 
Court, the Afghan Ministry of Justice, the Office of the Attorney 
                                                           
 
 
604  UNAMA, Afghan Justice Sector Overview (April 2007), p. 5. 
605  IOM Afghanistan, ‘Supporting the Rule of Law’, 2(1) IOM Newsletter 
(September) 2008, 3, http://www.unama-
afg.org/news/_publications/08sep-IOM-newsletter.pdf.  
606  Project: ‘National Legal Training Center’, activities implemented from 
December 2005 to May 2007. The project cost to Italy around € 1 million 
(Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo, Le attività multilaterali (cit.)). 
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General and the Ministry of Higher Education»607. USAID was also 
involved in the project in a minor part, by providing new furniture and 
other equipment. NLTC building works were completed in late 2006 
but the construction was officially handed over to the Afghan 
government only in May 2007. A month later, the NLTC was promoted 
as an independent governmental institution by a presidential decree. In 
the first months of 2008, a governing charter, a strategic plan and a 
code of conduct were drafted, with input from US and Italian officials. 
The governing charter was then approved by the NLTC interim board – 
including, inter alia, the Chancellor of Kabul University and 
representatives of the Supreme Court, AGO and MoJ – and was sent to 
the MoJ for presentation to the National Assembly. 
However, notwithstanding the initial participation to the NLTC 
project of all the Afghan justice institutions, in early 2008 the Supreme 
Court started boycotting the Center’s activities, expressing 
determination in having its own training center608. The Court was 
followed by the Attorney General, who made similar claims. The 
Supreme Court and the AGO withdrew their support to the first NLTC 
training course, initiated in June 2008609, stating that they would not 
accept graduates from that study programme as judges and 
prosecutors. As a result the course was closed down and students 
                                                           
 
 
607 Press briefing by UN spokesperson Adrian Edwards and by UN agencies in 
Afghanistan (Kabul: UN News Centre, 6  March 2006), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusnews.asp?NewsID=1036&sID=1.  
608  The Supreme Court’s intent of having its own training centre, distinct from 
the NLTC, was initially made clear at the Afghanistan Rule of Law 
Coordination Meeting, held in Dubai on 4-5 December 2006 (summary of 
conclusions available at http://www.rolafghanistan.esteri.it), and 
reaffirmed in its 5-year strategy presented at the Rome Conference on the 
Rule of Law in Afghanistan (Strategy of the Supreme Court, with Focus on 
Prioritizations, Kabul, March 2007, p. 9, 
http://www.rolafghanistan.esteri.it/NR/rdonlyres/491571E5-4D82-461A-9F0F-
FD4C0DAEADA1/0/SupremeCourtStrategy.pdf).  
609  A 36-week judicial ‘stage’ course had previously taken place in the NLTC, 
starting from 1 April 2007. 
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carried out a public demonstration in front of the building610. Curiously, 
the failure in the organization of courses did not prevent USAID from 
financing the opening of the new NLTC library, which was handed 
over to the Afghan authorities in August 2008. 
Up until mid-2007, UNODC had opened a few ‘Justice Support 
Centers’ (JSCs), in order to supplement the PJI. Three JSCs were 
inaugurated in Paktia (Gardez), Mazar-e-Sharif and Jalalabad in October 
2006, February 2007 and May 2007, respectively611. However, it is not 
clear, at the time of writing (October 2008), whether they are really 
operational. Reportedly, UNODC would have plans to establish JSCs in 
11 other provinces612. New judicial infrastructure was also requested 
directly by the Afghan justice institutions to the donor community at 
the Rome Conference. As earlier mentioned each institution presented 
five quick implementation projects to be financed bilaterally by 
donors613. Italy decided to fund an MoJ project and two AGO projects614. 
Building works were assigned to the International Management Group 
                                                           
 
 
610  Reed et al., IDLO Italian-Funded Projects, p. 31-32. 
611  See UN News Centre, UN anti-drug offices expands facilities to aid prosecution of 
Afghan traffickers, 14 May 2007, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=22535&Cr=afghan&Cr
1.  
612  Project: ‘Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Capacity Building’, No. 
AFG/R42, financed by Italy and Ireland. See UNODC, Thematic Evaluation of 
the Technical Assistance, p. 21. 
613  Donor Implementation Plan for Adoption Jointly by Donors at the Rome 
Conference, Paper presented at the Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in 
Afghanistan, Rome, 2 July 2007, Appendix 1, p. 7, 
http://www.rolafghanistan.esteri.it/NR/rdonlyres/193108D9-737E-467E-
A7BF-D5E351D24740/0/RomeDIPwithApp1.pdf.  
614  Italy decided to finance the MoJ Project No. 1: ‘Construction of offices for 
departments of Huquq and Government Cases’; and the AGO Project Nos. 1 
and 2: ‘Infrastructure – for a fully functioning prosecution service’ and 
‘Transportation – provincial and district access by prosecutors, and by 
victims/witnesses’. 
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(IMG), which is now entering into contract with local Afghan 
counterparts. 
 
7.5 A ‘New’ Leadership: The Growing US and Military 
Involvement into Justice Sector Reform 
The second phase of reconstruction activities is also characterized by 
the growing role of US civilian contractors and international military 
contingents in justice sector reform. On the one hand, this may be 
considered as an «inevitable development»615 of the holistic approach 
we have analyzed in chapters three and four, under which military and 
civil reconstruction activities are supposed to move forward together. 
On the other hand, this increased US and military role may be 
considered as a direct consequence of the lack of leadership and 
financial/technical means of support in reconstruction shown by Italy 
and other donors. On the whole, one could affirm that approximately 
since mid-2005 the US has started planning to do things by itself, 
involving both its civil and military presence on the ground. This trend 
has even intensified in recent times. As previously referred, the US 
leadership had been present from the beginning of international 
intervention. However, between 2001-2005, it was the huge financial 
and technical assistance that granted the US a de facto leadership in the 
sector. The political control and the responsibility for coordinating 
activities within the justice sector officially remained in the hands of 
Italy, being the ‘lead nation’. Conversely, starting from 2005, the 
general failure of all the ‘leads’ established at the Tokyo Conference 
pushed the US to assume a more incisive political role, which rapidly 
turned into broader economic and technical assistance in the reform of 
justice. 
 
                                                           
 
 
615 See M.T. Doel, ‘Military Assistance in Humanitarian Aid Operations: 
Impossible Paradox or Inevitable Development?’, 140(5) RUSI Journal 1995, 
26-38. 
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7.5.1   The US Civilian Assistance to the Rule of Law Sector 
Currently, the US assistance to justice sector reform is provided by four 
US agencies: the US State Department – Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), USAID, the Department 
of Justice (DoJ), and the Department of Defense (DoD)616. Such 
government agencies are committed to different areas of responsibility: 
USAID focuses on civil and commercial law, as well as judicial training; 
the DoJ specializes in counter-narcotics prosecutions; the DoD assists in 
police-prosecutor coordination; the INL focuses on criminal justice and 
corrections reform in the AGO and the MoJ. Agencies and their 
programmes are coordinated by the US Embassy in Kabul through a 
Special Committee on the Rule of Law, chaired by a Rule of Law 
Coordinator. The INL funds two major programmes, namely the JSSP 
and the Corrections System Support Program (CSSP). Both 
programmes are implemented by the Pacific Architects & Engineers 
and Homeland Security Corporation through its subcontractor, the 
National Center for State Courts. JSSP and CSSP have been set up since 
mid-2005 and early 2006, respectively617. 
                                                           
 
 
616  If not otherwise specified, organization and data are gathered from the US 
Government, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan 
(Washington, D.C.: Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National 
Defense Authorization Act, June 2008), 34-38, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Report_on_Progress_toward_Security_
and_Stability_in_Afghanistan_1230.pdf; US Department of State and the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors – Office of Inspector General, Rule-of-Law 
Programs in Afghanistan (Washington D.C.: Report of Inspection No. ISP-I-08-
09, January 2008), 4-5, 23-24, 43, 
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/106946.pdf; D.T. Johnson, 
Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System 
in Afghanistan (Washington D.C.: Statement before the Subcommittee on 
National Security and Foreign Affairs of the House Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee, 18 June 2008), 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/106015.htm.  
617  CSSP was officially split off from JSSP in late 2005. 
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JSSP involves 30 US prosecutors, judges, defence attorneys, and 
criminal justice experts, as well as 35 Afghan legal advisors. The 
Programme has permanent teams based in Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Kunduz, 
and Nangarhar provinces, focused on criminal justice reform. Together 
with DoJ prosecutors, JSSP also conducts police-prosecutor training 
and mentoring, working closely with the Focused District Development 
(FDD)618 initiative – run by the US military command – in a number of 
districts. Reportedly, to date, JSSP has trained more than 1,000 Afghan 
lawyers. The JSSP staff in Kabul is divided into three sections. The first 
two provide training and mentoring, as well as act as advisors to the 
AGO and the MoJ, respectively619. While the third JSSP section concerns 
access to justice. It includes mentoring and capacity building activities 
for private legal defence organizations, legal education and training, as 
well as the organization of provincial justice conferences. A further 
component (Regional Police Prosecution Training Section) is 
responsible for regional police-prosecutor training. 
The CSSP is composed of about 30 US advisors on prison law 
and administration, who work in Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar and 
Paktia provinces. CSSP provides assistance on four distinct areas: 
training, capacity-building, prison infrastructure development, and the 
                                                           
 
 
618  The FDD is a police training programme established in October 2007 by the 
MoI in cooperation with the US Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan. The programme is supposed to tackle inadequate training, 
poor equipment and corruption affecting the Afghan police. 1,500 US 
trainers (800 militaries and 700 DynCorps contractors) are involved in the 
training activities. Under the FDD initiative, police officers are sent from the 
districts to the respective provincial capital cities for an 8-week course. Then 
they redeploy in the districts of origin. Six cycles of FDD are planned for 
completion in 2008. They will cover 52 districts. According to initial 
forecasts, four years will be required to spread the programme across all the 
365 districts of Afghanistan. Since May 2008, JSSP has begun offering 4-week 
courses to prosecutors in the provinces as a part of the FDD initiative, 
practically merging two training activities. Joint courses aim at establishing 
law enforcement and criminal justice linkages at district level. 
619  The first section consists of 16 US and Afghan advisors, while the second 
section is composed of 3 US and 11 Afghan advisors. 
  
 
 
185 
 
operation and maintenance of the CNJC in Kabul (including both the 
CNT and the CJTF). With regard to training activities, to date CSSP has 
trained more than 1,400 corrections officers in the provinces through 
both a basic 8-week course and a ‘train the trainers’ course. In addition, 
the CSSP capacity-building component advises the MoJ Central Prison 
Directorate (CPD) on prison policies and management, as well as on 
organizational reforms. 
USAID, through the ARoLP620 assists both the MoJ and the 
Supreme Court, thus covering the remaining Afghan justice institutions 
and judicial activities. The project also supports the faculties of law and 
sharia in five provincial universities. ARoLP is divided into seven 
components: court administration; legal and judicial training; 
commercial dispute resolution; legal education; legislative process 
reform; women’s rights under Islamic law; and access to justice and 
informal justice sector. In 2004-2007 ARoLP focused on two major sub-
programmes. The first constructed 40 courthouses in 17 provinces 
across the country, with a cost of approximately US $ 12.4 million. The 
second programme allocated US $ 33.5 million for legal and judicial 
training, developing media and publications for professional use and 
general public education621. Training courses were organized for both 
candidates to the post of judge and sitting judges. They included a 36-
week stage for incoming judicial candidates, a 4-week training for 
sitting judges, and a ‘training of trainers’ programme to establish a pool 
of trainers within the Supreme Court.  According to USAID, by June 
2008 ARoLP had trained over 70 percent of Afghan judges and by the 
                                                           
 
 
620  Checchi and Company Consulting Inc. is the implementing contractor for 
the Afghanistan Rule of Law Project. 
621  These activities included, inter alia: the codification of core Afghan laws 
dating from 1964 in both Dari and Pashto (further collected in 17 books); the 
publication of the Afghan Official Gazette in both electronic and print 
versions; the production of TV and radio programmes on citizen’s rights, 
with particular emphasis on women’s rights; and the publication of comic 
books for the Afghan rural population. This sub-programme has practically 
overlapped and eventually replaced the ‘Access to Justice at the District 
Level’ project. 
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end of 2008 it will have trained the entire Bench, which would consist 
of 1280 judges622. These figures prove that there are often duplications 
in training activities, as many other donors are involved in organizing 
similar courses for judges. In addition, ARoLP supported the Supreme 
Court in creating and adopting a code of judicial ethics, which was 
further disseminated through the training courses. The USAID-funded 
project has also financed the Supreme Court’s inspection tours and 
conferences in provincial courts, which started in 2007, as well as a 
court administration system (Afghan Court Administration System – 
ACAS), aimed at implementing a standardized nation-wide court filing 
system623. ARoLP will expire at the end of 2008. It will be replaced by a 
Justice Sector Development Program (JSD), which will have more or 
less the same tasks and targets624. Ultimately, JSSP, CSSP and ARoLP 
advisors also participate in and often lead the various working groups 
                                                           
 
 
622 USAID Afghanistan, Justice Sector Development Program (JSD) (Kabul: 
Solicitation No. 306-08-024, 26 June 2008), p. 9, 
https://www.fbo.gov/download/c59/c599fda28d49cf912080a39ce6d94561
/FINAL_RFP_ISSUED_June_26,_2008.doc.  
623  The ACAS was officially approved by the Supreme Court in September 
2007, at the end of an 18-month evaluation phase. The system’s roll-out 
began in November 2007 and its dissemination across the country is 
expected to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2008. Training is usually 
provided through a 4-day course, divided into both theoretical and practical 
phases, lasting 2 days each. The practical phase consists of taking 
participants (judges and courts’ administrative staff) to a court in order to 
show them how to practically implement the procedures learnt during 
classes. At the end of each course, participants go back to work in the courts 
of origin, followed by an ARoLP assessment mission. In principle, sessions 
should take place in the districts concerned, but they are often organized in 
the main provincial cities, due to security reasons. Travel and 
accommodation expenses are paid by ARoLP. ACAS comprises the supply 
of filing cabinets, lockers, folders and forms for any kind of 
judicial/administrative act, including criminal records. Participants are also 
trained in very basic operations such as opening and searching files, storing 
them into the lockers and sending them to higher courts. 
624  USAID Afghanistan, Justice Sector Development Program (JSD), p. 12. 
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established within CG No. 2, whose meetings often take place within 
their compounds in Kabul. 
As regards the DoJ, the Department has been providing 
assistance to the Afghan justice through the DoJ’s Senior Federal 
Prosecutor Program since 2005. The latter is composed of up to four 
legal advisors and the same number of criminal investigators seconded 
to the CJTF and the CNT. DoJ advisors, inter alia: drafted the counter-
narcotics law and the presidential decree establishing the CNT, refined 
the military court legislation and the military penal and procedural 
codes; and drafted counter-terrorism and extradition laws. The latter 
were further reviewed by the Taqnin and are now under review by the 
Criminal Law Committee. 
 
7.5.2 The Costs of US Civilian Assistance 
The US contribution to justice sector reform has grown gradually over 
the years. In 2002-2007, INL and USAID spent US $ 110.4 million on 
rule of law programmes (US $ 64 and 46.4 million, respectively). In the 
fiscal year 2007, the United States spent US $ 67.35 million (US $ 55 
million through the INL programmes and US $ 12.35 million in USAID 
funding). In order to evaluate these figures, one should compare them 
with the total amount of contributions/pledges provided by other 
donors (Italy included), which was US $ 164.8 million at end of 2007 
(US $ 81.8 million before the Rome Conference and US $ 83 million 
pledged at the same event – not considering the US contribution). 
Therefore, by the end of 2007, justice sector reform in Afghanistan had 
received a total of US $ 275.2 (110.4 + 164.8) million. This data reveals 
that the vast majority of funding has been provided by the US. 
Recently, US efforts in justice sector reform have even increased.  In the 
fiscal year 2008, the INL budget reached US $ 68 million, while USAID 
received US $ 4 million. A further US $ 20 million were granted by the 
Congress as emergency supplemental funds. This caused the US annual 
contribution to leaven up to US $ 92 million, which is far more than 
that allocated by Italy to the justice sector since 2002. Once again this 
level of funding makes the US the biggest donor in the Afghan justice 
system, even though the US affirms it will not be able to cover the 
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sector’s future needs, estimated to be US $ 600 million over the next 
five years, on its own. In addition, notwithstanding the huge US 
involvement, data proves that funds allocated for justice sector reform 
represent only a small fraction (0.48 percent) of the US assistance to 
Afghanistan, which by the end of 2007 was estimated to be over US $ 
22.8 billion625. This reveals the poor attention paid to justice system 
reform by the US, if compared to other sectors. In fact, these figures do 
not include corrections, police and counter-narcotics justice, which 
received more funding than justice. However, data does not take into 
account the money spent by the DoD in RoL programmes, as this is 
included in the military budget626. 
 
7.5.3  The Military Involvement into Justice System Reform 
Addressing the interplay between reconstruction and military activities 
in Afghanistan is beyond the objective of this study. Besides, that of 
military involvement in humanitarian activities is now described by 
                                                           
 
 
625  On the whole, since 2001, international donors have pledged about US $ 32.7 
billion in the reconstruction of Afghanistan (M. Lee, ‘US hopes to pledge 
more for Afghans’, USA Today, 8 April 2008, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-04-08-
3963072919_x.htm).  
626  By the end of 2007, INL alone had spent US $ 48 million on corrections 
programmes and US $ 10 million on counter-narcotics justice programmes. 
For the fiscal year 2008, counter-narcotics activities are funded by the US 
with around US $ 500 million. As concerns police reform, before the Rome 
Conference, international donors had contributed US $ 218 million for 
dedicated programmes. Currently the US DoD provides INL with US $ 300 
to 400 million per year for police training. On the whole, the US spent US $ 
2.5 billion on the police in fiscal year 2007 and will spend over US $ 800 
million in 2008 (J. Straziuso, ‘US in new push to bolster Afghan police’, ABC 
News, 15 February 2008, 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=4295509).  
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scholars as a «long-running, and generally inconclusive debate»627.  
However, it may be said that in Afghanistan the connection between 
civil assistance and war-effort mostly stems from the conflict situation 
and the holistic approach to reconstruction adopted since the beginning 
of the international intervention. Indeed, in Afghanistan, that of 
keeping the reconstruction distinct from military activities is a pure 
theoretical question, of no real scientific value. On the contrary, willing 
or not, the ‘humanitarian circus’628 in Kabul does openly (but indirectly) 
sustain military operations. Basically, external actors are actively 
engaged in a state-building mission by assisting the government in 
place to extend its powers and authority throughout the country, while 
the Taliban and other armed groups are attempting to reduce the same 
powers and authority by force. In this respect, justice has been held 
since the beginning of the international intervention as one of the five 
Security Sector Reform’s (SSR) pillars in Afghanistan629. This is in line 
with the current conception of SSR at international level, which tends to 
include large parts of or the entire judicial sector630. However, this 
                                                           
 
 
627 See M.C. Pugh, ‘Military Intervention and Humanitarian Action: Trends and 
Issues’, 22(4) Disasters 1998, 339-351, at 339; For a study on the relationship 
between military activities and ‘humanitarian action’ in peace support 
operations see M.C. Pugh, ‘The Challenge of Civil-Military Relations in 
International Peace Operations’, 25(4) Disasters 2001, 345-357. 
628  The concept of humanitarian circus was initially used by David Rieff in 
order to portray the situation of humanitarian assistance in Kosovo during 
the first year of international intervention. See D. Rieff, ‘Kosovo’s 
Humanitarian Circus’, 17(3) World Policy Journal 2000, 25-32. 
629  The other four pillars are basically the ‘leads’ established at the 2002 Tokyo 
Conference, namely military reform, police reform, counter-narcotics, and 
DDR. See Sedra, Security Sector Reform, p. 96-102. See also gen. C. Hodes and 
M. Sedra, The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan (Abingdon: 
Routledge, Adelphi Paper No. 391, 2007), 51-93 (‘Chapter Five: Security-
Sector Reform’). 
630 M. Brzoska, Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform 
(Geneva: DCAF Occasional Paper No. 4, November 2003), 23, 
http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/occasional_4.pdf. See also gen. J. Chanaa, 
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practically entails the ‘securitisation’ of justice, which ends up being 
seen as a mere tool to coerce the opponents of state-building process. 
The US military command in Afghanistan became more active in 
the rule of law area in early 2006, addressing the issue as a high 
priority. Before, coordination with other US or international players 
was fairly poor. Reportedly, there were no contacts between US 
military lawyers and  IJPO officials in Kabul, notwithstanding attempts 
made by the former to establish formal and informal links631. During the 
Summer of 2006, for the first time since the beginning of the 
intervention, a Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAG) team drafted a 
five-year strategic plan for the implementation of a rule of law 
development programme. The plan was created on behalf of the Office 
of the US Rule of Law Coordinator. The master document included a 
vision, key participants, opportunities, threats, and a number of key 
initiatives. More importantly, it described the desired end-state and the 
financial resources required to reform the Afghan justice system632. 
From that moment onwards the US started having its own strategy for 
justice reform, involving the totality of its civilian and military 
apparatus on the ground. In this context, since 2006 the DoD has 
increased its activities in providing assistance to the justice sector. Such 
assistance now concerns two major areas: improving linkages between 
justice and police sectors, and implementing rule of law initiatives in 
Eastern Afghanistan through JAG teams. The former area of assistance 
is provided by the Combined Security Transition Command-
                                                                                                                               
 
 
Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, Adelphi Paper No. 344, 2002). 
631  A US Major who was participating in a legal training mission in Kabul at 
that time declared: «After days of effort to effect such coordination, we were 
only able to secure the name and number of an Italian lawyer who left Kabul 
more than six months ago» (S.M. Watts, C.E. Martin, ‘Nation-Building in 
Afghanistan: Lessons Identified in Military Justice Reform’, Army Lawyer, 
May 2006, 1-11, at 10). 
632  V. Tasikas, ‘Developing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Need for a 
New Strategic Paradigm’, Army Lawyer, July 2007, 45-60, at 54. 
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Afghanistan (CSTC-A)633 – one of the two US operational command in 
Afghanistan, based in Kabul. In particular, CSTC-A advises the MoI 
Legal Advisor’s Office on law enforcement legislation and procedures. 
The second US operational command in Afghanistan, namely the 
Combined Joint Task Force 101 (CJTF-101, based at the Bagram Air 
Base) is tasked with implementing projects of legal training, 
distribution of legal texts, and infrastructure support at provincial and 
district level in Eastern Afghanistan. Both commands work in 
coordination with the Rule of Law Coordinator at the US Embassy. 
The US military involvement in justice reform includes a full 
range of activities. For example, CSTC-A assisted in developing the 
new military criminal and military criminal procedure codes634, as well 
as in drafting and implementing internal police disciplinary policy and 
regulations. Other activities consisted in drafting decrees, laws, and 
regulations regarding border control and criminal procedure. Judge 
advocates have further mentored Afghan officials and court-martial 
defence attorneys on several legal issues concerning military, 
international, environmental, fiscal, and personnel law. Judge 
advocates also meet on a regular basis with governors, judges, 
prosecutors, police and prison officers in the provinces to assess their 
concerns and priorities in the reform of justice. JAGs participate to 
provincial justice conferences and make assessments of the condition of 
judicial infrastructure and courts’ functioning. In case of need, the US 
commander on field may use quick-disbursing funds (taken by the 
                                                           
 
 
633  CSTC-A is a US military command specifically created to «program and 
implement structural, organizational, institutional and management reforms 
of the Afghanistan National Security Forces in order to develop a stable 
Afghanistan, strengthen the rule of law, and deter and defeat terrorism 
within its borders» (CSTC-A Mission, http://www.cstc-
a.com/Mission.html). Under CSTC-A’s operational control is Task Force 
Phoenix, composed of more than 6,000 units, which is responsible for 
training, mentoring and advising the Afghan army and the police. 
634  Military Penal Code and Military Criminal Procedure Code, Official Gazette 
No. 876, 9 February 2006, available at the MoJ website, 
http://www.moj.gov.af/?lang=en&p=e14.  
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Commander’s Emergency Response Program – CERP) to rehabilitate 
judicial infrastructure and facilities, buy vehicles, finance defence 
counsel services, and launch public awareness campaigns. Any 
initiative and information is coordinated with the US Embassy and 
PRTs officials635. That of justice has become a priority for the US 
military command. Reportedly, during the Summer of 2006, 15 out of 
the 18 JAGs stationed in Kabul were conducting rule of law activities in 
one form or another at least 50 percent of the time. That is, over 80 
percent of the US military lawyers in Kabul were fully engaged in 
justice sector reform636. 
The US command is not the sole military body involved in justice 
system reform in Afghanistan. As previously reported, ISAF-led637 PRTs 
are rather active in supporting training courses for legal and judicial 
professionals as well as in restoring and providing new judicial and 
correctional facilities in the provinces. For example, in January 2008 the 
Italian PRT handed over to the MoJ 20 new houses for prison officers, 
built within the premises of the Herat juvenile correctional centre638. 
Again, building works for a new court in the district of Shirin Tagab 
(Faryab province) recently started in October 2008. The project is co-
funded by Latvia and the EU, but implemented in cooperation with the 
Latvian PRT. Two additional court buildings will be further erected in 
the remaining two administrative districts of  Faryab, namely Qaysar 
and Gurziwan. In line with the ‘self-contained’ PRT operational 
doctrine, the project also includes the training of some 60 judges and 
                                                           
 
 
635  Tasikas, Developing the Rule of Law, p. 54-55. 
636  Ibid., p. 55-56. 
637  The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), is the NATO-led security 
and development mission in Afghanistan. ISAF was initially set up on 20 
December 2001 by UNSC Res. 1386 (2001). Its establishment is also 
envisaged by the Bonn Agreement. As of October 2008 its troops number 
around 50,700. 
638 News Network International, Italian PRT aids Herat juvenile correctional centre, 
15 January 2008, http://www.nni-
news.com.pk/lastNode.php?transfer=yes&secure=yes&pointer=20775.  
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prosecutors, in order to improve the capacity of legal professionals in 
the districts concerned639. If legal training and rebuilding judicial 
facilities are the PRTs’ most common activities in justice sector reform, 
their widespread organization has been often used to portray the status 
of justice in the provinces and districts. For instance, in February 2008, 
ISAF instructed the regional commands and PRTs to conduct a survey 
of judicial infrastructure, equipment, and other capacity, in order to 
identify current lacks and needs. The survey was closely coordinated 
with the donor community, and, most importantly, with the World 
Bank, which used the information gathered for the NJP initial 
financing640. 
 
7.6   Assessment: A Mixed Ownership Regime 
As earlier mentioned, this second phase of reconstruction had the aim 
of finally putting the Afghan ownership of justice reform into practice. 
In view of that, the international authorities were to leave the 
restoration of the sector to be, at least formally, driven by the Afghan 
government. However, far from the ‘ownership’ aims declared in 
official statements, national institutions have remained strongly 
dependent on external contributions. In fact, unsurprisingly, according 
to UNAMA among the various consultative groups chaired by national 
                                                           
 
 
639  Pajhwok Report, Construction work of Faryab court building started, 5 October 
2008, http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=63078.  
640  US Government, Report on Progress toward Security, p. 34. In addition, 
recently, all reconstruction and development projects carried out in 
Afghanistan since 2002 have been inserted into database, developed and 
managed by ISAF, called Afghanistan Country Stability Picture. The 
database contains an estimated 70,000 activity records, provided from more 
than 170 sources. The value of projects included into the database amounts 
to US $ 12 billion. ISAF Public Affairs Office, New system tracks Afghanistan 
reconstruction, development projects (Kabul: ISAF Press Release No. 2008-065, 
10 February 2008), http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2008/02-
february/pr080210-065.html. 
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ministries, those which have received significant external support in 
policy-building and capacity-planning have been the «most effective in 
fulfilling their aims»641. This clearly raises the question of whether 
national officials in these ministries are really in a position to 
autonomously decide about the goals concerned, as well as questions 
the extent of the role played by international consultants and personnel 
inside these institutions. 
Although this process should rationally lead to a wider 
integration of all reconstruction activities within the justice sector, this 
target appears to be still missing. Generally, recent researches based on 
empirical findings support the idea that development aid is often 
marked by scarce coordination among donors642. In Afghanistan, this 
seems particularly true, as recently observed by the ICG643. According 
to Zalmay Khalilzad, US representative to the UN, ‘As things stand, 
more than 30 national embassies and bilateral development agencies, 
several United Nations agencies, four development banks and 
international financial institutions, and about 2,000 nongovernmental 
organizations and contractors are involved in rebuilding in [the 
country]’644. Coordinating this plethora of international actors (often 
pursuing different and competing interests) with national agencies, 
aiming at securing the local ownership of reforms, is naturally an 
uneasy job. With the recent adoption of the UN Security Council 
                                                           
 
 
641  UNAMA, Afghan Justice Sector Overview (Kabul: UNAMA-RoL Unit, June 
2006), p. 2, on file with the IJPO. 
642  R. Thiele, P. Nunnenkamp, and A. Dreher, ‘Do Donors Target Aid in Line 
with the Millennium Development Goals? A Sector Perspective of Aid 
Allocation’, 143 Review of World Economics 2007, 596-630, at 614. See also gen. 
R. Mascarenhas and T. Sandler, ‘Do Donors Cooperatively Fund Foreign 
Aid?’, 1 Review of International Organizations 2006, 337-357. 
643 International Crisis Group, Afghanistan: The Need for International Resolve, p. 
12. 
644  Z. Khalilzad, ‘Afghanistan's New Deal’, New York Times, 20 March 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/20/opinion/20khalilzad.html?scp=6>s
q=>st=nyt. 
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resolution No. 1806, an expanded coordinating role has been conferred 
to UNAMA, notwithstanding the current scarcity of personnel and 
capacities, especially within its Rule of Law Unit. This principle was 
further remarked at the Paris Conference of July 2008645. Undeniably, 
the lack of coordination does not spare the justice sector, as was 
extensively reported during the Rome Conference646. However, apart 
from that, other factors indicate that the Afghan ownership in justice 
reform is yet to be met and that we are probably experimenting a 
mixed regime, in which external players still influence de facto the 
decision-making process. 
Examples of this trend can be found at both the policy-making 
and the operational level. Basically, however, the local ownership of 
reforms is seriously put at risk first of all by the country’s economic and 
financial dependence on external aid, as well as by the way funds are 
disbursed. International assistance represents around 90 percent of all 
public expenditure, while some two-thirds of aid bypasses the Afghan 
government, being spent bilaterally by donors647. As for the reform of 
justice, apparently, this trend will not cease in the future. This may be 
proven by a comparison between the limited funds that will be 
channelled multilaterally (i.e., through the ARTF Justice Project, which 
will initially cost only US $ 27.75 million) and the incredible number of 
projects to be implemented bilaterally in the near future, as reported in 
the NJP – Part Four. The dependency is even amplified by the donors’ 
                                                           
 
 
645  Declaration of the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan, Paris, 
12 June 2008, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/enghlish.pdf.  
646  M.C. Bassiouni and D. Rothenberg, An Assessment of Justice Sector and Rule of 
Law Reform in Afghanistan and the Need for a Comprehensive Plan, Paper 
presented at the Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, Rome, 2 July 
2007, p. 10, 
http://www.rolafghanistan.esteri.it/ConferenceRol/Menu/Ambasciata/Gl
i_uffici/ 
647  See M. Waldman, Falling Short: Aid effectiveness in Afghanistan (Kabul: 
ACBAR, March 2008), 
http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effecti
veness%20(25%20Mar%2008).pdf. 
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practice of disbursing less money than initially pledged. For instance, at 
the Rome Conference donors agreed to offer US $ 360 million for justice 
reform. However, countries included in their pledges, money that had 
been previously promised but not disbursed yet. As a consequence, the 
total amount of contributions was broadly over quoted, resulting in 
only $ 98 million of ‘fresh cash’648. 
At the strategic level, the application of the local ownership 
principle in reshaping the new sector’s policy-making structure has 
been, at best, partial. With regard to the NJP, the document was 
initially drafted by a dedicated working group, whose participants 
were almost completely international, except for a representative of the 
ANDS Secretariat. While the first part of the NJP was entirely drafted 
by the dedicated working team, the second one was finalized with 
major contributions from a representative of a foreign Embassy. The 
third part was instead drawn up by the World Bank, and then 
amended after requests made by donors. The fourth part was prepared 
by UNAMA, with relevant inputs coming from contributing states. 
UNAMA also set up the matrix of current reconstruction activities, 
contained in the first annex to the document. Conversely, the sole 
Afghan stakeholder involved in the drafting process, i.e., the ANDS 
Secretariat, only prepared the second annex to the document, including 
priorities identified through consultations at provincial level. 
The lack of inputs by local actors in the drafting process may be 
due to a number of reasons. They may probably include the limited 
capacity of local personnel to contribute to such a complex document, 
which requires specific skills, and also the determination of 
international actors to complete the draft NJP as quickly as possible. 
However, this can also stem from the poor interest of the Afghan 
authorities themselves. Indeed, so far the latter have appeared reluctant 
to be absorbed in difficult tasks like that of preparing a complicated 
                                                           
 
 
648  Canada alone pledged US $ 30 million. Other commitments included the 
United States (US $ 15 million), and Italy (US $ 13.6 million). In fact the NJP 
reports new funding pledges for only US $ 60 million (p. 13) – which is 
approximately the sum of such commitments. 
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development aid framework for the sector, and more inclined to use 
their powers after the completion of the initial drafting process. At that 
stage, they can successfully bargain their ‘institutional weight’ with 
that of other external actors, in order to obtain a major role within the 
designed policy-making structure. The lengthy adoption of the NJP is a 
clear example of this way of acting. 
The NJSS approval process may be regarded as another example 
of such a trend. The document’s framework was initially conceived 
during the Summer of 2007 by a UNDP officer seconded to the ANDS 
Secretariat. The draft paper was then completely reviewed in 
September 2007 by a dedicated working group (whose members were, 
once again, all but one international) and sent to both ANDS Secretariat 
and donors. The latter made various comments which were further 
included in the draft by the same working group. At that point the 
document was translated in Dari (by JSSP and another international 
organization) and re-submitted to the ANDS Secretariat in order to be 
circulated among the Supreme Court, the AGO and the MoJ. Following 
on from that, a number of discussion tables among international and 
national stakeholders took place at the ANDS Secretariat. In the end, 
other modifications were included in the document, as required by 
Afghan justice institutions. The final draft was then sent again to the 
ANDS Secretariat, which made a few formal amendments and finally 
published it in a restricted area of its website, in order to circulate it 
before its official adoption. 
At the operational level the ‘mixed ownership regime’ of reforms 
seems even more apparent. As reported above, membership and 
powers of TWGs, sub-WGs and committees established within the RoL 
WG are based on terms of reference agreed by the MoJ. This would 
formally preserve the authority of state institutions, though it remains 
to be seen how effectively such authority is exercised. Among the 
TWGs, those within the Law Reform TWG are probably the fora in 
which the local ownership principle is better implemented. Although 
their meetings are normally held at international offices and the 
Government’s chairmanship is not always granted (e.g. the Criminal 
Law Committee is chaired jointly by UNODC and JSSP), the weight of 
Afghan members differs from group to group. Generally, their 
influence varies with the ability of international experts to involve the 
local counterparts in the works. The final aim should be that of creating 
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a common will towards the adoption of laws and regulations which 
comply with international norms and standards but that also respect 
local legal traditions. This is possible only if Afghan members 
understand their significance, and above all, their usefulness. As 
previously seen, in order to make this happen, international 
representatives should concentrate on the effective ‘demand for justice’ 
of local actors – more than on their political priorities – while drafting 
or amending laws and regulations. 
Conversely, it may be noted that TWGs are strictly consultative 
bodies. The last decision over the adoption of laws or policies remains 
in the hands of Afghan institutions, and sometimes, as in the case of 
some articles contained in the forthcoming Police Law, local authorities 
are unwilling to accept amendments suggested by international 
experts649. Obviously, all this negotiation process delays the approval of 
new norms. Nevertheless, it is essential in order to create the 
preconditions for such norms to be effectively abided by people, once 
they come into force. However, this open procedure does not prevent 
external actors from putting some pressure on the adoption of specific 
laws, by requesting amendments to the annual legislative plan or 
rather by organizing a seminar abroad (held in Siracusa – Italy – at the 
end of April 2008) in order to attempt inserting provisions taken from 
the UN-backed Model Criminal Procedure Code to the upcoming new 
Afghan criminal procedure code. 
Besides, de facto influence of international actors over justice 
sector reform may be powerful at any rate. It can take the form of legal 
advisors or ‘mentors’ seconded to justice institutions, as done by the 
EU/EC missions and by several US contractors, as well as recently 
advocated by UNAMA. International consultants cover positions at all 
levels, including personal advisors to the top-level authorities in the 
justice sector. Sometimes, influence is exercised by the creation of 
                                                           
 
 
649  The most controversial issue is the time-limit for pre-charge detention 
(police arrest), which Afghan authorities want to extend up to 10 days, as it 
was provided in the old 1979 ‘Law on the Discovery and Investigation of 
Crimes’. 
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privileged relationships between such authorities and international 
representatives, as was the case, for example, with the business lunches 
organized on a regular basis between representatives of two 
international agencies and the former Attorney General until his 
sacking in July 2008. Occasionally, international actors operate as 
guarantors, by playing the role of a confidence-building promoter 
among Afghan institutions. The mixed Ministry of Interior – Attorney 
General’s Office Commission (MoI-AGO Commission), born in October 
2007 to facilitate the establishment of good relationships between the 
two institutions, is being held under the auspices of representatives of 
the US (through its contractor JSSP), Germany, Italy (both through their 
development cooperation agencies) and the EU Police Mission. 
On the whole, contrary to appearances, the mixed regime which 
characterizes the decision-making process within justice sector reform 
in Afghanistan may be considered as an evolution. It is far from the 
‘bilateralization of aid assistance’ registered at the beginning of the 
international intervention and it has the merit of being open to a wider 
number of stakeholders. In addition, it grants a major role for the 
Afghan government authorities. How genuinely the system is oriented 
towards the achievement of the full Afghan ownership will be revealed 
when the real intentions of donors will be unveiled. This will happen 
when they will be asked to support principally pooled financing 
mechanisms for the justice area, and to reduce bilateral projects, as also 
requested by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, 
Kay Eide650. Indeed, the path from the ‘lead nation approach’ to the 
local ownership of reforms may be described with the loosing of 
political interests by single contributing nations and the birth of a real 
common political end-state, being that of truly establishing a 
functioning sovereign nation. In this respect, the growing lack of 
confidence among all the stakeholders, as testified e.g. by the huge 
                                                           
 
 
650  Quoted in J. Hemming, ‘U.N. says donors should back Afghan aid plan’, 
International Herald Tribune, 22 May 2008, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/05/22/asia/OUKWD-UK-
AFGHAN-AID.php. 
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number of US bilateral projects listed into the NJP, is the most serious 
danger that threatens the success of future reforms. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
 
 
It's not just the lack of security that poses a 
problem but the challenge of figuring out 
what actually works on the ground651 
I can't say where all the money is going!652 
 
In Chapter  One and Two I have offered some brief opening remarks 
about the dissertation and introduced the contents of the subsequent 
chapters. Furthermore, I have discussed some methodological aspects 
of this thesis, in an attempt to specify the reasons that led me to choose 
the reform of the Afghan justice system as the topic of my Ph.D. 
research. The title of this thesis is the combination of two Latin sayings: 
‘the weak (minor) capitulates before the strong (major)’ and ‘where 
there is society, there is law’. ‘Ubi Maior, Ibi Ius’ basically sounds like 
‘only the mighty make the law’. This sentence evokes the fundamental 
and still unresolved issue which stands at the basis of the general 
theory of law, namely the conception of law in the struggle between its 
sociological and autocratic origin. In state-building interventions, when 
the reconstruction process also deals with justice system’s restoration, 
                                                           
 
 
651  Stephen Wallace, vice-president of the CIDA Afghanistan Task Force, 
quoted in S. Levitz, ‘Canada learning hard lessons in aid to Afghanistan: 
senior aid official’, Canadian Press, 3 March 2008, 
http://www.630ched.com/News/National/article.aspx?id=3382.  
652  Ele Pawelski, former Chief of Party for the IDLO-CIDA project, commenting 
the legal training activities financed by CIDA and implemented by IDLO 
(quoted in S. Levitz, ‘Detainees captured by Canadians see better prisons, 
but may never see justice’, Canadian Press, 2 March 2008, 
http://www.630ched.com/News/World/article.aspx?id=3125). 
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this dualistic conception resurfaces and requires state-builders to refer 
to it when establishing a model of conduct for legal and judicial 
reforms. In this respect, justice system reform in Afghanistan clearly 
shows that a mere top-down, externally-directed transfer of legal 
knowledge is doomed to fail. 
While specifying the motives for this research, I have affirmed 
that the latter issue is one of the main points of interest of this thesis. 
Other reasons include, inter alia: the major change in the concept of 
humanitarian action which took place during the state-building 
intervention in Afghanistan, the profound ideological basis of such 
intervention, the magnitude of the commitment undertaken by the 
international community, and the challenge of transplanting Western-
oriented legal and administrative models into an Islamic, war-torn, 
atomized society – traditionally refractory to any political and 
institutional change. I have chosen to investigate the reform of justice 
because of my educational background and because law is typically a 
product of local society. Law characterizes the society which it applies 
to, and vice versa. Modifying the Afghan law and court system and 
making it acceptable for the local population means, to some extent, 
inducing profound changes in the Afghan society. Rectius, the 
acceptance of a large-scale justice reform entails that society is already 
changed. This is the reason why success in justice system reform in 
Afghanistan may be also ‘a matter of approach’. 
In Chapter Three, I have attempted to illustrate the major changes that 
occurred after the September 11 attacks in IFIs development aid 
policies. To this aim, I have drawn a broad picture of strategies and 
frameworks used at international level to support the development of 
countries recovering from conflict. I have also explained the rising of 
the ‘local ownership’ principle in the dedicated literature and how such 
theory is put into practice through the ‘consultative group formula’. 
First, I have briefly traced the evolution of the approach to 
institutional changes in war-torn countries since the nineties. In 
particular, I have focused on the a vast consensus, which emerged 
among key international actors in the wake of 9/11, around the concept 
of ‘aid-induced pacification’. According to the latter, stabilization may 
only be achieved by an effective development aid. I have further 
argued that the growing concerns over the failure of the state-building 
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intervention in Afghanistan are now leading to a change of approach, 
whose outcome is still open to debate. Subsequently, I have described 
policies and guidelines issued by international financial and 
development institutions for countries emerging from conflict. This 
preliminary study has been indispensable for the subsequent analysis 
of the Afghan justice system development, since the policy-making 
framework which governs institutional reforms in Afghanistan is set 
up according to those policies and guidelines. However, I have also 
underlined that this pattern of combining traditional humanitarian 
assistance and IFIs development policies relies on the expected 
continuum between emergency and development, which is often 
missed in state-building operations. In another paragraph, I have 
highlighted the importance of respecting the local ownership of 
reconstruction activities, even though this principle is frequently 
invoked more in word than in deed, as a kind of saving clause which 
donors may appeal to in case of failure. I have then considered the 
application of the local ownership principle through the establishment 
of a policy-making structure composed of ‘consultative groups’, 
participated jointly by national and international stakeholders. This 
decision model is provided in IFIs manuals and guidelines.  
In Chapter Four, I have given a brief overview of state-building 
theories and methods, as applied to justice system reform in post-
conflict scenarios. In the first two paragraphs I have considered the 
need for balance between imposed and consensual solutions. In 
addition, I have remarked that the domestic political order should be 
settled before providing to legal or judicial reforms. In the third section 
I have illustrated the reasons for choosing a model of reform based on 
local consensus and how to successfully rely on it. This entails 
considering the real ‘demand for justice’. I have then added a few notes 
on the attempts made to establish a ‘transitional justice’ phase in 
Afghanistan. Ultimately, I have analyzed some common characteristics 
of state-building operations, in which international authorities play a 
role in the reform of local systems of justice. 
More in detail, I have specified that justice system reforms in 
post-conflict state-building interventions may take place under a 
variety of implementing strategies, influenced either by a ‘dirigiste’ 
(i.e., neo-colonialist) or a consent-based approach. I have stressed that 
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the success of reforms depend in turn on the consensus received by the 
local population. As concerns justice reform, this means attempting to 
respond to the ‘demand for justice’ of the Afghan people. This also 
implies drawing-up a ‘social compact’ between national and 
international stakeholders, including the ‘legal empowerment’ of a 
growing part of the population. Such an inclusive strategy could lead 
to postponing the full application of the rule of law principles, in case 
of need. In this respect, I have argued that, in order to generate a 
relatively strong popular demand for legal and judicial services, justice 
system reform has to adapt to the local conditions or contain principles 
already familiar to the local population. On the contrary, if new laws 
and institutions were merely imposed, the initial demand for their use 
would probably be weak, conditioning the success of reforms. Local 
‘demand for justice’ may imply adopting transitional justice 
mechanisms. In this regard, I have first briefly explored the issue of 
transitional justice in countries recovering from conflict and then 
extended the analysis to Afghanistan. I have then concluded that this 
phase has not been established yet in Afghanistan, notwithstanding the 
adoption of a dedicated ‘action plan’, which was launched in 2006 by 
the Afghan government, but never truly implemented. This is mostly 
due to the fact that prosecution and vetting procedures could possibly 
involve former Northern Alliance commanders, putting at risk the 
balance between political factions which sustains the existing political 
order. This is the main reason why transitional justice vests a limited 
significance within the whole justice system reform. With regard to the 
features that are common to the majority of post-conflict state-building 
operations dealing with justice system reform, I have listed a number of 
characteristics and made a comparison with the current situation in 
Afghanistan. Common features include: 
(i)   high level of destruction of infrastructure and judicial records; 
(ii)  strong interference of local executive authorities in the 
administration of justice; 
(iii)  law in force not consistent with human rights law and/or its 
validity contested by the population; 
(iv)  the existence of a parallel/unofficial justice system; 
(v)   limited human and material resources. 
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In Chapter Five, I have described the development of the Afghan 
justice system before the 2001 military intervention. In the first 
paragraph I have briefly examined the most relevant principles of 
Islamic law, which are of interest for this study. In the subsequent 
sections I have focused on the influence of Islamic law over the Afghan 
justice system in the ‘pre-American era’, starting from the reforms 
undertaken in the twenties. The analysis has comprised the study of the 
legal and judicial reforms carried out during the Taliban regime. In a 
short introductory section I have emphasized the influence of sharia 
and the pashtunwali (the code of conduct of Pashtun tribes) over the 
‘formal’ justice system. Traditionally, statutory law is expected to be in 
harmony with sharia and to supplement it, while both are supposed to 
overlay tribal codes or customs. The confrontation between formal and 
informal justice systems mirrors the historical clash between urban 
elites and the rural population and elite. Understanding this conflicting 
relationship between centre and periphery is fundamental in the 
implementation of current reforms. On the other hand, Islamic law has 
always strongly influenced the Afghan justice system. Islamic 
jurisprudence and principles have constantly represented a law source 
in many areas of law, such as criminal, family and contract law. In 
addition, they have been often granted constitutional value in the nine 
constitutional charters adopted (or even just drafted) during the 70 
years going from 1923 to 1992. 
In the subsequent paragraphs I have illustrated the evolution of 
the Afghan court and legal system from the sixties to the beginning of 
the state-building intervention in late 2001. This study shows that the 
new organization of courts adopted after the US-led invasion and the 
subdivision of roles and powers within the justice system, resemble 
those set up during the past forty years. Jurisdiction and authority of 
the three ‘justice institutions’, namely the Supreme Court, the Attorney 
General’s Office and the Ministry of Justice, on the whole, have 
remained unchanged. The history of the Afghan justice system shows 
that, notwithstanding the launch of several law reforms in the sixties 
and seventies, and the adoption of the main substantive and procedural 
codes, laws have never been easily accessible. As a result, many judges 
and prosecutors only had a basic knowledge of their contents, or 
otherwise were often reluctant to apply them. The first compilation of 
all the Afghan laws and regulations passed since 1963 was only drawn 
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up in 2002 by IDLO. I have further pointed out that the justice system 
has never been seen as fair and impartial by the local population, who 
have always perceived it as a tool for the ‘centre’, to impose its 
authority over the most volatile provinces. This perception was even 
amplified during the communist regime, fuelling the rebellion. In view 
of that, I have concluded that in 2001 the international community was 
not required to restore the justice system in place, but to build it up for 
the first time. 
In Chapter Six, I have analysed the Afghan justice system currently in 
force. I have shown how the latter has been slightly modified following 
the institutional reforms – culminated with the new 2004 Constitution – 
the reorganization of the judicial administration, and the enactment of 
new basic substantive and procedural laws. In order to highlight the 
evolution that occurred in the reconstruction activities since 2001, 
justice system reform has been divided in two phases. The first phase is 
described in the sixth chapter. It goes from the beginning of the 
international intervention to the opening of the London Conference on 
Afghanistan, held in January 2006. This phase of reforms was 
implemented under the so-called ‘lead nation approach’, under which 
five G8 nations assumed the role of leading security sector reform, each 
one within a single sub-sector of responsibility. In this respect, I have 
addressed the role of Italy, being the ‘lead nation’ in the reform of 
justice. In a further paragraph I have examined the development of 
training and capacity-building activities, as well as the reconstruction 
of the crumbling judicial infrastructure. In this chapter I have also 
analyzed the main issues raised by the adoption of the 2004 
Constitution and the establishment of a new court system. The latter 
has been assessed in the last paragraph, which reports the number of 
judges, prosecutors, defence attorneys and functioning courts, as well 
as data on the qualification of judicial and administrative personnel. 
The picture emerging from available data is not encouraging. 
Specifically, I have emphasized the compromise made in the 
initiatives undertaken to spread the rule of law through the country. 
Furthermore, I have considered the most visible externally-generated 
inputs introduced into the domestic legal system (namely a number of 
new laws and codes), and discussed some key points that emerged 
during the analysis. It should be observed that the Afghan legal system 
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still admits norms derived from Islamic jurisprudence which can be 
easily considered in breach of a number of human rights conventions 
and the 2004 Afghan Constitution. This clear contradiction is the result 
of two complementary efforts: strengthening domestic institutional 
capacity through the introduction of legal norms respectful of human 
rights, and the need to restore legitimacy to the central authorities by 
respecting Afghan rural and Islamic traditions and conventions. 
Therefore, relevant Afghan and international actors have agreed to 
postpone the most incisive reforms in order to maintain the existing 
balance of powers between political and judicial elites. Indeed, the 
Constitution itself encompasses some articles that apparently contradict 
each other when they refer to the coexistence of Islamic and human 
rights law. 
Chapter Six is also the first chapter which is principally 
analytical rather than descriptive. Indeed, it ends with a preliminary 
assessment of justice reform in Afghanistan during the first phase of 
reconstruction. This preliminary evaluation precedes the comments 
raised in the subsequent chapter and in the general conclusions. In the 
sixth chapter I have argued that a number of problems have inevitably 
undermined the success of reform projects undertaken under this 
donor-recipient bilateral scheme. On the whole, this ‘lead nation 
approach’ has generated a donor-oriented system, with broad 
bilateralization of planning and programming. It has been 
characterized by the absence of a unique development concept, lack of 
coordination, and disparity in the level of committed resources. Indeed, 
during this initial phase of reconstruction activities, the lack of a clear 
national plan or even a background policy among the different 
international players is rather evident. On the other hand, the absence 
of systematic coordination among donors has led to establishment of a 
plethora of overlapping and sometimes ill-assorted projects, each 
advancing independently. In addition, I have pointed out that the 
limited impact on the ground of these reform projects has not only 
stemmed from the lack of coordination among donors. The problem is 
more profound and probably concerns the lack of a credible political 
leadership among external actors. In this regard, I have highlighted that 
donors have missed their initial target, being that of implementing 
justice reform by influencing the political will of Afghan authorities 
through direct financial and technical support. In fact, domestic 
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institutional and policy changes, as well as improvements in the 
technical capacity of local authorities, have been extremely limited. As 
a consequence, I have argued that the substantial failure of assistance 
provided under the ‘lead nation’ approach is probably due to the 
limited powers, the financial capacities and the expertise of the selected 
‘lead nation’. However, I have also wondered whether Italy has ever 
really exercised this leadership over the sector, given the vast amount 
of technical and financial aid provided by the US during the same 
period.  
In Chapter Seven, I have discussed the second phase of justice sector 
reform, going from the London Conference to date. This phase has been 
characterized by a change of course in the overall approach to 
reconstruction activities. The new development aid strategy has 
included a wider participation of the Afghan authorities to the reform 
process, especially on the decisional plane. In this respect, I have 
described the implementation of the local ownership principle at both 
the operational and the strategic level. I have also attempted to give a 
practitioner's view of the ongoing activities, on the basis of my service 
for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome and Kabul. I have 
shown that, basically, the local ownership principle has been put in 
practice by reshaping comprehensively the whole decisional 
framework which regulates the reform process. In particular, aid 
architecture has been aligned with the templates included in policies 
and guidelines set by major international financial institutions for 
countries emerging from conflicts. In addition, Afghan authorities have 
been granted the presidency of all the consultative bodies established 
to support the Executive in formulating sector policies. Eventually, this 
local ownership consolidating process has led to the adoption of a 
sector development strategy (National Justice Sector Strategy) by the 
Afghan government, to be implemented through a National Justice 
Programme. The NJP is based on two major funding options, being a 
pooled financing mechanism, namely the ARTF Justice Project, and the 
‘classic’ bilateral assistance, experimented so far. The ARTF Justice 
Project is run jointly by Afghan justice institutions funded through the 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which is in turn participated 
by a number of contributing countries and administered by the World 
Bank. I have underlined that the ARTF Justice Project may be 
considered as the product of real change of approach towards the 
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Afghan ownership of justice system reform. However, the use of 
multilateral funding mechanisms, managed by local authorities, is only 
at the beginning and the difference with the total amount of financial 
and technical assistance provided bilaterally is still profound. 
On the other hand, the study of this second phase of reform 
activities is not limited to the main policy-making bodies and their 
powers, but extends to several other issues. The latter include the end 
of the political process initiated at the Bonn Conference in 2001 and the 
status of the Afghan justice system, which is assessed by presenting 
new and updated data. In the seventh chapter I have also addressed the 
most recent reconstruction programmes, focusing on the growing US 
and military role in justice sector reform. I have explained that the US 
contribution to the reform of justice in Afghanistan in terms of both 
technical and financial assistance is unreachable by any other donor. 
Indeed, since 2006, the US political and financial leadership within 
justice sector reform has been rather evident, as shown by the available 
data. I have highlighted that the US assistance to justice sector has 
concerned the totality of the US civilian and military apparatus on the 
ground. Inspired directly by the US, is the establishment of a counter-
narcotics special jurisdiction in Kabul, which comprises special courts, 
prosecutor’s office and police. I have pointed out that this represents 
the most relevant change in the organization of justice that has 
occurred since 2005. Other paragraphs concern the establishment of 
new training programmes and the construction of new judicial 
infrastructure. The latter includes the National Legal Training Centre, 
which is supposed to serve as a joint training centre for all the three 
justice institutions. While tracing the short history of the NLTC, I have 
reported the difficulties faced by the Centre – with the Supreme Court 
and the AGO trying to obtain their own training centres – and the 
teaching activities which are now in a deadlock. 
In the conclusive paragraph, I have argued that the invasive 
participation of international actors within justice sector reform, at both 
the decisional and operational level, practically impedes the 
implementation of the local ownership principle, which basically 
remains only on paper. I have concluded that at present the system is 
characterized by a ‘mixed ownership’ regime, split between 
international and national stakeholders. Such fragmented regime is 
mostly generated by the inability of international actors to involve the 
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local counterparts into a mutually-shared process of reforms. Other 
reasons may include the lack of an authentic common vision among 
donors over the final end-state of justice reform, the confusion of roles 
between international and local players, the gap of capacity and 
expertise in the Afghan justice administration and the consequent 
mutual lack of trust between donors and local authorities, the necessity 
of international actors to achieve quick results from their ‘investments’ 
within the justice sector, and, last but not least, the overall top-down 
approach to the development of justice system, which donors have 
never truly abandoned.  
A few additional comments may be raised from the study as general 
conclusions.  
First, justice sector reform in Afghanistan is de facto still 
influenced by external players, who generate strong inefficiencies in the 
decision-making process. Notwithstanding donors officially declare 
their willingness to provide assistance through a true multilateral 
programme (i.e., the ARTF Justice Project), they still channel their 
financial and technical aid almost entirely through bilateral projects, 
putting the Afghan ownership of reforms at risk. The lack of local 
ownership in turn has jeopardized the success of reforms. Bilateral, 
neo-colonialist, top-down assistance in the reform of justice may 
succeed only when the recipient state is small enough for the financial 
capacity of the donor, willing enough to receive assistance (for example 
in the case the recipient state is defeated and order on the ground is 
effectively imposed manu militari), and the lack of capacity and 
technical expertise among local authorities is quickly filled. Conversely, 
multilateral programmes, implemented through pooled financing 
mechanisms have the merit of truly attempting to improve local 
technical and institutional capacities. First, they are run by the 
government of the recipient state, which thus becomes accountable to 
both donors and citizens. Secondly, state sovereignty is effectively 
respected and even reinforced, as it should be during a real state-
building process. On the contrary, bilateral assistance only strengthen 
dependency from foreign aid and does not really stimulate the 
improvement of capacity and expertise among local authorities. The 
practice of state-building operations proves that bilateral assistance is 
mostly ineffective and often ends up in a waste of money. In 
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Afghanistan, this ‘project-centred approach’, employed by many 
international actors, has promoted quick results at the costs of 
sustainability and international standards. Unsurprisingly, this 
approach has also generated a severe lack of accountability among aid 
organizations on the way they provide financial and technical 
assistance to the Afghan institutions. 
Indeed, the scarce reaction by donors to the failures that 
occurred so far in the justice sector reform raises doubts on whether aid 
programmes and projects implemented to date are truly aimed at 
improving the Afghan justice sector or are instead intended to achieve 
results at another level. In fact, aid could primarily serve the political 
(and economic) interests of donors, rather than the development of the 
Afghan justice system. For a donor country, internally, assistance 
consists in disbursing a large amount of money to several 
governmental and non-governmental organizations to implement aid 
projects abroad. Such organizations are almost always based in the 
donor country which finances the projects. Let’s consider, for example, 
the legal training activities in Afghanistan. The US has involved several 
American contractors whose personnel is mostly composed of ex-
militaries or ex-government officials. Italy has financed IDLO and 
ISISC, both located in Italy, and UNODC, which is led by an Italian 
executive director. Germany has funded the Max Planck Institute, 
based in Heidelberg. Besides, the cost of training activities is usually 
quite high, resulting in good business for the organizers. IDLO, for 
instance, received the staggering figure of US $ 20.34 million (US $ 14  
and 6.34 million from Italy653 and CIDA, respectively) to implement 
training activities. High costs are frequently ascribed to the lack of 
security and the poor living conditions for expatriates, which would 
make the salaries for consultants and managers leaven. In general, in 
                                                           
 
 
653  Reed et al., IDLO Italian-Funded Projects, p. 38. This means that IDLO to date 
has received about 20 percent of the entire Italian aid to the Afghan justice 
reform (which is around US $ 57 million until the beginning of 2007 plus US 
$ 13 pledged at the Rome Conference in 2007). The IDLO evaluation report 
itself admits that «there is a widespread perception that IDLO’s costs are 
high when compared to organizations with similar mandates» (ibid.). 
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Afghanistan, the transaction costs of international assistance seem very 
high. They are reportedly 40 per cent, while for example in Burkina 
Faso they are around 10 per cent654. More in detail, data gathered from 
reliable sources655 confirm that the cost of foreign personnel working for 
consulting firms and contractors ranges from US $ 250,000 to US $ 
500,000 a year, that is, from 200 to 400 times the average annual salary 
of an Afghan civil servant. These figures are rather high even if 
compared with the cost of international personnel deployed in other 
state-building missions and engaged in justice reform656. The cost of 
mentors, advisors, consultants and trainers (namely, the ‘technical 
assistance’) absorbs about 25 percent of all aid to Afghanistan. In 
addition, more than 60 percent of such ‘technical assistance’ is not 
coordinated with the Afghan government, being practically imposed 
from the outside. Unsurprisingly, reports confirm that «much of such 
assistance has been wasteful, donor-driven and of limited impact»657. 
The ANDS itself has been sarcastically called «the world’s most 
                                                           
 
 
654  A. Donini, ‘Local Perceptions of Assistance to Afghanistan’, 14(1) 
International Peacekeeping 2007, 158-172, at 165. However, it is worth saying 
that ‘transaction costs’ is a quite generic formula, mostly including 
administrative costs (like working time of administrative staff), other 
indirect costs (like disbursement delays and lack of state ownership), and 
opportunity costs (trading off resources consumed in the transaction with 
alternative applications). Aid transactions costs are normally shared by 
donors and the recipient country. They practically measure the difficulty in 
establishing and implementing development aid programmes. 
655  If not otherwise specified, information and data mentioned in this chapter 
are gathered from Waldman, Falling Short (cit.), and from ActionAid 
Afghanistan and ELBAG, Gaps  in  Aid  Accountability:  A  Study  of  NSP  
Finances (Kabul: ActionAid Afghanistan, 2007), 
http://www.actionaid.org/assets/pdf/FEB%20ELBAG%20report.pdf. 
656  According to data provided by the RAND Corporation, the costs per person 
per year were approximately US $ 154,195 for Congo, US $ 292,285 for Haiti, 
US $ 163,486 for Liberia, and US $ 122,680 for Sierra Leone, with an average 
cost of US $ 183,162 (Dobbins et al., The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building, p. 
105). 
657  Waldman, Falling Short, p. 2. 
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expensive poverty reduction strategy», as its drafting process cost at 
least US $ 15 million658. 
As concerns the number of advisors to be seconded within the 
local justice administration during a state-building intervention, the 
RAND Corporation recommends deploying one advisor for every 10 
judges, one for every 30 prosecutors, and one for every prison659. 
Although in Afghanistan the number of advisors in the justice sector is 
probably much higher, by using these parameters, the annual cost of 
foreign mentors would be approximately US $ 56 million at best660. 
Naturally this figure does not take into account the dozens of foreign 
mentors seconded to the three justice institutions’ central 
headquarters661, nor the local consultants hired by international 
organizations and contractors. Indeed, thanks to the high salaries, 
international agencies/contractors often employ the best local legal 
advisors. However, this tends to undermine the technical capacity of 
the Afghan justice institutions662. 
                                                           
 
 
658  J. Boone, ‘Afghan failure to meet IMF target casts doubt on debt relief’, 
Financial Times, 2 April 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/94314c9c-0059-
11dd-825a-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1.   
659  Dobbins et al., The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building, p. 102. 
660  Following official data, we have estimated approximately 1100 judges, 2000 
prosecutors, one prison in each province (34 provinces), 10 mentors in the 
Pul-e-Charkhi prison complex. The annual cost of each advisor has been kept 
at minimum (US $ 250.000 per year, as earlier reported). 
661  Just to have an idea of the number of advisors working in the Afghan central 
state institutions, one may consider that reportedly, as of late 2004, 224 
international consultants (including expatriate Afghans hired on 
international contracts) were working within the Ministry of Finance, 
contracted by USAID under a US $ 95.8 million contract (see A. Suhrke, The 
Limits of Statebuilding: The Role of International Assistance in Afghanistan (San 
Diego: International Studies Association Annual Meting, 21-24 March 2006), 
20-21, http://www.svet.lu.se/conference/papers/suhrke.pdf).  
662  This problem is common to every state-building operation. It may be 
considered as a direct consequence of the economic impact of these missions 
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The importance of considering the ‘internal factor’ is amplified 
by the large portion of aid which remains in the hands of implementing 
agencies and the small part that effectively reaches the ultimate Afghan 
subcontractor and/or the local population663. This practice has been 
labelled the ‘salami slicing’ of international aid664, whereby multiple 
cuts of any disbursement are grabbed by foreign agencies and 
managers, rather than delivered to local stakeholders. In Afghanistan, 
over three fourths of assistance bypasses the national budget, being 
spent directly by donors without any reporting to the Afghan 
government665. Indeed, only one-third of donor analytical or assessment 
work over reconstruction projects is conducted jointly with the Afghan 
government666. Donors provide 72 percent of the core budget and about 
90 percent of all the public expenditure. Even when donors decide to 
channel aid funds through multilateral programmes – whose financing 
is accounted into the national development budget, and thus managed 
by the Afghan authorities – the money pledged is never entirely 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
on the local economy. See on the point M. Carnahan, S. Gilmore, and W. 
Durch, ‘New Data on the Economic Impact of UN Peacekeeping’, 14(3) 
International Peacekeeping 2007, 384-402, at 394. 
663  A 2005 report by ActionAid confirms that for example, the bulk of funds for 
development aid spent by France (89 percent) and the US (86 percent) is 
‘phantom aid’, returning to the donor in form of corporate profits and 
consultant salaries (see ActionAid International, Real Aid: An Agenda For 
Making Aid Work (Johannesburg: ActionAid, 1 June 2005), 30, 
http://www.actionaid.org/docs/real_aid.pdf). See also on Afghanistan: B. 
Upadhyay, ‘US aid “failing to reach target”’, BBC News, 16 May 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7405434.stm.  
664  See R. Weitz, ‘Afghanistan: Rethinking Reconstruction’, Eurasia, 23 
September 2008, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092308.shtml  
665  Whilst some donor agencies, such as the UK Department for International 
Development (DIFD), channel up to 80 percent of funds through the Afghan 
national budget, USAID spends the core of its funds in external budget. 
666  Reportedly, among the most virtuous donors are Canada and the WB, 
which, for example, in 2005 conducted over 60 percent of analytical work 
jointly with the Afghan government. 
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disbursed667. Up until March 2008, of the US $ 25 billion of aid pledged 
by donors, only 15 billion had been effectively spent (60 percent)668. In 
addition, at least 40 percent of funds have returned to donor countries 
in corporate profits and consultant salaries. However, contractors and 
sub-contractors’ corporate profits may absorb up to the half of the 
contract value. Moreover, some big contracts in Afghanistan include up 
to five layers of international or Afghan subcontractors, each of which 
usually has a 10-20 percent of profit margin on its contract, although, in 
some cases, the profit margin may reach 50 percent of the contract. In 
addition, occasionally costs may be inflated by the 
contractor/implementing agency669. As we have earlier mentioned, this 
practice of contracting out works and services is rather common, for 
instance, in the construction of judicial infrastructure or in organizing 
legal training activities. Efficiency is reportedly hampered by the scarce 
transparency in procurement and tendering processes and by donor 
bureaucracy. Ultimately, the necessity to achieve quick and visible 
results has led to a ‘centralization’ of aid, which has mostly focused on 
Kabul and other major urban centres. The capital city has also received 
70 percent of the national operation and maintenance budget. 
                                                           
 
 
667  The ActionAid Report takes as an example the National Solidarity 
Programme (NSP), financed through the ARTF similarly to the ARTF Justice 
Project. According to ActionAid, «a total of US $ 111 million was pledged by 
seven donors for NSP for the [2007] to the ARTF. Out of the US $ 111 million 
pledged, the donors had paid-in only US $ 10.64 million (9.6 % of total 
pledge) as of July 22, 2007». 
668  According to ACBAR, with regard to the money pledged for 2002-2008, the 
Asian Development Bank and India have disbursed only a third of their 
commitments, the US only half, the WB just over half, while the EC and 
Germany less than two thirds. 
669  For example, personnel belonging to a US contractor in Afghanistan have 
been recently charged with conspiracy, major fraud and wire fraud by the 
DoJ, for having obtained reimbursement by USAID for inflated expenses 
(DoJ, Four Individuals and Subcontracting Company Charged with Contract Fraud 
Related to the War in Afghanistan and Rebuilding Efforts, Press Release No. 08-
893, 3 October 2008, http://www.usdoj.gov:80/opa/pr/2008/October/08-
crm-893.html).  
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On the external plane, financial and technical assistance always 
has a political return. ‘Investing’ in the aid market in Afghanistan can 
generate good dividends on the international stage and increase the 
influence of donor countries in conditioning local politics. This is 
possible only if assistance is provided in external budget through 
bilateral projects; only if technical and financial dependency of the 
recipient country continues. This is to say that, since the recipient 
country’s internal political order is conditioned by external aid, the 
more the political situation is unstable or led by factions which may 
possibly oppose donors’ interests, the more international actors will 
avoid providing money to the core budget and will strictly use bilateral 
assistance programmes. 
This may explain why it has been decided to establish a 
coordination mechanism of bilateral projects at provincial level – i.e., 
the PJCM – run by international agencies (UNAMA and UNDP) only, 
and out of the Afghan government’s control. In addition, the 
comparison between the PJCM costs and limited coordinating 
functions cast doubt on the real efficiency of such initiative670. 
According to Daniele Canestri, the PJCM is essentially a «self-
referential mechanism». In his view, the PJCM self-referential character 
is systemic, stemming from UNAMA itself. Indeed, he acutely observes 
that UNAMA is a mission mandated to simply coordinate the 
interventions of donors at central level. In this perspective, the PJCM is 
nothing but ‘a small UNAMA’ at provincial level. Therefore, just as 
UNAMA owns neither the power, nor the mandate, to effectively 
improve the conditions of state institutions at central level, the PJCM 
effectiveness at provincial level will probably be limited. In addition, 
remarkably, the PJCM will not operate as a concrete assessment 
mechanism. It will only present reports on the status of justice 
infrastructure and services in the provinces and districts without 
                                                           
 
 
670  The estimated annual cost of the PJCM is between US $ 3,464,640 and US $ 
4,544,640 (UNAMA, Proposed Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism for 
Afghanistan, Paper presented at the Conference on the Rule of Law in 
Afghanistan, Rome, 2 July 2007, p. 8, http://www.rolafghanistan.esteri.it).  
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contributing to a realistic analysis of the situation and to an authentic 
improvement of justice services at local level671. 
The need to obtain good ‘political dividends’ as quickly as 
possible leads to promote high visibility programmes and to 
immediately display their good results, without looking at the 
effectiveness and sustainability of the programmes themselves. This 
ends up generating a profound and diffused lack of accountability at all 
levels. With regard to justice system reform, this would explain why 
donors, in affirming the success of their assistance, often only refer to 
the number of judicial and prison facilities constructed, or the number 
of  judges trained, rather than making a more in depth evaluation of 
results. Independent evaluations of assistance programmes are in fact 
quite rare and generally money are simply given by donors to the 
implementing agencies without providing any further effective 
oversight. A few evaluations are conducted by the implementing 
agencies themselves through ‘independent evaluation units’672. 
However, this process is similar to an internal audit and 
unsurprisingly, it leads to evaluations which are often very positive. In 
the case difficulties arise, failures may be easily blamed on other 
relevant actors, or even on the local authorities/population, by 
invoking the local ownership principle as a saving clause. 
On the contrary, when the evaluation is conducted by the donor 
(as it should regularly be) and accountability mechanisms are more 
clear and transparent, results are often quite different. For example, a 
recent in-depth review of CIDA-funded projects in Afghanistan, made 
by the same Canadian agency, revealed that a number of activities 
(approximately 50 percent of projects) have led to unsatisfactory 
outcomes673. Among the projects which generated poor results, a legal 
                                                           
 
 
671  Interview with Daniele Canestri, Pisa, 5 November 2008. 
672  See, for instance, the evaluation of development projects financed by Italy 
and implemented by IDLO and UNODC. (Reed et al., IDLO Italian-Funded 
Projects (cit.); UNODC, Thematic Evaluation of the Technical Assistance (cit.)). 
673  Data provided by Nipa Banerjee, former CIDA Head of Office for 
Afghanistan, quoted in S. Levitz (Canadian Press), ‘Cup half full, half empty 
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training programme, implemented by IDLO, entitled ‘Strengthening 
Rule of Law in Afghanistan’ stands out674. The latter mirrors a similar 
project of legal training financed by Italy, which used the same assets, 
personnel and methodologies as the ‘Canadian’ one. In fact, the two 
projects have been recently merged by IDLO. However, unlike the 
IDLO-CIDA project, the evaluation of the Italian project is rather 
positive675, possibly because the assessment work has been carried out 
by IDLO itself, through an independent evaluation team, and not by 
the donor. 
Apart from the ‘bilateralization of aid’ and the real intentions of 
donors, the poor success registered so far in the reform of justice in 
Afghanistan may also be ascribed to other factors such as the lack of 
organizational capacity and legal experience among Afghan officials, 
widespread corruption676, poor security conditions and the dearth of 
skilled international consultants to carry out aid programmes. With 
regard to the latter issue, provisional results of a study being carried 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
in Canada’s development work for Afghanistan’, Afghanistan Times, 3 
February 2008, p. 2-3. 
674  Lack of results had been also mentioned in a previous CIDA evaluation 
report: see CIDA, Review of the Afghanistan Program (Ottawa: CIDA 
Evaluation Division, May 2007), 34, http://www.acdi-
cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/Afghanistan/$file/RapportAf
ghanistanSept07-E.pdf. According to the Canadian Press, an IDLO internal 
survey found that, at the end of the training activities, judges would not be 
able to apply the procedural norms learnt during classes, including the basic 
right of access to a defence counsel for the defendant (Levitz, Detainees 
captured by Canadians). 
675  Reed et al., IDLO Italian-Funded Projects, p. 28. However, both the 
evaluations made by IDLO and CIDA, refer to budgetary inefficiencies and 
scarce long-term impact of the legal training projects (see ibid., p. 39 and 47;  
CIDA, Review of the Afghanistan Program, p. 34-36). 
676  For example, the Supreme Court has recently ordered the dismissal and 
arrest of 40 judges on charges of embezzlement and corruption (See Ariana 
TV, ‘Afghan Supreme Court sacks 40 judges on bribery charges’, 2 July 2008, 
in BBC Monitoring – Afghanistan, 4 July 2008). 
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out by Prof. Cynthia Alkon, of the Appalachian School of Law 
(Virginia), reveal that foreign experts working in Afghanistan within 
justice development programmes generally have good professional 
experience in rule of law development, but virtually none of them has 
received any specific training on Afghanistan before being deployed on 
field.  In addition, apparently, only one of the consultants surveyed is 
able to speak any of the local languages677. 
The security issue is naturally another conditioning factor. 
Development programmes implemented outside the main urban 
centres are almost all due to fail. A large number of districts are simply 
not accessible, because they are out of the Government’s control and in 
the hands of armed groups which may possibly belong to the Taliban. 
It is important to note that the deterioration of security not only affects 
international staff, but also has repercussions on local judicial 
personnel and thus on the functioning of justice at all levels. Indeed, 
several murders and kidnappings of judges have occurred in the last 
months, in some cases paralyzing the respective courts678. In general, it 
is the institutional system itself to be still fairly weak. The continuous 
search for a stable political order ends up conditioning the 
establishment of the rule of law. For example, in July 2008 the former 
Attorney General Sabet was immediately dismissed by the President 
Karzai, after he publicly announced his candidature to the next 
presidential elections679. Provisionally, a good result would be that of 
concentrating justice system reform in the major cities and supporting 
traditional ADR in the villages, as suggested by the World Bank in a 
                                                           
 
 
677  Personal correspondence with Prof. Cynthia Alkon, 20 October 2008. 
678  See e.g., Afghan Islamic Press, ‘Gunmen kidnap three judges in Afghan 
east’, 16 July 2008, in BBC Monitoring – Afghanistan, 17 July 2008; Pajhwok, 
‘Kidnappers of Afghan judges demand ransom’, 29 July 2008, in BBC 
Monitoring – Afghanistan, 30 July 2008; Pajhwok, ‘Afghan counter-narcotics 
judge shot dead’, and ‘UK envoy condemns murder of Afghan counter-
narcotics judge’, 4 September 2008, in BBC Monitoring – Afghanistan, 5 
September 2008. 
679 BBC News, Afghan attorney general is sacked, 16 July 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7509463.stm.   
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recent report680. Unfortunately, traditional ADR are not taken into 
account in the NJP, even if realistically their role within justice system 
reform will remain central in the next years. Besides, a good deal of 
realism is fundamental for the success of justice sector reform in 
Afghanistan, as recently underlined by both the IMF and the 
International Development Association (IDA)681. 
Problems affecting sector development are also due to a 
fragmented decisional process, at all levels, that hampers the system’s 
effectiveness. Negotiating in each and every working group or 
consultative body may take time, while the final outcome of 
discussions is in any case uncertain. However, involving both national 
and international stakeholders in a broad debate on the reforms to be 
undertaken is probably the only way to reach a mutually-shared 
reform policy, influenced, but not conditioned, by external inputs. 
Indeed, reforms always impose a balance between Western 
international legal norms, seen as crucial to building institutional 
capacity at both the national and provincial levels, and ensuring 
Afghan ‘ownership’ of the reconstruction process, through respect for 
local expectations in terms of the legitimization and operation of legal 
norms. In this regard, the complex balance of the ‘light footprint’ 
approach to international institutional assistance to post-conflict state-
building makes it particularly important for international actors to 
develop a coherent and common reform strategy for the justice system. 
                                                           
 
 
680  According to the World Bank: «Both judicial reform and infrastructure 
creation should focus on the major cities because that is where the formal 
justice system is most used and most needed. [This report recommends] 
[f]ocus[ing] judicial reform on provincial rather than district courts [and …] 
[s]upporting non-state dispute resolution. Traditional conflict resolution 
mechanisms […] may be all that is available for many years» (World Bank, 
Afghanistan – Building an Effective State: Priorities for Public Administration 
Reform (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 10 June 2008), 82, 
http://www.worldbank.org.  
681  IMF and IDA, Joint Staff Advisory Note on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(Washington D.C.: IMF Country Report No. 08/193, June 2008), 10, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08193.pdf.  
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In principle, such a common approach should be genuinely oriented 
towards strengthening the sector development, and it should 
overshadow the interests of single donors. On the contrary, regrettably, 
the large number of bilateral projects to be implemented in future 
years, as testified by the NJP-Part Four, still highlights a rather patchy 
development policy for the sector. Success could be possible only by 
reducing the bilateral activities and concentrating efforts on real 
multilateral programmes, such as the ARTF Justice Project. Probably, 
short-term results will not be rousing, but still in the medium-term, a 
multilateral approach will produce more robust and stable effects, 
helping the new justice system to take root in the Afghan society and to 
stimulate the internal ‘demand for justice’. In the end, there is nothing 
to loose in attempting to use real multilateral aid mechanisms, since the 
opposite approach, namely the bilateral one, has clearly failed. 
Spreading the new legal and judicial system throughout the 
country will require a long-term commitment by international donors. 
Success will mainly depend upon the political situation and the end of 
war. This research confirms that justice system reform in Afghanistan 
may succeed only if development programmes are implemented 
through a real multilateral approach, involving domestic authorities 
and other relevant local stakeholders682. I therefore recommend: 
                                                           
 
 
682  According to Daniele Canestri, future developments will be linked to: 
improving the trustworthiness and capacity of the Afghan justice 
institutions; opening the higher education system to foreign instances (e.g., 
by inviting visiting professors or expatriate Afghan legal scholars to hold 
courses in local universities); conducting an in-depth survey of the Afghan 
justice system, as those surveys currently available would be not completely 
reliable; extending effectively the government control throughout the 
country; improving the conditions of judicial facilities, as they represent the 
tangible presence of the state on the ground; and increasing the number of 
legal professionals. Mr. Canestri is relatively optimistic about the future. He 
notes that at the end of the NJP in 2013, the general situation of the Afghan 
justice sector will probably be improved, as the system will be composed of 
more and better-educated legal professionals, and judicial infrastructure will 
be in a better condition, meeting the targets included into the ARTF Justice 
Project. In addition, he also observes that the military role in justice sector 
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i)  concentrating financial contributions through pooled financing 
 mechanisms such as the ARTF Justice Project; 
ii)  drastically reducing the number of bilateral activities; 
iii)  expanding and improving the monitoring and evaluation 
activities by donors on implementing agencies and their 
subcontractors in bilateral projects; 
iv)  reducing the number of international personnel; the remaining 
 personnel should be mainly used for monitoring and evaluation 
 activities in multilateral programmes rather than as 
implementers; 
v)  employing much more skilled and experienced international 
 personnel, also providing them with specific pre-deployment 
 training;  
vi)  drastically reducing the legal training activities undertaken on 
 bilateral basis and focusing on improving the capacity of the 
 local higher education system; 
vii)  promoting legal awareness activities at district level; 
viii)  involving traditional ADR in development policies as a part of 
 justice sector reform; this would practically entail adopting 
 specific policies on the matter – as provided in the NJSS – and 
 implementing them through the second and third phase of the 
 NJP; 
ix) and, finally, stopping the implementation of a reform which 
 seems mostly concerned with the short-term interests of donors 
 rather than aimed at shaping a modern and effective justice 
 system. 
 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
reform will probably increase, as a result of the holistic approach to 
reconstruction activities. However, such activities will escape the 
government control as they will not be included into the NJP (Interview 
with Daniele Canestri, Pisa, 5 November 2008). 
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